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Preface
This book contains the proceedings of the 5th European Public Key Infrastruc-
ture Workshop: Theory and Practice, EuroPKI 2008, which was held on the
NTNU campus Gløshaugen in Trondheim, Norway, in June 2008.
The EuroPKI workshop series focuses on all research and practice aspects
of public key infrastructures, services and applications, and welcomes original
research papers and excellent survey contributions from academia, government,
and industry.
Simply put, public keys are easier to distribute than secret keys. Nevertheless,
constructing eﬀective, practical, secure and low cost means for assuring authen-
ticity and validity of public keys used in large-scale networked services remains
both a technological and organizational challenge. In a nutshell, this is the PKI
problem, and the papers presented herein propose new solutions and insight for
these questions.
This volume holds 16 refereed papers including the presentation paper by the
invited speaker P. Landrock. In response to the EuroPKI 2008 call for papers, a
total of 37 paper proposals were received. All submissions underwent a thorough
blind review by at least three PC members, resulting in a careful selection and
revision of the accepted papers. The authors came from 10 countries: Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Spain, and the
USA. The accepted papers were organized into the topical sessions: Invited Talk,
Certiﬁcates, Authentication, Practice, Signatures, Analysis, and Networks.
The use and exploitation of large-scale public key infrastructures have arrived
at a slower tempo and perhaps in other directions than originally envisioned a
decade ago. A case in point, only 2 out of 16 authors in this workshop found it
convenient to provide a digital signature on the copyright transfer form for the
submitted paper. So we are not there yet!
We thank all the people who contributed to this workshop: the authors, the
invited speaker, the members of the Program Committee, the members of the
Organization Committee, the staﬀ at Springer, the sponsors for their support,
and ﬁnally all the workshop participants. They all made this workshop successful.
June 2008 Stig F. Mjølsnes
Sjouke Mauw
Sokratis Katsikas
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New PKI Protocols Using Tamper Resistant Hardware 
Peter Landrock 
Cryptomathic 
Cambridge Science Park 
327 Milton Road  
Cambridge CB4 0WG, UK 
and 
Mathematics Institute, Aarhus University, DK 
Abstract. Keys are indispensable in secure communication, and can only be ade-
quately protected by tamper resistant hardware. Conversely, once you have tam-
per resistant devices available, you may as well try to make the most of them. In 
this exposition, we present three novel ideas for the combination of PKI and ap-
propriate use of tamper resistant devices for other purposes than traditional key 
management. The first is Electronic Negotiable Instruments, such as cash, but 
there are other important examples, such as Bills of Lading and endorsable 
checks. The challenge is to prevent double spending without the use of a central 
registry to keep track of ownership. The second is a new light way digital signa-
ture scheme which seems to work well with tamper resistant hardware, but not in 
software, where it can be broken. We briefly discuss how to make use of this in a 
transparent PKI solution to be employed by vehicles, which appears to be a hot 
research topic. Finally we introduce the concept of a digital signature server with 
central storage of user keys and a central signing facility only, which is operated 
at the full control of the user using a secure channel for proper authentication. The 
first and last scenarios have both been deployed in live systems and have been 
patented, in contrast to the light weight digital signature. 
Keywords: Practical PKI, HSM, Light weight digital signature. 
1   Introduction 
Cryptographic techniques are not just of academic interest, although I have to admit it 
was because of the academic challenge I first got interested. But through my work 
with this field, I gradually developed at least partly from an academic researcher into 
a committed engineer, and this presentation aims to reflect some of the work I have 
been involved in with my engineering hat on. The main motivation has been practical 
challenges rather than existing theoretical research. 
Of course, there is only one way to protect messages transmitted through insecure 
networks in almost any sense of the word “protect”: By the use of cryptographic 
and/or error coding techniques. For this we need various algorithms, mechanisms and 
protocols, and common to all of them are that we need some secret parameters as 
well, typically called keys. 
2 P. Landrock 
Fine, so we need to protect the secrets adequately. This can be done either by in-
troducing procedures, e.g. by using key custodians to key in components of a key, or 
better, by using tamper resistant hardware, or a mixture of both. And once we have 
tamper resistant hardware for the protection of keys, it would be even better to build 
solutions where the key would actually never leave the protected environment of the 
tamper resistant hardware. 
So, a few steps into the discussion of how to protect messages, it is already clear 
that without tamper resistant hardware, it would be a challenge except for the odd user 
with a trusted, isolated environment. But, if we need tamper resistant hardware any-
way, why not try to make the most of it? 
The purpose of this discussion is to focus on other aspects of the use of tamper re-
sistant hardware than the obvious one, key management. What more can be achieved 
using these tamper resistant HSMs, Hardware Security Modules, as they are called? 
As the space is limited, we have decided to concentrate on three different scenarios, 
which are all PKI solutions, but where tamper resistant hardware allows for the intro-
duction of novel approaches to address a practical challenge. 
In security there is always a cost factor to take into account. We could just drizzle 
HSM’s all over, building very secure, but at the same time prohibitively expensive 
solutions. Thus we want to include as few HSM’s as we really need – but not fewer 
than that! 
2   A Bit of History 
As far as I am aware, IBM was the first company to realize and commercially exploit 
the importance of HSM’s for other purposes than key management. When IBM intro-
duced PKI into their Common Cryptographic Architecture in the early 90’ies, they 
operated with four different classes of public key pairs: Device keys, Signature keys, 
Encryption Keys and Certification Keys. The main reason it did not sell that well as a 
concept was that it was basically for closed groups, where everybody would have 
IBM hardware. The main point here is that it was designed to meet a particular busi-
ness demand. This was also the motivation for Microsoft to design Palladium as well 
as the follow-up, NGSCB, and likewise with the TPM architecture adapted by a num-
ber of hardware vendors, one purpose of which is to introduce device key-pairs for 
proper identification of hardware. See [13] for more details. 
As an illustration a digital signature cannot be forged by malicious software with ac-
cess to data that can be signed unless this software also has access to a particular private 
key. This is contrary to classical protection mechanisms such as a log on a local ma-
chine which in principle may be forged, and this makes a fundamental difference. 
The protection we need here is protection against adversaries with the ability to 
modify vital parts of the software. When we state that a device must be trusted to do 
or not to do something, we mean that we rely on that the software and hardware of the 
device ensures that the device provides the intended behavior and only that. 
We begin with a short description of the background of the three solutions.  
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3   Three Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Electronic Negotiable Instruments 
“Negotiable Instruments” is the standard legal term for object that basically can be 
traded freely such as bank notes, i.e. cash, as the most obvious example. Other exam-
ples include endorable checks and Bills of Lading, which is a document being issued 
when - typically - a ship is loaded with a cargo. The Bill of Lading (B/L) represents 
the cargo, and whilst the ship travels from one continent to the other, the B/L may be 
traded many times over, and is needed to be presented finally to take hold of the 
cargo. (Strictly speaking a B/L is only a quasi-negotiable instrument, but we will 
spare the reader of this subtlety in the present discussion, as this is of legal implica-
tions only.  
 
Challenge: prevent double spending (i.e. trading the same electronic negotiable in-
strument fraudulently several times without the use of a central registry to keep track 
of ownership. 
 
Scenario 2: Light weight PKI in Vehicular Communication 
It is envisaged that in the near future, automobiles will be able to communicate elec-
tronically for the sake of improved safety. It seems inevitable that a number of scenar-
ios will demand some kind of transparent PKI, i.e. a PKI solution where the users are 
devices, in principle beyond the reach of the persons that actually drive the vehicles. 
This in particular implies that these devices must be tamper resistant, which gives a 
number of advantages and challenges. Due to the speed and communication band 
width requirements, traditional PKI based on e.g. RSA and EC seem too complex.  
 
Challenge: Develop new light weight protocols and use tamper resistant modules to 
prevent these from being too weak. 
 
Scenario 3: Mobility in Digital Signature Generation 
Use case: A customer wants to log on from any work station and carry out his transac-
tions in a secure manner. 
 
Challenge: provide a central server which generates digital signatures on behalf of the 
owner of the private key at the entire control of the owner with no possibility for e.g. 
operators to log on as the rightful owner in such a way that e.g. legislation on non-
repudiation can be satisfied. 
4   1st Scenario: Electronic Negotiable Documents 
For the sake of this discussion, en Electronic Negotiable Document (END) is an elec-
tronic version of some Negotiable Instrument, i.e. something that can be traded and 
has a (well-defined) value. As mentioned above, examples include cash of course as 
an obvious example, but another important example as mentioned is Bills of Lading, 
which is what we will focus on here, although we will stick to the term END for the 
electronic version of a B/L. 
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The average value of a Bill of lading is well over US $ 50,000 these days, so there 
is something a stake. When a ship is loaded with a cargo, the shipper issues a Bill of 
Lading (B/L). It could be a B/L for each container, or it could just be one on 5 million 
tons of oil. This B/L may then be traded (e.g. 20 times over) whilst the ship aims for 
its destination on another continent. The B/L must be presented by the owner to take 
possession over the cargo.  
In 1995, we built a large pilot for electronic B/Ls in the BOLERO project, spon-
sored by the European Commission. This was later commercialized by SWIFT and 
others (see [2]). One of the challenges is obviously to provide a solution which 
doesn’t allow an owner of a an END to sell the versy same END to different buyers. 
The solution for preventing double-spending in BOLERO was to have a central regis-
try, which at all time keeps track of the current ownership of a particular B/L. 
In particular this requires an online registry, which basically is aware of all trading 
of all B/Ls, and perhaps not always that attractive from a business point of view, as 
that register becomes very powerful. A more attractive solution would be to give each 
trader a tamper resistant B/L Token, with an appropriate functionality, which prevents 
double spending, and then allow trade to move on as it used to do in the past. Let us 
briefly sketch how this could be - and has been - achieved. This was first described in 
[5], which was never published in some proper form. 
4.1   The Basic Idea 
The basic property any electronic negotiable document (END) must have is that of 
uniqueness: By this we do not mean that the document as such cannot be copied. If 
this were so, it could not be exchanged through an unprotected network. Rather it 
means that nobody, but the (rightful) owner, is able to make any use of the document. 
The only other way to provide uniqueness is to physically prohibit free copying. 
This would involve tamper resistance to realize a protected communication with re-
stricted functionality, if possible. 
We thought long and hard for alternative solutions, but in the end the only solution 
that seemed to work to achieve uniqueness here was quite simple: A message encrypted 
under a key known to only one entity is indeed unique, as long as it is encrypted, and 
establishes indisputable ownership by the mere fact that it will only be useful to (the 
tamper resistant device of) the owner of the key!  Only the person in possession of the 
right key can make any use of the document, which in effect is the property of unique-
ness. Only problem: You can’t really make use of it as long as it remains encrypted! 
The only way the rightful owner can verify that the right END has been encrypted 
by his key is by decrypting it. But this will give him access to the message and he 
might then subsequently be able to “sell” it to two different persons by encrypting it 
simultaneously with their respective keys. Hence this must be prevented. This re-
quires tamper resistant hardware, perhaps a chipcard, or a hardware protected PC. In 
the following this hardware will be called the B/L Token. 
The functionality we require here from the B/L Token is that once the owner has 
agreed to sell a particular B/L to another registered user, they both have to enter a 
protocol which allows the B/L to be exported from his B/L Token to the B/L Token of 
the buyer, but he cannot subsequently export it again, except if at a later point in time 
he has imported it as it has been repurchased. 
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An END is generated electronically, for instance by using non-repudiation of ori-
gin, in a B/L Token. It is essential that the signature thus appended to provide the 
non-repudiation never appears in the clear. It will of course suffice to represent the 
END by a hash value inside the B/L Token. 
An END is transferred from one B/L Token to another, through a public unpro-
tected network, in such a way that 
a) It can only be transferred to one particular B/L Token to change ownership. 
b) Recovery is possible, if the transfer is unsuccessful. 
c) The protocol cannot be executed by any other device than an authorised B/L Token. 
Each B/L Token must have a public key pair for signature generation and one for 
encryption. They do not have to be different e.g. if RSA is being used. But it is para-
mount that the secret keys are not even known to the owner of the B/L Token. The 
private keys cannot be exported except for back-up solutions - representing another 
interesting challenge which will not be addressed in full in this exposition. 
Now, the challenge is to ensure that B/Ls can only be released (through the trading 
process) from one genuine B/L Token to another. So the initial question is, how can 
one B/L Token identify another? 
This works well with traditional PKI. A Certification Authority CA, authorises all 
B/L Tokens in the following manner: The public key of the CA is installed on the B/L 
Token, and cannot be replaced except through an appropriate protocol. (This will not be 
further addressed here, but would be completely standard). Moreover, when an END, or 
rather the defining signature of an END is entered into the B/L Token, the B/L Token 
must ensure that it can only be released again encrypted for an alternative B/L Token. 
The point behind this is that it will prevent the use on a non-authorised B/L Token to get 
access to the vital signature which defines the particular END. In particular this en-
crypted message is useless except when imported in a certificated B/L Token holding 
the corresponding decryption key. 
Furthermore, and this is an essential assumption, such an encryption of a particular 
END on an individual B/L Token can take place only once, or rather, once a public 
key has been selected for export, it is impossible at any later stage to go through the 
same procedure with another public key and the exact same END, unless of course 
said END has been properly imported through another sales negotiation at a later 
point in time. 
4.2   The Required Functionality 
Here are the basic concepts we need to appreciate in order to design the protocols. 
• Creation of a B/L: The B/L is generated on a work station, and the hash is for-
warded for the B/L Token. The signature may then be generated by the B/L 
Token at the will the owner of the B/L Token. Again, once generated, the sig-
nature will NEVER appear in the clear outside a B/L Token 
• Ownership: If a B/L signature has been imported to a B/L token, it is always 
marked with a flag which indicates whether it may be negotiated or whether it 
has been sold. 
• Export of a B/L: If the owner of a B/L has ownership of a negotiable B/L, he 
may choose to export (= sell) it to a business partner - the buyer - who in turn 
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is the owner of a registered B/L Token as well. To do that, the seller imports 
the public encryption key of the B/L Token of the buyer simply be receiving 
the certificate and verifying it. Selling is achieved by encrypting the defining 
signature under the public encryption key of the buyer and then forwarding it, 
say over the Internet. It is then marked as “sold” by his B/L Token. 
• Import of a B/L: The buyer imports the encrypted signature and verifies the 
content. If he accepts, it is imported in the sense that the signature is stored by 
the B/L Token and marked by the B/L Token as “negotiable”. If he does not 
accept, which is the exception rather than the rule, as that as a scenario that 
will only happen if something went wrong, an off-line TTP has to be involved 
to reset the B/L as “negotiable” in the B/L token of the seller. 
Consequently, the B/L Token must provide the following essential functionality: 
 
a) Creation of an electronic B/L. The content of the B/L is generated in a normal 
office environment, and once generated, a hash is imported by the generating B/L 
Token. The B/L Token will add appropriate data for identification and the preven-
tion of double-spending (selling the same B/L to two different buyers) and then 
sign the concatenation of this and the hash. We will consider this in further details 
later. It may be appropriate only to allow certain B/L Tokens to have this creation 
facility for commercial reasons. 
b) Exporting (= selling) a B/L. The actual negotiation with a buyer is done out of 
band in the same fashion as with paper B/Ls. But once agreed to trade,  
1. The certificate of the public encryption key of the B/L Token B of the Buyer 
is forwarded to the B/L Token A of the Seller. 
2. A verifies the certificate of B, and if this is successful, 
3. The owner of the B/L Token specifies which B/L he wants to export. He can 
only choose B/Ls which are exportable. 
4. A encrypts the data identifying the electronic B/L, incl. defining signature 
with the public encryption key of B and forwards this to B. The B/L is the 
listed by A as exported, i.e. non-negotiable. 
 
Notice all this only makes sense with an application that actually forwards and re-
ceives the actual B/Ls with the full content and not only the defining encrypted data. 
 
c) Importing (= buying) a B/L. This matches “exporting” above in the obvious 
manner: 
1. B decrypts with its corresponding secret key 
2. B verifies the signature and reports the findings to the owner. 
3. The owner accepts. 
4. The B/L is accepted by B and flagged as negotiable. 
 
The Buyer is now the owner of the B/L. 
4.3   Additional Properties 
We have mentioned the possibility of re-importing an END which has previously 
been exported from a B/L Token. This can be achieved as follows: 
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A counter will be incremented for each completed negotiation in such a way that a 
B/L Token may re-purchase any END at a later point in time, without violating ii). 
This counter will allow the B/L Token to distinguish between the END previously 
sold and therefore flagged as non-negotiable from the same END later received again 
through a proper negotiation-phase and then flagged as negotiable. 
Back-up: Each B/L Token may have a back-up B/L Token. Alternatively, a record 
may be kept of all purchased END’s (i.e. encrypted under the public key of the Buyer) 
by the owner of the Buyer or by the TTP, if this is involved in tracing, and the TTP 
may have a back-up copy of the secret key. If an owner announces a particular END 
for lost, e.g. because his B/L Token has broken down, the TTP waits until the expira-
tion of the validity period. If the END has not been claimed by someone else by then, 
the TTP will handle this by the back-up copy of the secret key of the Buyer. Alterna-
tively, which is the most realistic commercial solution, the Owner may recover im-
mediately by giving a guarantee or similar. 
Further Mechanisms and Protocols 
a)  Generation of an END 
As discussed above, the content of an electronic negotiable document is generated 
freely in an unprotected environment with a time stamp indicating the time of issue. A 
hash value of a fixed bit length of this is given as input to a B/L Token. The B/L To-
ken automatically, at the initiation of the user, adds 
1) Its device number, which is in one-to-one correspondence with the public key 
of the device used for verification of digital signatures generated by the device. 
This could be reflected in the certificate, or the device number could be the 
upper bits of the public key, after the most significant 1. 
2) A serial number which identifies the END uniquely in the system. 
This is all beyond the control of the user. 
The concatenation of all of this is then signed by the signature key of the B/L To-
ken. The numbers appended by the device are public and appears as output from the 
B/L Token, after which they are appended to the plaintext content of the END as well. 
This information and the digital signature are stored on the B/L Token for later nego-
tiation in its own record. To this information is further appended the number 0, called 
the counter, which indicates that the END has been negotiated 0 times, and a flag 
which indicates that the END may be negotiated. 
 
b)  Negotiation of an END 
A negotiation involves a seller (Sl) and a buyer (Br). It may involve a TTP as well for 
passive logging only for recovery purposes. 
1. Sl decides to sell a certain END, which is stored on his B/L Token (either be-
cause it has been issued on the B/L Token, or because it has previously been 
purchased by the B/L Token) to a certain Br. 
2. Sl requires the certificate of the encryption key of the B/L Token, which is for-
warded through a public channel to the B/L Token of the Sl. 
3. The B/L Token of the Sl verifies the validity of the certificate and extracts the 
public key of the B/L Token of the Br. The Sl specifies the serial number of the 
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END to be negotiated. If the flag of the End indicates that the END is non-
negotiable (i.e. has already been negotiated), further action is denied. Otherwise, 
step 4 is carried out. 
4. The full record in Sl’s B/L Token of the END is encrypted by means of the pub-
lic key of the B/L Token of the Br (possibly using a hybrid system) and trans-
mitted, together with the content of the END through a public channel to Br. 
5. The status of the record (i.e. the END and the counter) is flagged non-
negotiable. 
6. The B/L Token of the Br decrypts the received information with its secret key. 
7. The B/L Token of the Br requests the certificate of the Issuer, the hash value of the 
original content of the END and verifies the signature and the device number of the 
Issuer. If accepted, an acknowledgement such as a digital signature on the concate-
nation of the serial number of the END, the generating signature and the counter is 
returned to the B/L Token of the Sl, together with the certificate of the B/L Token 
of the Br. A copy may be returned to the Issuer as well for tracing. 
8. The B/L Token of the Sl verifies the acknowledgement and outputs the result for 
information to the Sl. (Likewise at the Issuer if applicable.) 
9. The received information, i.e. 
 1)  the hash value of the content of the END 
 2)  the device number of the generating END 
 3)  the serial number of the END 
 4)  the generating signature  
 5)  the counter, subsequently incremented by 1 
A flag will indicate that this document, with this particular counter, is now negotiable. 
 
c)  Recovery 
Various back-up procedures are possible as mentioned earlier. In one solution, the 
TTP will have a copy of the appropriate keys protected by a key only known to the 
owner of the B/L Token. As the Buyer always received the END’s encrypted under 
the public key of his device, he may keep copies of the received encrypted informa-
tion for later recovery my means of the TTP. 
Alternatively, each B/L Token could have a back-up identical device with identical 
public key pairs, certificates and device number, which furthermore is identified as a 
back-up device. Whenever a negotiation takes place, the protocol is duplicated with 
the back-up B/L Token. If the primary B/L Token breaks down, the back-up may sell 
to the issuer after expiration time of the END’s which could not be negotiated, or 
special procedures could take over. 
 
4. Splitting a B/L 
This is a functionality that had previously not been available in the paper based world. 
In the application where each B/L Token is an issuer, a END may be split by any 
Seller into two (or more for that matter if this is meaningful) END’s, where the sum 
of the values of the new END’s is that of the old, e.g. if the cargo is oil. This is se-
cured by the B/L Token. The Seller’s B/L Token then signs each of the End’s, which 
basically is the original signature together with a new value, and forwards its certifi-
cate in the trading protocol. The B/L Token of the Buyer verifies the original signa-
ture of the Issuer as well as the new signature. 
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5. Settlement 
In the end, the cargo is collected, and the B/L is finally returned to the issuer with the 
payment. This is again handed out of band. 
If the END is digital cash or an electronic cheque, perhaps with the electronic wa-
termark of the bank, the bank will cash in the END and mark the END non-
negotiable. Thus the settlement follows the same principle as an ordinary negotiation. 
In 1994 we filed a world wide patent [10] on these fundamental protocols, which has 
now been granted almost everywhere with the exception of USA, where the difference 
of this approach and the BOLERO approach with a central registry still appears to be 
incomprehensible to the patent reviewer. The first live world-wide solution has now 
been employed by e-Title Authority Pte Ltd.[3], and we wish them good luck. 
5   2nd Scenario: Light Weight PKI in Vehicle Communication 
This is more speculative and has not been deployed yet. Nor has it been patented.  
It is now a well established fact that information technology is the driving force 
behind a number of innovations in the automobile industry, and a number of papers 
have analysed the various threats and security measures that may become relevant, 
see for instance [1], [4] and [12]. 
A major challenge is to avoid providing so much functionality that the security re-
quirements become intolerably complicated and expensive. Of course, it will not 
really be possible to design the appropriate and optimal secure architecture until we 
know exactly which functionality we need from the system - something researchers 
often forget. Until then, the object we want to secure, the automobile, easily becomes 
a moving target (!).  
It is pretty obvious that once we start building solutions, there will be a number of 
fundamental, difficult challenges such as timeliness, robustness and scalability: To 
have whichever information is required at any time at any party available, regardless 
of the density of the traffic, and highly trustworthy at the same time. 
The ideas presented here go back to [8]. Before we can even start thinking about 
the appropriate security architecture, there are a number of generic challenges we will 
have to address, such as 
1) How can we take the maximal advantage of the fact that each vehicle will have 
a tamper resistant device installed? For instance, will that enable us to come up 
with light weight authentication mechanisms, which are an order of magnitude 
faster to generate and verify than the standard ones – even considerably faster 
than elliptic curve digital signatures? 
2) How do we provide an appropriate PKI solution with as little overhead as pos-
sible? E.g. can we avoid revocation lists – which is the nightmare of most PKI 
solutions and if so how? 
5.1   A Lightweight Digital Signature  
We start by recalling a new proposal for a lightweight Digital Signature we presented 
some years ago in [7] – which alas can be broken if implemented in software but at a 
speed which is an order of magnitude slower than it takes to generate or verify it and 
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then move on to explain how to make use of it. We will then discuss how to enhance 
this using tamper resistant hardware. 
In the following, “a ≈ b” mod k means a and b have the same residue modulo k. 
The following observations can be found in greater detail in [6]: 
 
P. Fermat observed that if p is a prime, then  
(1) p ≈  1 mod 4 iff there exist a, b with p = a2+b2 
i.e. p factors to the primes (a+ib)(a-ib) in the Gaussian ring Z[i] (which happens to be 
a unique factorization domain). 
An equivalent, although not entirely obvious, statement is that 
(2) p ≈  1 mod 4 iff –1 is a square root modulo p 
Now, let n = pq be an RSA modulus, where p and q are primes which both are 1 mod 4.  
Then the multiplicative subgroup of Z/nZ has exactly 4 square roots of -1, say  +/− 
δ and +/− ε, where say 
(4) δ ≈ ε mod p and – ε mod q 
Then obviously gcd(δε+1, n) = p, i.e. knowing δ and ε is equivalent to knowing p and 
q. However, as argued in [6], knowing only one of them and then calculating the other 
from that is likely as hard as factoring. 
 
Assumptions 
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus, where p and q are primes which both are 1 mod 4.  
 
Prover knows a square root γ of –1 mod n 
Verifier knows Prover’s public RSA key 
 
Signature generation 
Let m be a message (or the hash of another message) with  m < n.  
Choose a random and calculate b to satisfy γab = m mod n. 
 
Set r := (a+γb)/2, s := (γa+b)/2 
 
Then (r,s) is called the γ-signature of m with respect to a. 
 
Signature verification 
The verifier V receives m, r and s, and verifies that 
r
2+s2 = (a2–b2+2γab–a2+b2+2γab)/4 = γab mod n = m 
Notice here that if a is revealed, too, then calculating rs reveals γ: 
4rs = (a+γb)(γa+b)/4 = γ(a2+b2), as we know a2 as well as b2 (from γb). 
It is thus essential that a is chosen at random and kept secret.  
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So why does this look like a good idea? For m a message, let the pair (r,s) be the 
digital signature. All that is required to calculate it is about 2 modular exponentia-
tions, and verification is equally easy, if RSA with small exponents are being used. So 
indeed, we have come up with a scheme that is dramatically better than any other 
known scheme! 
Unfortunately, as explained in [7] as well, it can be broken: 
Find a number x such that y = x2m mod n is a prime which is 1 mod 4. This is rela-
tively easy using say the Rabin primality test.  
Use Cornacchia’s algorithm (see [8]) to find a, b with y = a2+b2 
Then m = (x-1a)2+(x-1b)2 mod n, and we have broken the scheme. In fact in doing 
so, we discovered that you do not even need the assumption that n be the product of 
two primes equivalent to 1 mod 4 to write m as a sum of two squares modulo n. 
We notice though that breaking it is considerably more time demanding than gen-
erating it in a legitimate way in that it requires at a minimum a modular exponentia-
tion +, compared to a couple of modular squarings. 
So doesn’t that kill our proposal for a light weight digital signature? Not necessar-
ily so! That depends entirely on the details of the architecture and this is where HSMs 
come in handy. Just as an example, assume the following holds: 
1. The signature is always generated by a tamper resistant device which has been 
certified for use in a system. Such a device will come with a very limited set of 
commands, and it cannot include any other means of generating a light weight 
signature. 
2. Vital parts of the communication is encrypted or otherwise protected to pre-
vent outside attacks exploiting the attack described overleaf. 
3. A certificate has been generated by a recognised CA for the system on the cor-
responding public key.  
Under the assumption that all communicating unit are tamper resistant and authorised 
and certified with the alleged functionality, any falsified digital signature obviously 
must originate from a third party. Whether that will be a realistic threat depends on 
the nature of the communication, but we should of course try to minimise the prob-
ability that this can happen at all. One possibility, just for the sake of the argument, is 
to encrypt all messages. In order to avoid overhead, this would basically require that 
communicating units already share a key, but even though this would be possible, the 
security of the whole system would rest with the protection of that key, which perhaps 
would be considered unduly risky.  
 
A more sophisticated approach is the following example: 
One recipient B of a message signed as proposed above by A, and to whom the mes-
sage is deemed critical by some application, could return a randomly chosen chal-
lenge c RSA-signed by B encrypted under the public key of the alleged transmitter A. 
The RSA signature by B could easily be pre-calculated, even with a timestamp which 
is fairly accurate, and encryption under A’s public key is cheap for RSA with small 
exponents. A verifies the RSA signature (which proves that c was chosen by B, hence 
is random, as B is tamper resistant). By choosing c smaller than the smallest prime 
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divisor of the public key of A (e.g. say 500 bits, where all primes used are around 512 
bits), decryption at A is faster by a factor 2 – 4 compared to e.g. an RSA signature 
generation, depending on implementation, as A need only decrypt modulo the small-
est prime divisor. So with one initial RSA message from B, A can now authenticate 
itself to B using light weight signatures as follows. 
Let a(m) = a denote the random number chosen above along with the message m. 
A then chooses a(m) = c, which he just received from B, and calculates b = b(m) from 
γcb = m mod n, to return the signature r := (c+γb)/2, s := (γc+b)/2. B can now verify 
that indeed the signature was calculated using a square root of – 1 modulo the 
modulus of the public key of A, which rules out the attack described above. Of course 
this means that B will learn of the secret of A, but as it is a tamper resistant device, it 
can make no use of it and dispose of it if programmed so. At the same time, any other 
recipient can verify that the message m has been signed by means of a light weight 
signature, but of course cannot rule out the attack. For a subsequent message, m1, A 
could use a(m1) := h(c), where h is a known hash function, and so on, so for all subse-
quent signed messages, B can verify that A indeed did sign using a square root of -1 
modulo its  public key modulus.  
Notice that if a number of vehicles are communicating, B could now confirm to all 
other parties that it has verified the signature as genuine with its own light weight signa-
ture on said message m, which indicate that either the original signature received from A 
is genuine, or A and B are both allied with a malicious third party. We leave it to the 
reader to generalise this to a scheme where a small, but reassuring number of vehicles 
authenticate each others messages for the benefit of all other communicating vehicles. 
Notice that it will still be possible for other applications – if need be – to generate 
ordinary RSA signatures on the same device.  
So far for the basic protocol. But we need a PKI. 
5.2   Transparent PKI for Vehicle Communication  
Before we discuss this further, we want to recall that there are a number of large scale 
transparent PKI solutions out there: In EMV (debit- and creditcards), TPM  (Trusted 
Platform Module) and DRM (Digital Rights Management), and on the whole they 
work very well. What we propose here is yet another transparent PKI protocol. 
Avoiding Revocation Lists 
One of the most challenging problems has been identified as that of how to possibly 
avoid revocation lists (see e.g. [2] and [5]).  
First of all, it is reasonable to ask: Under which conditions should the certificate of 
a particular vehicle be revoked? We can think of dozens of reasons why a driver 
should be banned from driving, and we can also think of reasons why a particular 
vehicle should be banned from getting on the road (e.g. as it failed its MOT test be-
cause of a serious defect). But if the vehicle contains a tamper resistant unit which 
only transmit automated messages, we can only think of a couple of reasons why the 
corresponding private key should be revoked: Sufficient suspicion that the private key 
has been compromised in spite of the tamper resistance, or that the device has suc-
cessfully been removed from its vehicle, or – in the scenario where lightweight signa-
tures are being used, that the vehicle is known to collude with a malicious third party. 
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It could thus be quite unlikely that we need to revoke a key pair. Nevertheless, if 
we feel strongly about this, here is a way forward that would still avoid revocation 
lists: Basically, the idea is the following: The CA only issues very short term certifi-
cates, say every hour or even every 15 minutes depending on capacity, just for the 
sake of the argument. This would automatically revoke any certificate much faster 
than if revocation lists were to be used. If the vehicle is in a remote area it does not 
matter, this is not were the technology will be of any use worth mentioning. On high-
ways and in densely populated areas, it would be easy to have the certificate renewed 
in an automated fashion once a base station is passed, and we shall make a more de-
tailed proposal below. Obviously, if a vehicle key pair needs to be revoked, it just 
needs to be communicated to the appropriate CA not to reissue a new certificate at the 
next automated request. The impact of this will be quite dramatic, as suddenly certifi-
cates become very trustworthy – which is very important for the proposal above on 
light weight signatures. 
Renewing a certificate: As mentioned earlier, electronic communication between 
automobiles is much more important in densely populated areas. At the leisure of the 
appropriate authorities, there could be base renewal stations at regular intervals in 
sufficiently densely populated areas that carries out the renewal in a completely 
automated manner as the vehicle passes. In addition, we could imagine such a unit 
installed in every police car as an option. Once a vehicle passes within communica-
tion range of such a renewal station, it automatically submits a request for renewal, 
and the CA for the region is contacted for an online generation of a certificate pro-
vided the existing cer has not been revoked. So there would be revocation lists, but 
not at the end user level, only at the regional CA level, a bit like in the EMV world. 
So each region has a CA, and when a vehicle is in that region, this is the only CA that 
matters. Of course the regional CA needs to be aware of basically all other CAs in the 
world, e.g. through certificate paths just as in the EMV environment, as a vehicle could 
arrive e.g. by ship from another country, but once it has been verified that the certificate 
should be renewed, it might as well be with the private key of the local CA.  
6   3rd Scenario: Mobility in Digital Signatures 
Whereas digital signatures really are designed - and mostly deployed - for automated 
processes, there is one exception, electronic commerce, which is often conducted 
from an insecure – or at least untrusted – workstation and gives a lot of headaches, not 
least legal ones. 
To introduce a device that the user can carry around - like a chipcard or a USB to-
ken - is a very appealing way of protecting the secret key, but in the case of the chip-
card, one additionally needs a connected chipcard reader, and in both scenarios there 
are further challenges with this approach. 
For an electronic message which an individual is about to sign, he is forced to believe 
that whatever he sees is a true representation, or "transcription" of what his is digitally 
signing. He normally has no means of verifying, but has to rely on the interpretation of 
the codes, he himself typically cannot read or comprehend. 
The functionality he needs is what we introduced in [9] and named WYSIWYS, 
“What You See Is What You Sign”. The real issue of course is whether the hash to be 
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signed really is calculated on the message displayed to the user on the screen prior to 
signature generation. 
6.1   Protection of Signing Keys 
Apart from WYSIWYS the other paramount issue in electronic commerce or banking  
- namely proper key protection – touches a vulnerable point of traditional digital sig-
nature solutions: From a security perspective the best solution is to keep the signing 
key in protected hardware of some kind as discussed above. But usability considera-
tions have promoted software-based solutions, and today these are by far the most 
widespread for cost as well as convenience. 
Thus the traditional solution is a compromise between security and usability, and 
in reality a software solution ties the users’ access to e.g. a particular Net-banking 
application to one specific work station. But mobility is an absolute requirement  of 
most Net-bank users. 
Since the weakness is storage and handling of the signing key, the straightforward 
solution is to free the user from this responsibility. Instead the keys are generated and 
stored centrally on a secure server enhanced by appropriate HSMs - preferably han-
dled by an independent third party - and the signature key never leaves this protected 
environment, yet it is controlled entirely by the user through secure channels at all 
times. This has some evident advantages: 
• Optimum physical security: The key is far better protected on a secure server 
than on the user’s hard disk or on a smart card. 
• Protection against theft: It is practically unfeasible to steal a key from a secure 
server – even for the system administrator. 
• Mobility: The owner can use the key from any terminal with Internet access. 
• Logging: Access and use of the key is logged which makes it easy to detect 
misuse. 
6.2   Two Factor Authentication 
With the approach described above, the security challenge has now been reduced to 
protection of key usage, and again this new approach has superior functionality. For 
software solutions, the key is only protected by a (static) password on the user’s hard 
disk. On a signature server the security level is easily increased with a well-known 
technique: authentication through two independent channels – typically something 
you know and something you possess. In Net-banking a natural solution is a (static) 
password combined with at one-time password, which can be delivered as an SMS to 
the user’s mobile phone, printed on a card, generated by a token, etc. To access the 
key the user has to prove that he (1) knows his password and (2) is in possession of 
his phone/card/token.  
So to handle this one server, the signature server, stores the private keys on behalf 
of all users and at their full control, while another, the authentication server, is re-
sponsible for proper authentication of some sort do the users. These two servers are 
connected through a secure channel, and a re best operated by independent parties, 
although for less secure solutions , the two server functionalities may be handled by 
one ubiquitous server only. 
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6.3   Signing 
Signing a transaction then looks as follows: 
1. The user logs on to the Net bank or the application. 
2. The user wishes to perform a transaction, which requires a digital signature. 
The static password and a hash of the transaction, required to generate the sig-
nature, is sent by the authentication server to the signature server through the 
secure tunnel. 
3. The user has received/generated the one-time password controlled and verified 
by the authentication server. 
4. The user sends the one-time password to the signature server via the secure 
tunnel. 
5. The server verifies that the information received from the user and the authen-
tication server match  and if so returns the signature on the transaction (and a 
certificate if required). 
6. For particularly sensitive or valuable data, the content of the signed message 
may even be forwarded to the user through a different channel, e.g. on a mo-
bile phone or a pda, and the user confirms the content via that channel. This is 
one simple but very efficient way of addressing the WYSIWYS issue, which 
completely thwarts MITM attacks.  
7. The transaction, signature, (and certificate) are sent to the Net bank or appro-
priate application. 
8. The Net bank or appropriate application validates and processes the transaction. 
Of course there are lots of details to add before the solution is sufficiently secure to 
offer non-repudiation in the legal sense. Again, we have filled several patent applica-
tions to protect our technology, and a European patent was obtained in 2006 [11], and 
a number of solutions have already been deployed throughout Europe. 
7   Summary 
We have presented two solutions from the real world (first and third scenario) where 
the challenge was to combine PKI with the use of tamper resistant hardware not only 
to protect keys, but to enforce a certain and limited functionality that enables the spe-
cial requirements that were imposed by the system architecture. We have moreover 
presented what we believe is a viable and practical way forward  for the use of an 
innovative new PKI system for communication between moving vehicles which em-
ploys tamper resistant hardware that would enable a new light weight digital signature 
we have proposed. This is based on RSA but is an order of magnitude faster than RSA 
in that both signature generation and verification is a few exponential modular squar-
ings. As PKI in vehicle communication is still something of the future, this has not 
been implemented yet, in contrast to the two other scenarios. 
 
Note: This paper was produced to explain in greater details what was presented by the 
author as the invited keynote speaker at EuroPKI 2008. The author is grateful to the 
referees for their feedback which helped making the paper more accessible. 
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Abstract. A PKI in support of secure Internet routing was ﬁrst pro-
posed in [1] and reﬁned in later papers, e.g., [2]. In this “Resource”
PKI (RPKI) the resources managed are IP address allocations and Au-
tonomous System number assignments. In a typical PKI the validation
problem for each relying party is fairly simple in principle, and is well
deﬁned in the standards, e.g. RFC 3280 [3]. The RPKI presents a very
diﬀerent challenge for relying parties with regard to eﬃcient certiﬁcate
validation. In the RPKI every relying party needs to validate every cer-
tiﬁcate at fairly frequent intervals (e.g., daily). In addition, certiﬁcates
on the validation path may be acquired from multiple repositories in
an arbitrary order. These dramatic diﬀerences motivated us to develop
performance-optimized validation algorithms for the RPKI. This paper
describes the software developed by BBN for the RPKI, with a special
focus on this optimized validation approach.
Keywords: Border Gateway Protocol, Resource PKI, Internet Routing
PKI, Route Origination Attestation.
1 Background
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4] is a critical routing protocol in the In-
ternet. Routers exchange Autonomous System (AS) path information between
themselves using BPG UPDATE messages. Unfortunately the current implemen-
tation of the BGP protocol does not provide any method for determining if such
path information is valid. Path information may be invalid due to conﬁguration
errors, or due to malicious BGP spooﬁng [5, 6].
Several proposed alterations to BGP provide for additional security to the
path information [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. All are predicated upon the existence of some
form of PKI that binds AS# and IP-address block resources to the entities to
which they have been allocated. These proposals have not been adopted due to
the changes required to routers and the infrastructure requirements imposed.
The most recent proposal for creating the requisite infrastructure is described in
[1], an approach based on a new, digitally signed object, the Route Origination
Attestation (ROA), together with a PKI to validate, manage and process such
objects. Relying party software for use with this “Resource” PKI (RPKI) was
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 17–30, 2008.
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implemented by BBN, and is described in this paper. Of particular interest is
the set of validation algorithms that were developed for the RPKI.
In a typical PKI [12] the validation problem for each relying party is fairly
simple in concept, although it may be complex in practice. Typically a relying
party receives an End Entity (EE) certiﬁcate which must be validated prior
to verifying the signature on an object. The relying party may be provided
with additional Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) certiﬁcates needed to complete the
certiﬁcate path to one or more Trust Anchors (TA) employed by that relying
party. The validation of a certiﬁcation path from a TA to a EE certiﬁcate,
including processing of revocation status data, is well deﬁned and speciﬁed in
standards. The non-standard part of the process is the discovery of a suitable
certiﬁcate path.
Given this typical task for a relying party, strategies for optimizing the per-
formance of certiﬁcate validation have been developed. They are based on the
assumption that a relying party will, within a reasonable time interval (say, 24
hours), validate only a very small fraction of all the certiﬁcates issued in the
context of the speciﬁc PKI. This is a reasonable assumption for most PKI ap-
plications, e.g., secure email provided via S-MIME, VPN security using IPsec,
or secure web access via TLS/SSL [13].
The RPKI presents a very diﬀerent challenge for relying parties with regard to
certiﬁcate validation. In this RPKI it is anticipated that every relying party (e.g.,
every participating ISP) will need to validate every certiﬁcate within (roughly) a
24 hour interval. This dramatic diﬀerence in validation methodology motivated
the development of a novel performance-optimized approach to certiﬁcate val-
idation. This paper focuses on the validation algorithms developed as part of
our work on implemented the RPKI. Our approach to validation makes use of
a relational database containing only validated signed objects (e.g., certiﬁcates)
to avoid duplicative validation processing.
2 RPKI Software
The goal of the BBN RPKI (relying party) software is to process data from
repositories operated by the ﬁve RIRs (and their subordinate certiﬁcation au-
thorities) in order to create a single set of text ﬁles that can be used to generate
BGP ﬁlters. These ﬁlters describe which Autonomous Systems are authorized
to originate routes for speciﬁed IP address preﬁxes. The BBN RPKI software
system ﬁnds all the available ROAs, and their associated certiﬁcates and cer-
tiﬁcate revocation lists (CRLs), veriﬁes the ROAs using these certiﬁcates and
CRLs, and creates simple text ﬁles containing AS#/IP preﬁx pairs that can be
used to create BGP ﬁlters.
As noted above, this process is diﬀerent from the traditional use of a PKI to
support applications. Previously, an application received one or a small num-
ber of signed objects that required validation. The application would gather the
Validation Algorithms for a Secure Internet Routing PKI 19
certiﬁcates required to form a certiﬁcate chain to a Trust Anchor and then per-
form the appropriate certiﬁcate path checks. Our application needs to determine
the validity of all the available ROAs, certiﬁcates and CRLs across multiple
repositories. To do this quickly and with eﬃcient use of system resources re-
quires a diﬀerent approach than that of PKI software supporting a traditional
application, since it will require processing the same certiﬁcates and CRLs many
times. Therefore, our software extracts relevant information from local copies of
certiﬁcates and CRLs, and creates relational database records containing that
information. This approach provides a simple, eﬃcient, and highly structured
way to access the applicable information for each object without having to re-
peatedly acquire and process certiﬁcate and CRL data. We ﬁrst discusses how
the data is stored locally, and then describes the diﬀerent programs that operate
on the data and transform it, eventually resulting in output ﬁles that can be
used to create BGP ﬁlters.
Our software suite consists of a set of programs that typically run continuously,
in the background, rather than a set of programs that are executed once from
the command line. This is done for the sake of eﬃciency; as the ROA’s validation
state changes over time; our software updates ﬁles incrementally, so as not to
require reprocessing all the data.
Fig. 1. Transforming the data
The diﬀerent forms of the data and the transformations between them are
shown in Figure 1. We now describe each component in the process.
Remote Repositories - The raw data (certiﬁcates, CRLs, and ROAs) are
stored as ﬁles on a distributed system of servers provided by the CAs that
comprise the RPKI. Each of the ﬁve RIRs will attempt to cache data from its
subordinate CAs on its repository server, so it is expected that our software will
be able to ﬁnd most of the data it needs on the RIR servers. However, there
will be some cases where the data is not cached at a RIR and the application
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will need to retrieve data directly from a subordinate CA repository. Data from
these repositories can be located using the Subject Information Access (SIA)
extensions present in RPKI certiﬁcates [14].
Local Repository - Our application retrieves ﬁles from repository servers and
caches them locally. It uses rsync, an existing freely available utility, to keep
the local repository synchronized with the remote repositories in a directory
structure that mirrors the originals. Because most of the ﬁles retrieved from
the remote repositories will need to be accessed many times as part of ongoing
processing, it is more eﬃcient to copy these ﬁles once (particularly with the
eﬃcient copying of rsync) rather than to continually access the remote versions.
Furthermore, rsync outputs a record of what changes occurred in which ﬁles,
which allows our application to process only the modiﬁcations, and thereby
minimize the work done with each incremental data update.
Relational Database - MySQL [15] was used as the relational database un-
derpinning our relying party software. The database has three main tables, one
for each type of object of interest: certiﬁcates, CRLs and ROAs. Each object
type has a diﬀerent set of data ﬁelds in addition to its signature. The database
includes only those ﬁelds required to search for and/or identify the diﬀerent
objects/rows in the tables. (It is easier and more eﬃcient to leave seldom-used
information in the corresponding ﬁle.) For example, some of the ﬁelds included
in the certiﬁcate table are: subject key identiﬁer (SKI), subject, authority key
identiﬁer (AKI), and issuer. This supports an SQL query requesting the certiﬁ-
cate with a particular SKI and subject, or a query requesting all certiﬁcates with
a particular AKI and issuer. (The signiﬁcance of these queries is discussed in the
section on validation algorithms.) Such database queries allow rapid location of
objects of interest.
The database does not include all objects. If an object has been determined to
be invalid, that object is either not loaded into the database, or is deleted from
the database if it had previously been valid or awaiting validation. Note that
the underlying ﬁle remains in the local repository until its remote copy has been
deleted. (Henceforth we will always use the term “repository” to denote the local
collection of ﬁles, unless otherwise noted.) An object can be determined invalid
for a variety of reasons including expiration, revocation or a signature that does
not verify. An object will be placed into the database if it is valid, or if there is
not yet enough information to determine whether or not it is valid. The most
common reason for an inability to determine the validity of an object is when
there is a missing link (ancestor) in the certiﬁcate path to a Trust Anchor. An
object of undetermined validity stays in the database until it expires (and hence
is know to be invalid) or it is deleted from its remote repository (and hence also
from the local repository).
There is one column in each object table containing the validation state.
This ﬁeld can have three possible values: validated, awaiting-validation, and
CRL-stale. Validated and awaiting-validation represent the obvious meanings;
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CRL-stale is explained next. Each CRL has a ﬁeld next-update that tells the
latest time to expect an updated version of the CRL, which may enumerate a
potentially diﬀerent set of revoked certiﬁcates. When the current time becomes
later than the next-update time for a CRL, then any sibling certiﬁcate of this
CRL (i.e., any certiﬁcate that shares the same issuer and hence could be revoked,
as discussed below) enters an uncertain state. This uncertain validity extends
to all its descendants, i.e., those certiﬁcates and ROAs whose certiﬁcation path
includes this certiﬁcate. All sibling certiﬁcates and descendants have their vali-
dation state set to CRL-stale until the expected update to the CRL arrives.
BGP output files - The goal of the application is to derive this set of ﬁles,
which are just text ﬁles consisting of IP address preﬁxes and their associated AS
numbers. These pairs are speciﬁed in the ROAs and our software accumulates
the pairs from all validated ROAs. An issue is what to do with those ROAs
in the CRL-stale validation state. The application provides the user with three
options: include them, exclude them, or put their pairs in a separate table/ﬁle
where a human can decide how to handle them. (This last option is the default.)
The software is composed of a set of application programs that operate on the
data. There is a natural sequential order to these programs which mostly follows
the sequence of data transformations shown in Figure 1. Typically, one would
expect them to be run in sequence at least once a day. However, there may be
times when the programs need to be run separately, which is also possible. The
program components are described next.
Synchronizer - This program executes rsync for each of the ﬁve top-level RIR
repositories in order to create a local repository copy that contains the same
data as the remote repositories. The program rsync is an open-source utility
that eﬃciently synchronizes ﬁles and directories between two systems. The local
repository has at least ﬁve parallel subtrees, one for each of the remote repos-
itories. The synchronizer can synchronize with remote repositories other than
these ﬁve main ones and generate additional subtrees if it is known beforehand
(or discovered subsequently) that the data from some RPKI CAs is not cached
at one of the ﬁve RIRs. The rsync program outputs messages about everything it
does, including all ﬁles that it has added, updated or removed; the synchronizer
saves this output to a log ﬁle to tell the loader which ﬁles need to be handled.
Loader - This program looks at the logs generated by the synchronizer and
loads the data from all new or modiﬁed ﬁles into the database; it also deletes
the data corresponding to those ﬁles that have been removed. Before the loader
puts a record corresponding to a new object into the database it checks whether
this object is invalid and refrains from loading such ﬁles. If the object can be
validated, it sets the validation ﬂag for that object, and then determines which
other objects already in the database need to have their validation state changed,
or need to be deleted, as a consequence. This process of validating an object and
then determining the eﬀects of this change on other objects in the database
is discussed in detail in Section 3. When there are multiple remote repositories,
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the loader is executed in parallel with the synchronizer. After the synchronizer
is done updating from one repository and has proceeded to a second repository,
the loader can be loading the data from the ﬁrst repository. Because both the
synchronizer and loader spend much of their time doing input/output, parallel
execution provides true speedup.
Pruner - This program looks for changes in the state of objects due to the
passage of time, in particular certiﬁcates and CRLs that have expired (but which
were valid at the time they were loaded). Finding expired objects in the database
is easy, requiring only two database queries, one for certiﬁcates and one for CRLs.
Propagating the eﬀects of an expired certiﬁcate follows the process described in
Section 3.
Chaser - This program is invoked when not all the certiﬁcates are cached at
the RIR repositories, and hence accumulating all the required data necessitates
retrieving data from lower-level CA repositories. Each certiﬁcate has a ﬁeld that
points to the location of its parent (the Authority Information Access or AIA),
one pointing to sibling certiﬁcates (the Subject Information Access or SIA),
and one pointing to the CRL in which the certiﬁcate will be listed if revoked
(the CRL Distribution Points or CRLDP). The chaser accumulates a list of
alternative repositories from which to retrieve data and executes the synchronizer
and loader on these repositories in the same way they are initially executed on
the RIR repositories. Currently there is no way to check which objects from these
lower-level repositories have already been cached by an RIR. In this case those
objects will already have been copied and processed locally. When the duplicates
are copied from a lower level CA repository, the fact that it they are duplicates
will be noted, and they will not be entered into the database twice.
Translator - This utility creates the output ﬁles. The primary content of a ROA
is a mapping from IP address preﬁxes to AS numbers; the translator combines
the data from all the validated ROAs into a single large list. Note that the
translator is part of a more general query tool for extracting information from
the database, which allows easy visibility into the database for the expert user.
BBN has developed, integrated, tested, and released this software as a free,
open source project. It may be downloaded from [16].
Work on the software is ongoing. In particular, the evolution of the resource
certiﬁcate project [17] has grown to encompass a new type of object: a ﬁle man-
ifest. BBN is currently working on extensions to the RPKI software to process
manifests, as well as integrating them into the overall database architecture. (A
manifest is a list signed by an EE representing a CA, enumerating all of the
ﬁles currently published under that CA. The manifest will be used to detect
unauthorized deletion or substitution of (older, valid) ﬁles in a repository.) BBN
also plans to continue work on improving the eﬃciency of the software suite. As
described below, there are cases in which caching a previously computed vali-
dation result can result in a signiﬁcant performance improvement. In addition,
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the chaser (and the entire rsync transfer process) can be made more eﬃcient by
adding a mechanism for determining which objects in which repositories have
already been retrieved, so that duplicate ﬁles are transferred less frequently. A
number of other performance optimizations are also being considered. Finally,
as standards for secure internet routing continue to evolve [18], we anticipate
that the RPKI software will continue to be improved to track those changes.
3 Validation Algorithms
The process of keeping the (local) database current with respect to the validation
state of all objects (certiﬁcates, CRLs, and ROAs) has two main parts. The ﬁrst
is validating or invalidating individual objects. The second is propagating the
consequences of an object’s change of validation state throughout the database.
We discuss each of these steps, in turn, after providing a quick overview of the
various objects relationships.
The primary relationship between objects is the parent-child relationship. The
parent object is always a certiﬁcate. If the child is a certiﬁcate or a CRL, the
parent is the certiﬁcate of the CA that signed the child. For a ROA or a manifest,
the parent is an EE certiﬁcate. Hence, a parent certiﬁcate is required to validate
an object. For the signature to be acceptable, the parent must itself be validated,
and so a certiﬁcation path is required back to a Trust Anchor. A Trust Anchor
is a self-signed certiﬁcate that is inherently trusted; the default Trust Anchors
in the RPKI are self-signed certiﬁcates issued by the RIRs and by IANA.
The parent-child relationship between two objects is dictated by two simple
rules:
– A certiﬁcate is the parent of another certiﬁcate or of a CRL if the parent’s
SKI equals the child’s AKI and the parent’s subject equals the child’s issuer.
– A certiﬁcate is the parent of a ROA (or a manifest) if the two objects have
the same SKI.
The sibling relationship between CRLs and certiﬁcates is also important, be-
cause a CRL can revoke any certiﬁcate that is its sibling, i.e., has the same
parent. A certiﬁcate is the sibling of a CRL if the two objects have the same
AKI. A validated CRL revokes a sibling certiﬁcate if the serial number of the
certiﬁcate is in the list of serial numbers of the CRL.
Having a relational database makes it easy and fast to ﬁnd objects that satisfy
these relationships. For example, the following single SQL query produces all the
certiﬁcates that are the children of a certiﬁcate with SKI=foo and subject=bar:
SELECT id, ski, subject FROM certiﬁcates WHERE aki=”foo” AND is-
suer=”bar”;
We now discuss the diﬀerent ways that an object can change its state as part
of single object validation. These are changes in validation state that are not the
result of some other object changing state. Such initial events can potentially
start a chain reaction of validation state updates.
When the loader acquires a new or modiﬁed object, because the synchronizer
has added or modiﬁed a ﬁle in the local repository, it performs a set of checks
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to determine if it should create an object corresponding to that ﬁle and add it
to the database. The loader performs the following checks:
– If the syntax of the object does not follow the speciﬁcations for that type of
object, the object is not added to the database.
– If the object is a certiﬁcate or ROA and has expired, it is not added to the
database.
– If a certiﬁcate is revoked by a validated CRL already present in the database,
then the certiﬁcate is not added to the database.
Before loading an object into the database, the loader queries the database
to determine if a validated parent of the object is present. If no such parent
exists, the object is written to the database and put in the awaiting-validation
state, for subsequent processing by the deferred validation algorithm, described
below. If a validated parent does exist, then the object can be tested against a
potential certiﬁcation path. If the parent’s key validates the object’s signature,
then the object is added to the database and marked as validated, potentially
starting a chain of validation updates as described in the next section. If the
parent’s public key is inconsistent with the object’s signature, then the object is
not added to the database.
If the synchronizer removes a ﬁle that corresponds to an object that is still in
the database, the loader removes the corresponding object from the database.
This can possibly start a chain of validation updates. If the pruner determines
that a ROA or certiﬁcate has expired, it deletes the object from the database.
When a certiﬁcate is deleted, this can potentially start a chain of validation
updates. If a CRL expires, then the CRL is placed in the CRL-stale validation
state, and this can also start a chain of updates.
Note that once a potential path to a Trust Anchor exists, the actual valida-
tion of certiﬁcates and CRLs is done using existing publicly available software
(OpenSSL [19] and cryptlib [20]) that performs the certiﬁcation path validation
checks and veriﬁes the signatures all the way back to the Trust Anchor. An
approach that cached the validation state could oﬀer a potential performance
improvement, since all but the ﬁnal link in the chain has already been validated
at that point. Note that this potential ineﬃciency does not exist for ROAs, since
we had to write custom code to validate them.
When an object changes validation state this change can propagate through
the database. Because of the need for certiﬁcation path validation, a new cer-
tiﬁcate being validated or invalidated can ripple to its descendants, i.e. all those
objects that use the certiﬁcate as part of the path used to determine its own
validation state. The algorithms for propagating validation state eﬃciently and
incrementally, including the deferred validation algorithm, are described below.
There are four conditions that can lead to propagation of validation state
through the database. These conditions along with the actions they require are:
1. If a certiﬁcate moves from the awaiting-validation state to the validated
state, then all of its children are tested to see whether they are now valid.
(Note that the certiﬁcate cannot even reach the awaiting-validation state
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unless syntax checks on the certiﬁcate have already been successfully per-
formed; therefore the checking being refer to here has to do with signature
veriﬁcation only.) Generally, these children will be in the awaiting-validation
state until the missing parent is validated. Testing the signature of a child
against the newly valid parent’s key either proves the child valid, and hence
changes its state to validated, or proves it invalid, and causes it to be removed
from the database.
2. If a previously valid certiﬁcate is deleted or invalidated, then each of its child
objects is declared invalid unless the child object has been re-parented by
another certiﬁcate (during key rollover, for example). If the parent is deleted
or its new state is awaiting-validation, then the state of each child is modiﬁed
to be awaiting-validation. If the parent’s state is CRL-stale, then the state
of each child is modiﬁed to be CRL-stale.
3. If a CRL is validated, then each of its sibling certiﬁcates is tested to see if
its serial number is in the CRL’s list of revoked certiﬁcates, and if so, the
certiﬁcate is revoked. If the newly valid CRL replaces one that is stale, then
each of its sibling certiﬁcates should be removed from the CRL-stale state.
4. If a validated CRL becomes stale, its sibling certiﬁcates are placed in the
CRL-stale state.
Conditions 1 and 2 constitute the core of the deferred validation algorithm.
In a typical PKI path discovery propagates upward, from a child object to its
parent objects. In the RPKI, path discovery propagates downward, from a par-
ent object to its children, when new objects arrive. This type of validation is
essential for the operation of the RPKI, since ultimately all objects must either
be validated or invalidated, even though their order of arrival in the local repos-
itory is completely arbitrary. These operations are complicated by the fact that
objects can interact with one another. We provide an example scenario of such
propagation below.
Table 1. Initial state of example data on 01-JAN
Type ID SKI AKI Serial # Expires Validation State
Cert 1 AB:00 AB:00 123 31-DEC Validated
Cert 2 13:B5 C1:8D 2 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 3 EE:23 C1:8D 345 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 4 7D:62 13:B5 3 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 5 28:2C EE:23 7 15-JAN Awaiting
ROA 1 EE:23 01-FEB Awaiting
ROA 2 28:2C 01-FEB Awaiting
The following scenario contains far fewer objects than would be in a real
system, with the quantity of objects limited for the purposes of illustration.
However, it is otherwise realistic, and is similar to scenarios we used for initial
tests of our software. The initial state of the database is provided in Table 1. It
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does not show all the database ﬁelds, just those critical to determining validation
state propagation. Certiﬁcate 1 is the single Trust Anchor and initially is also
the only validated object, since the others do not yet have a certiﬁcation path
back to the Trust Anchor.
Table 2. Missing link in trust chains arrives on 02-JAN
Type ID SKI AKI Serial # Expires Validation State
Cert 1 AB:00 AB:00 123 31-DEC Validated
Cert 2 13:B5 C1:8D 2 01-FEB Validated
Cert 3 EE:23 C1:8D 345 01-FEB Validated
Cert 4 7D:62 13:B5 3 01-FEB Validated
Cert 5 28:2C EE:23 7 15-JAN Validated
ROA 1 EE:23 01-FEB Validated
ROA 2 28:2C 01-FEB Validated
Cert 6 C1:8D AB:00 23 01-FEB Validated
Table 2 shows the state after a new certiﬁcate arrives. This certiﬁcate provides
the missing link in the certiﬁcation paths for all the objects. Using the deferred
validation algorithm described earlier, the validation state propagates from the
new certiﬁcate ﬁrst to its children and then to their children and so on.
Table 3. Certiﬁcate 5 expires and its child ROA is invalidated on 15-JAN
Type ID SKI AKI Serial # Expires Validation State
Cert 1 AB:00 AB:00 123 31-DEC Validated
Cert 2 13:B5 C1:8D 2 01-FEB Validated
Cert 3 EE:23 C1:8D 345 01-FEB Validated
Cert 4 7D:62 13:B5 3 01-FEB Validated
ROA 1 EE:23 01-FEB Validated
ROA 2 28:2C 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 6 C1:8D AB:00 23 01-FEB Validated
Table 3 shows the state after certiﬁcate 5 expires. Certiﬁcate 5 is deleted from
the database, and its child, ROA 2, is invalidated and placed in the awaiting-
validation state.
Table 4 shows the state after a CRL arrives. This causes one of its sibling
certiﬁcates, certiﬁcate 2, to be revoked, and its child, certiﬁcate 4, to be placed
in the awaiting-validation state.
Table 5 shows the state after CRL 1 expires. Certiﬁcate 3 is a sibling of
CRL 1 and is therefore placed in the CRL-stale state. This propagates to its
child, ROA 1, which is also placed in this state.
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Table 4. CRL 1 arrives on 16-JAN, revoking certiﬁcate 2 and invalidating its child
Type ID SKI AKI Serial # Expires Validation State
Cert 1 AB:00 AB:00 123 31-DEC Validated
Cert 3 EE:23 C1:8D 345 01-FEB Validated
Cert 4 7D:62 13:B5 3 01-FEB Awaiting
ROA 1 EE:23 01-FEB Validated
ROA 2 28:2C 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 6 C1:8D AB:00 23 01-FEB Validated
CRL 1 C1:8D 2,33 20-JAN Validated
Table 5. CRL 1 expires on 20-JAN, causing other objects to enter the CRL-stale state
Type ID SKI AKI Serial # Expires Validation State
Cert 1 AB:00 AB:00 123 31-DEC Validated
Cert 3 EE:23 C1:8D 345 01-FEB CRL-stale
Cert 4 7D:62 13:B5 3 01-FEB Awaiting
ROA 1 EE:23 01-FEB CRL-stale
ROA 2 28:2C 01-FEB Awaiting
Cert 6 C1:8D AB:00 23 01-FEB Validated
CRL 1 C1:8D 2,33 20-JAN CRL-stale
4 Testing and Experimentation
While large-scale testing and experimentation with the application has been
limited, we have been able to do some testing with real data. The RIRs have
cooperated to supply data in order to test our software. All certiﬁcates and
CRLs from the ﬁve RIRs and their subordinates have been cached on a single
server, with the cache updated intermittently. Noticeably absent from this data
are any ROAs, since ROAs are objects that have only recently been deﬁned
and therefore are not currently used by ISPs as a means to express origin AS
authorization. Therefore we have generated our own ROAs in compliance with
the current speciﬁcation [21].
There are two diﬀerent scenarios of interest from the viewpoint of perfor-
mance. The ﬁrst is the initial synchronization and loading, when the software
starts from a clean state and does a full read of all the data. The second is an
incremental update, where the software starts with a local repository and data-
base that reﬂects the state at the time of last execution, and then reads only the
changes to the current state. The amount of work required for an incremental
update depends on the number of objects added, modiﬁed, or deleted since the
previous update, which in turn depends in large part on the time since the pre-
vious update. We anticipate that an update will be performed roughly once a
day; since the number of objects updated in this time period is typically only a
fraction of the total number of objects, we focused on the initial synchronization
and load as the performance bottleneck. We also evaluated the performance of
28 D. Montana and M. Reynolds
the load operation when cryptographic validation was omitted, in order to give
us an estimate of how much time was spent in validation.
Our test for the initial synchronization and load for the non-ROA objects
involved 22,633 certiﬁcates and 10,528 CRLs. The total time required was 20
minutes and 2 seconds. This is divided into the time for synchronization with
the remote repository, which required 426 seconds (about 3.1 minutes), and the
time for the load, which required 776 seconds (12.9 minutes). The synchroniza-
tion time depends strongly on the network throughput, while the load time
depends on the speed of the local computer. (Our tests were done on a single
CPU running at 1.6 GHz.) Note that if we had broken the data into ﬁve separate
remote repositories, 80% of the time for synchronization could have been exe-
cuted in parallel with the load, hence reducing the time by around 340 seconds
(about 5.6 minutes). We anticipate that an incremental synchronization and load
would be well under a minute, although we were not able to test this because the
repository was not being updated when we performed our experiments. With-
out cryptographic validation, the time for the load was 226 seconds (about 3.7
minutes); since the average validation path was three or four certiﬁcates long,
we could have saved roughly 400 seconds (about 6.6 minutes) by validating only
the last link in the chain (knowing that the remainder of the chain has already
been validated).
We generated 10,000 ROAs to be loaded (but not synchronized because we
stored them locally). We do not know how many ROAs will be in real system
if this approach is adopted, but this should be within an order of magnitude of
the actual number. In a real system, after the RIR and occasional NIR tier, one
would expect each CA certiﬁcate to be accompanied by at least one EE certiﬁcate
and one ROA. The number 10,000 is consistent with our 22k certiﬁcates and 10k
CRLs, on the basis of this reasoning. Loading these ROAs required 281 seconds
(about 4.7 minutes).
The remaining question then is how long it takes to generate a ﬁle containing
the BGP output values speciﬁed by these 10,000 ROAs, since this operation will
need to be performed every day. The answer is 297 seconds (about 5 minutes).
We have already identiﬁed a potential modiﬁcation to the ROA validation step
(involving putting more of the ROA data ﬁelds in the database), however, and
anticipate that this time can be dramatically reduced. Initial experiments indi-
cate that if this proposed modiﬁcation is implemented, the total amount of time
to process all 10,000 ROAs could be reduced to less than ten seconds.
It is worthwhile to note that an alternate implementation of RPKI valida-
tion has been carried out at ISC [22]. This code contains an implementation of
validation as an integrated part of rsync, their combined version being called
“rcynic”. It also contains a variety of Python scripts for manipulating certiﬁcate
and CRL information in a database. While this might appear similar to our
RPKI software, BBN’s focus has been on generating an end-to-end solution that
is optimized for ROA validation and BGP output ﬁle generation, and thus we
believe that the two are not directly comparable.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has described BBN’s implementation of a software suite for a re-
source PKI in which the resources are certiﬁcates, CRLs, and, most importantly
ROAs. The RPKI software performs all the syntactic and semantic validation
steps necessary in order to arrive at a set of trusted AS# to IP-address block
assignments that can be used to generate BGP ﬁlters. In the course of creating
the RPKI software, a novel deferred validation algorithm was developed. The
algorithm was optimized for the “validate everything” paradigm of the RPKI.
Performance testing indicates that even for very large repositories it will be pos-
sible to perform a complete ﬁlter generation run on a daily basis. The RPKI
continues to evolve as aspects of the RPKI itself evolve.
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Abstract. PKI has a history of very poor support for revocation. It is
both too expensive and too coarse grained, so that private keys which
are compromised or otherwise become invalid remain in use long after
they should have been revoked. This paper considers Instant Revocation,
or revocations which take place within a second or two.
A new revocation scheme, Certiﬁcate Push Revocation (CPR) is de-
scribed which can support instant revocation. CPR can be hundreds to
thousands of times more Internet-bandwidth eﬃcient than traditional
and widely deployed schemes. It also achieves signiﬁcant improvements
in cryptographic overheads. Its costs are essentially independent of the
number of queries, encouraging widespread use of PKI authentication.
Although explored in the context of instant revocation, CPR is even
more eﬃcient—both in relative and absolute terms—when used with
coarser grain (non-instant) revocations.
Keywords: Public Key Infrastructure, Revocation.
1 Introduction
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a means of binding a public key
with the user who is the key holder. This binding is in the form of an identity
certiﬁcate, signed by a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA).
Using the key holder’s identity certiﬁcate, a third party can verify that a state-
ment’s digital signature was produced by the key holder: The public key is used to
verify that the signature is for the statement and the binding identiﬁes the user.
The party that relies on a signature, called the relying party, generally bears
the risk if the signature is defective. This risk is reduced by ensuring that the CA
is trustworthy and the identity certiﬁcate information is current. Trustworthi-
ness comes from relying on the software and procedures for issuing certiﬁcates;
perhaps the single most important component is that the CA protects its private
key from disclosure or misuse. To safeguard the CA’s private key, it is desirable
to keep it oﬄine, and carefully log its use. This limits how often the CA can
sign certiﬁcates and hence argues for longed lived certiﬁcates, typically on the
order of a year. To prevent a relying party from using stale information, it is
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necessary to check that the information is still valid—that is, that the binding
has not been revoked. (In general, an identity certiﬁcate can be revoked because
the private key was exposed or because the binding is no longer valid.)
Unfortunately, the revocation problemhas long been a diﬃcultly in PKI, both
in obtaining timeliness and eﬃciency of revocation mechanisms. The cost of re-
vocations is the dominant cost for a PKI [23]. Rivest, for example, suggested
short lived certiﬁcates [20], but this requires frequent signings and hence ex-
poses the CA’s private key to attack, especially if it can no longer be kept oﬀ
line. Gutmann called revocation a Grand Challenge problem in PKI [6] and dis-
cusses several issues with it [5]. At a recent security architectures workshop1,
Sandhu stated PKI’s critical need is for instant revocation, which he described
as revocations which take place within a couple of seconds. Instant revocation
is interesting since it states the problem as a requirement (recency of revocation
information) rather than a mechanism for achieving it (eg. on-line queries).
We therefore consider the problem of instant revocation, which, following
Sandhu, is deﬁned as a revocation mechanism which can invalidate an identity
certiﬁcate in no more than a second. In addition to invalidation, the revocation
must be propagated to its destination to be used by the relying party. To achieve
a total revocation delay of two seconds, the propagation delay must be no more
than a second2.
We introduce a new PKI revocation scheme, which we call Certicate Push
Revocation (CPR). Our focus here is on the design of the Validity Authority
(VA) which revokes certiﬁcates, the cachewhich hold copies of revocations, and
the relying party. (Normally, the VA would be would be part of the CA, but we
separate them here to emphasize VA function.) While CPR was developed for in-
stant revocation, it is even more eﬃcient (and some requirements can be relaxed)
when used for longer revocation intervals. CPR relies on eﬃciently pushing the
updates towards the relying party, rather than a combination of pull and push
as in other schemes.
The instant revocation problem is complicated because authentication takes
place in a distributed environment amongst diﬀerent organizations which may
have limited trust in each other. Hence, the authentication should be robust,
that is support deniability resistance3, so that the relying party can prove after
the fact that the certiﬁcate was authenticated. This is the strongest guarantee
to the relying party that a VA can make, since the VA cannot later deny the
status that it provided.
1 ACM 1st Computer Security Architectures Workshop, Panel on Distributed Authen-
tication, Panelists Angelos Keromytis, Ravi Sandhu, and Sara “Scout” Sinclair.
2 As network latency requirements seems inherent in any instant revocation scheme,
and are not PKI speciﬁc, we do not consider them further here. Note that even
on-line checks experience a round trip delay.
3 We use deniability resistance to mean that with a few assumptions (the private key
is under the sole control of the key holder and the crypto is not broken) then the key
holder must have signed the statement. Of these assumptions, the “sole control” is
the most likely to be violated. Nonetheless, deniability resistance has the minimum
set of assumptions and therefore is the best basis for dispute resolution.
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There are further requirements, since the above timing requirement can be
trivially met with existing techniques—for example, a digital signature certifying
the status can be computed in well under a second. The scheme therefore must
also be eﬃcient in its use of resources—in particular, it must be economical in
its use of Internet bandwidth.
Hence, investigators traditionally measure the eﬃciency of certiﬁcate revo-
cation schemes in term of their Internet bandwidth. To analyze and optimize
revocation schemes accurately, it is important that the costs be accurately cap-
tured in the model. However, the network metric traditionally used is bits/day,
although bandwidth is typically priced in terms of peak bandwidth usage, as
the bandwidth provider must build out network hardware resources to address
this peak demand. Hence, if there is signiﬁcant diﬀerence in peak demand vs.
average demand, average bit rates do not accurately reﬂect costs. Therefore we
analyze, and our goal is to minimize, peak Internet bit rates. In particular, local
network costs are inexpensive and hence ignored (although we show that local
bandwidth requirements are modest).
Ideally, a revocation scheme should achieve the following goals:
1. Support instant revocation,
2. Eﬃciently use peak network bandwidth for the VA,
3. Eﬃciently use network bandwidth for the relying party,
4. Eﬃciently use computational resources at the VA,
5. Eﬃciently use computational resources at the relying party,
6. VA costs should increase minimally as revocation checks increase, and
7. VA vulnerability to attack should be minimized.
Item (1) is a requirement for PKI in high value operations. Items (2)-(5) are
necessary to make the scheme economically viable4; Item (6) encourages use,
thus increasing the value of the PKI facility; item (7) is desirable to protect the
VA (and its high value keys) from attack.
CPR achieves all 7 of these goals. In contrast, existing techniques clearly
fail to eﬃciently achieve the two-second goal. Existing techniques either have
high cost per use (e.g., a digital signature) or costs which depend on the time
granularity (e.g., hash chains) which make them more expensive to use for instant
revocation. Techniques which attempt to aggregate unrelated information (such
as revocation lists) increase transmission size and thus network costs.
CPR is also suitable for coarser grained revocation. We believe that, when
applicable, it sets records as best in class for (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6); in some
cases the improvements are by orders of magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the background,
Section 3 describes related work, and Section 4 characterizes VA attributes.
Section 5 presents CPR. Section 6 shows the performance of CPR against OCSP
4 Peak rate is used for the VA and average rate for the relying party. The VA’s sole
mission is to support PKI (and hence its peak network bandwidth is solely for the
support of revocations), while the relying party caries on a variety of tasks and hence
it is somewhat less sensitive to peak rates.
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and CRS and describes how to combine CPR with other schemes to support
low-bandwidth, intermittently connected computers. Section 7 describes security
considerations and then we conclude.
2 Background
Revocation schemes have followed a common architecture, using a VA and, op-
tionally, a set of caches. They vary in the algorithms and protocols used to
provide up-to-date information. Revocation schemes are centered around the
following 4 components:
VA holds the secrets (such as private keys and/or hash chain seeds) necessary
for revocation and thus produces deniability resistant validity information.
Caches hold replicas of the information produced by the VA and answer
queries as to the validity (revocation status) of certiﬁcates. Caches do not
hold secrets and need not be trusted. Hence, for schemes in which secrets are
necessary to answer queries, the VA answers queries directly and the cache
is eliminated.
Signing party is the user whose private key is used to produce a digital signa-
ture and who is the subject of authentication.
Relying party is the user who receives a digitally signature, determines who
it corresponds to, and validates it.
In general, each of the above entities is administered by a diﬀerent organization,
and hence the network traﬃc between them is typically routed over the Internet.
These parties and the communications between them are shown in Figure 1.
VA Cache
signing
party
relying
party
Fig. 1. Parties to a revocation scheme
Although both VA and cache costs are borne by the same entity, they are
managed diﬀerently because their security needs are diﬀerent; the VA must be
trusted for integrity and availability while caches collectively need only supply
suﬃcient availability. This enables the caches to be outsourced. The cost of a
revocation scheme is measured by the cost of Internet traﬃc from VA to cache
(providing the basis of authentication) plus the queries to the caches (or VA) as
to the validity of speciﬁc certiﬁcates.
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The queries can be made by the relying party or the signing party. With
traditional revocations periods, such as a day, cache costs are reduced by sending
information to the signing party. Given a single query, the signing party can send
the validity information to multiple relying parties until the revocation period
expires. However, signer caches has negligible advantage with instant revocation
and thus the signing party saves network bandwidth when the cache transmits
revocation information to the relying party. Moreover, this optimization does
not increase cache costs. It is also more secure, as it prevents the signing party
from sending dated information when she knows that her entry is about to be,
or already has been, revoked (for example, just after she is ﬁred).
3 Related Work
Initial designs for PKI centered on Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists (CRLs) which
are lists of bad certiﬁcates digitally signed by a VA. CRLs are patterned after oﬀ-
line bad credit card number lists which were published by credit card issuers and
used by retailers; a credit card not in the list was assumed to be good. To reduce
the CRL publication and use costs, two CRL variants are used: segmented CRLs
(partitioned by certiﬁcate serial number, alternatively see [12]) or delta CRLs
(containing the changes since the previously published CRL). As revocations
are typically assumed in the literature to be about 10% [15], CRLs constitute a
non-trivial share of the VA plus CA databases. CRLs are ineﬃcient due to their
size and frequent publication (needed to ensure timeliness) [15,20].
CRLs are patterned after an oﬄine technique, so its natural that there be
an on-line version. In order to provide deniability resistance, its necessary for
the relying party to have positive proof that a certiﬁcate has not been revoked.
To provide this property, an On-Line Certicate Status Protocol (OCSP) signs
each revocation request [18]. OCSP provides high timeliness, but the signature
increases query network bandwidth and CPU costs. The OCSP scheme we con-
sider here does not use caches, an alternative to OCSP-based scheme uses mul-
tiple private keys to enable some secrets to be moved to the caches [10].
Micali proposed an authentication scheme called Certicate Revocation Sys-
tem (CRS) [14,15,16] which combines Lamport’s hash chains with certiﬁcates.
Lamport’s scheme uses a cryptographic hash H(x), applied n times to a hash
seeds, Hn(s) to support n authentications [11]. The hash function H and the
top of the hash chain Hn(s) are public information while s is secret. Authenti-
cation i is proved by providing ai = Hn i(s) which can be veriﬁed by showing
that Hn(s) = Hi(ai). It is computationally infeasible to determine s from H(s).
CRS uses a hash value for each revocation period. Hash chains have two main
advantages over signing; hash values are an order of magnitude smaller, and
about 10,000 times more eﬃcient to compute, than a signature.
Hashing is also useful to summarize an arbitrary amount of data, such as some
part of the VA database. If only part of the data is used or changed, then an
eﬃcient alternative to a simple hash is a tree of hash values—called a Merkle
Tree [13]. As with a single hash, the root of the Merkle Tree summarizes the
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whole data. The tree is constructed recursively from the children; given two
children containing values d0 and d1, the parent contains H(d0|d1) where ‘|’ is
concatenation. Given S values, stored at the leaves, logS hash values are needed
to compute the root of the tree and thus verify the value.
Certicate Revocation Trees (CRTs) uses a tree whose leaves are ranges of
values [9]. A certiﬁcate is valid if its serial number falls within one of the ranges of
the CRT and is otherwise revoked. Every new time period, a signed list of revoked
certiﬁcates is sent to the cache, which updates (and rebalances) its tree. The
drawback of this scheme is that certiﬁcate validations requires logarithmic (in
the number of certiﬁcates) hash values—using a Merkle Tree—plus a signature.
Hence, it reduces VA-to-cache costs while increasing query costs.
To reduce VA to cache costs versus CRS, Goyal proposed using hash chains
(based on CRS) to authenticate groups of certiﬁcates [4]. The hash chain is
attached to a validity certiﬁcate which has a validity bit for each certiﬁcate in the
range. If one of the (previously valid) certiﬁcates became invalid, a new certiﬁcate
would be issued with a new hash chain. This scheme increases revocation-to-
cache costs while decreasing query costs.
We do not consider certiﬁcate chains in our performance comparisons. All of
the schemes (including our own) handle certiﬁcate chain processing, but such
considerations drive up the authentication cost of other schemes while having
no eﬀect on our own. The cost of chains can be reduced for other schemes using
synthetic certiﬁcates [21].
We consider only revocation here, and not the reason for revocation (i.e.,
status), although CPR could be extended to do so. For a fuller discussion of
PKI revocation and status issues see [8,7].
An alternative approach for revocation is to revoke public keys rather than
the certiﬁcates which contain them. For example, security mediated PKI does
this with a mediator which the relying party queries [24,25]
4 Characterization of VAs
We next describe the parameters which have the greatest impact on the per-
formance of revocation schemes. Each certiﬁcate is assumed to have a serial
number; serial numbers are consecutively issued by the CA5. Two of the most
signiﬁcant parameters of the VA are the number of certicates , denoted N and
the annual revocation rate, denoted R. From these, the size of the active range
of serial number, Nr = N/R can be derived. Q is the number of authentication
(queries) per user per day. We are interested in peak performance, the peaks are
characterized relative to average authorizations and revocations:
– Pa is the ratio of authentications in the busiest second to that of the average
second, and
– Pr is the ratio of revocations in the busiest second to that of the average
second.
5 It is possible to extend this scheme to allow, for example, multiple series of sequence
numbers.
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We consider two VA sizes, the small VA with N = 10, 000, 000 and the large
VA with N = 100, 000, 000. These values are summarized in Table 1. To be
conservative, we have chosen Pa ranges to be relatively modest (since that aﬀects
only traditional schemes) while chosen Pr ranges to be more aggressive (since
that aﬀects only CPR).
Table 1. Certiﬁcate Authority statistics
Parameter Meaning Small VA Large VA
N Certiﬁcates 10,000,000 100,000,000
R Annual revocation fraction .1 .1
Nr Size of serial number range N/R N/R
Q Number of authentications per certiﬁcate per day 1–64 1–64
Pa Peak–ratio of authentications 1–10 1–10
Pr Peak–ratio of revocations 1–100 1–100
Table 2. Crypto++ benchmarks on AMD Opteron 2.4 GHz processor
Operation Time Cycles
SHA-1 (Hashing) 0.546 μs 999 + 10.6 cycles/byte
RSA 2048 Signature 5,950.000 μs 10,890,000
RSA 2048 Veriﬁcation 150.000 μs 280,000
The schemes described here use cryptographic hashing, digital signatures, and
Merkle (Hash) Trees. For the purposes of presenting performance, we use 2048-
bit RSA signatures and SHA-1 hashing. The cost of cryptographic operations
are shown in Table 2 (for further information see http://www.cryptopp.com/
benchmarks-amd64.html). The table’s numbers are for a current but inexpensive
processor.
5 Certiﬁcate Push Revocation (CPR)
CPR provides the relying party with suﬃcient information to validate any cer-
tiﬁcate. Figure 2 shows the parties to CPR. Rather than the cache being owned
by the VA as in other schemes, in CPR the cache is owned by, and located at,
the relying party6. This does 3 things
– The VA does not pay any cache costs, resulting in substantial savings. These
savings include elimination of cache hosting and, most importantly, queries;
– The cache cost (including queries) is essentially zero, since it is co-located
with the relying party which performs revocation checking; and
– The relying party, which is taking the risk, can make tradeoﬀs which mini-
mize costs.
6 We distinguish our scheme from others in which the cache must be trusted.
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Because the cache has no secrets (integrity depends only on VA operations)
moving it to the relying party does not reduce security. The cost to the relying
party is very low.
VA
Cachesigning
party
relying
party
Fig. 2. Parties to CPR
Locating the cache at the relying party enables it to perform many authenti-
cations per second for not much more than the price of a single authentication.
But more importantly, it is the relying party which needs the assurance that the
information is valid (and thus will invest appropriately to protect it).
Finally, the relying party can chose when to take or mitigate risks depending
on its business model. For example, it might choose a lower cost (and availability)
system at the price of increased fraud. Diﬀerent businesses are subject to diﬀerent
risks, for example a web-based retailer may choose after-the-fact veriﬁcation,
while an investment brokerage ﬁrm may refuse to perform a transaction without
up-to-date veriﬁcation. Indeed, such a tradeoﬀ is inherent [2,3].
Because the cache is maintained at the client site, and CPR has many caches,
we need to consider cache failure. Of course, other schemes need to recover from
cache failure, but papers have traditionally ignored this cost because it is small
in traditional schemes. Hence, we’ll measure it carefully for CPR and assume
it’s cost is zero for other schemes.
Moreover, to ensure that we count all costs and provide maximum security
for the VA, access to the VA is limited to the minimum necessary: that which
performs revocation and addition of new certiﬁcate serial numbers. To enable
recovery under this scenario, the VA continually broadcasts recovery information.
If a cache fails, it simply listens to this broadcast channel until it is up to date.
Instant revocation relies on posting revocations once a second. In CPR, all
revocations for the past second are posted to the cache. Revocations are the slow-
est changing part of the system, and so having updates depend on revocations is
likely to be more eﬃcient than other techniques (this is how CRT achieves low
VA-to-cache costs). For example, assuming an annual revocation rate of 10%,
the small VA will have 0.032 revocations per second while the large VA will
have 0.317 revocations per second. This enables the certicate validity vector a
vector which contains a bit for each certiﬁcate indicating whether that certiﬁ-
cate has been revoked—to be kept up-to-date at the relying party. Furthermore,
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although each cache holds the entire revocation database, it is a relatively small
data structure, for example, for the Large VA it is less than 20 megabytes.
Our protocol is exceeding simple. Every second it sends out:
1. The summary (i.e. the root of the Merkle tree) of certiﬁcate validity vector,
2. The revocations in the last second, and
3. Part of the certiﬁcate validity vector for some range of certiﬁcates.
Item (1) is used to secure revocations. Item (2) is used to update certiﬁcate
validity vector. Item (3) is used for recovery after a cache failure. (Recovery
after a VA failure is provided by simply sending out the “updates” once the VA
comes up).
Revoker. We ﬁrst describe the revoker, which contains items (1) and (2). The
revoker data structure is shown in Table 3. We have tried to be conservative in
its design (no more than the number of bits speciﬁed are required), although if a
few thousand more bits are needed it is of little consequence as only one revoker
is issued per second.
Table 3. Revoker
Name Bits Purpose
time 64 Number of seconds since epoch
min 32 Minimum certiﬁcate serial number
max 32 Maximum certiﬁcate serial number
hash 160 Merkle hash root of certiﬁcate validity vector
srv 32 size of the rv
rv 32srv Revocation vector
signature 2048 RSA 2048 bit signature
2368 + 32srv total bits
It contains the time in seconds since some epoch as a 64-bit integer; to ensure
that the relying party has the latest update, it needs a reasonably accurate
clock7.
The min and max are the minimum and maximum certiﬁcate serial numbers.
The max increases when new certiﬁcates are issued. The min increases when the
lowest certiﬁcate serial number for the VA is either revoked or expires.
The revoker “points” to a certicate validity vector, a bit vector of length
max−min+1 with bit i being 1 if certiﬁcate min+i is not revoked and 0 other-
wise. As certiﬁcates are issued in order, and about 10% are revoked during the
year, the bit vector is of length Nr.
7 Time synchronization protocols such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) easily provide
synchronization to a small fraction of a second [17]. Other time sources include GPS
and radio receivers; obtaining an accurate time source is inexpensive. Moreover, the
relying party can always use a slightly older revoker (i.e., the last one received).
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Table 4. Certiﬁcate Validity Segment
Name Bits Purpose
time 64 Number of seconds since epoch
startVec 32 starting certiﬁcate serial number of the vector
sizeVec 32 size of the validity vector
valVec Nr /Trecovery 1/Trecovery fraction of the validity vector
signature 2048 RSA 2048-bit signature
Finally, to enable the cache to update its certiﬁcate validity vector, the revo-
cations that occurred in the last H seconds are sent (H can be set to 1 or larger,
and is a parameter related to fault tolerance). The cost of additional revocations
(due to Pa > 1 or H > 1) is quite small because the average number of revo-
cations is very small and because a 32-bit serial number is signiﬁcantly smaller
than a 2048-bit signature (both are ﬁelds of the revoker).
The algorithm at the cache is as follows:
– Each second the revoker is received and used to update the local copy of the
certiﬁcate validity vector (by turning oﬀ bits corresponding to the revoked
certiﬁcates and adjusting the bit vector to reﬂect the new valid range);
– The root of the Merkle tree is computed over the bit vector;
– The computed hash is valid if it equals the hash in the revoker and the
signature in the revoker is valid; and
– The bit vector can then be used to check an arbitrary number of revocations
in the next second.
Certicate Validity Segment. The certiﬁcate validity segment, used to construct
the certiﬁcate validity vector at the cache, is described here.
Every second a certiﬁcate validity segment containing 1/Trecovery of the cer-
tiﬁcate validity vector is transmitted; in Trecovery seconds the entire certiﬁcate
validity vector is transmitted. Hence, smaller Trecovery results in faster recovery
after a failure, but at a higher bit rate.
The ﬁelds of the certiﬁcate validity segment are shown in Table 4. The time
ﬁeld is as in the revoker. The current portion of the certiﬁcate validity vector is
described by:
startVec the starting certiﬁcate serial number of the vector,
sizeVec the size of the vector, and
valVec the bits of this segment of the certiﬁcate validity vector.
Its possible to save some bits (the signature and some time) by combining the
certiﬁcate validity segment with the revoker. However, the certiﬁcate validity
segment is used only for recovery while the revoker is used to validate signatures,
so there is an advantage of making the revoker small as it reduces average relying
party bandwidth requirements.
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Table 5. OCSP network bandwidth and CPU costs
Auth/sec bits/sec CPU cores
Q Pa Small VA Big VA Small VA Big VA Small VA Big VA
1 1 115.74 1,157.41 244,444.44 2,444,444.44 0.69 6.89
4 1 462.96 4,629.63 977,777.78 9,777,777.78 2.75 27.55
16 1 1,851.85 18,518.52 3,911,111.11 39,111,111.11 11.02 110.19
64 1 7,407.41 74,074.07 15,644,444.44 156,444,444.44 44.07 440.74
1 5 578.70 5,787.04 1,222,222.22 12,222,222.22 3.44 34.43
4 5 2,314.81 23,148.15 4,888,888.89 48,888,888.89 13.77 137.73
16 5 9,259.26 92,592.59 19,555,555.56 195,555,555.56 55.09 550.93
64 5 37,037.04 370,370.37 78,222,222.22 782,222,222.22 220.37 2,203.70
1 10 1,157.41 11,574.07 2,444,444.44 24,444,444.44 6.89 68.87
4 10 4,629.63 46,296.30 9,777,777.78 97,777,777.78 27.55 275.46
16 10 18,518.52 185,185.19 39,111,111.11 391,111,111.11 110.19 1,101.85
64 10 74,074.07 740,740.74 156,444,444.44 1,564,444,444.44 440.74 4,407.41
6 Performance
The performance of revocation schemes is measured here by two metrics: The
primary performance metric is Internet network bandwidth and secondarily, the
cost of performing cryptographic operations.
In particular, we consider the eﬀect of peak rate authentications and revoca-
tions8. This will almost certainly be signiﬁcantly higher than the average rates,
and the VA infrastructure must be sized to accommodate them. For example,
ﬁnancial markets are typically opened only a limited number of hours per day
and in addition tend to see the greatest volume at opening and closing; more-
over, trading volume varies widely on diﬀerent days. In retail, peak sales are
often related to Christmas or New Years shopping, depending on country. It is
the peak load for which these systems must be sized, for example Amazon.com
sizes its systems to work with extreme reliability even for its peak load during
the 2 weeks prior to Christmas. It would seem that minimum peak to average
ratios would be at least 5 although much higher peaks would be necessary in
many scenarios. Sizing for peak loads signiﬁcantly drives up costs; ignoring peak
factors signiﬁcantly distorts costs.
CPR outperforms traditional schemes under peak rates. But CPR’s advan-
tages do not depend on peak rates—it signiﬁcantly outperforms other schemes
under average rate measurements as well (Pa = Pr = 1). Our technique’s advan-
tages increase as the peak authentication ratio increases.
6.1 OCSP
The cost of OCSP depends on Q (average number of authentications per user per
day) and Pa. In Table 5, values are given for Pa equals 1, 5, and 10 and values
8 Although CPR performance is independent of query rate, other schemes such as
OCSP and CSR are not.
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Table 6. CRS network bandwidth and CPU costs
Auth/sec bits/sec CPU cores
Q Pa Small VA Big VA Small VA Big VA Small VA Big VA
1 1 115.74 1,157.41 22,222.22 222,222.22 5.46 54.6
4 1 462.96 4,629.63 88,888.89 888,888.89 5.46 54.6
16 1 1,851.85 18,518.52 355,555.56 3,555,555.56 5.46 54.6
64 1 7,407.41 74,074.07 1,422,222.22 14,222,222.22 5.46 54.6
1 5 578.70 5,787.04 111,111.11 1,111,111.11 5.46 54.6
4 5 2,314.81 23,148.15 444,444.44 4,444,444.44 5.46 54.6
16 5 9,259.26 92,592.59 1,777,777.78 17,777,777.78 5.46 54.6
64 5 37,037.04 370,370.37 7,111,111.11 71,111,111.11 5.46 54.6
1 10 1,157.41 11,574.07 222,222.22 2,222,222.22 5.46 54.6
4 10 4,629.63 46,296.30 888,888.89 8,888,888.89 5.46 54.6
16 10 18,518.52 185,185.19 3,555,555.56 35,555,555.56 5.46 54.6
64 10 74,074.07 740,740.74 14,222,222.22 142,222,222.22 5.46 54.6
for Q of 1 to 64. When Q = 1 and Pa = 1, the result is 116 authentications
per second for the small VA and 1157 per second for the large VA. As each
authentication requires 2112-bits, (a 32-bit certiﬁcate serial number, a 32-bit
time, and a signature). Minimum bit rates for this scheme are about 244,000
bits/second for the small VA and 2,444,000 bits/second for the large VA. They
increase linearly with the number of queries per day. For the large VA, they
exceed over a billion bits per second in a system which has Q = 64 and Pa = 10.
The cost of computing signatures is also signiﬁcant. While very low authenti-
cation and peak rates can be performed with just a few processing cores9, high
rates result in the need for hundreds or thousands of cores (or custom cryp-
tographic hardware). Furthermore, extra expense is incurred for these cores to
suitably protected the highly sensitive private key of the VA.
6.2 CRS
CRS achieves a signiﬁcant savings over OCSP because hash values are so much
smaller than signatures (160 bits vs. 2048 bits) and because the time is implicit
in CRS (by the hash value’s location in the hash chain). CRS’s scheme gains
a factor of 11 in network bandwidth. The corresponding CRS performance in
shown in Table 6. Nevertheless, CRS requires signiﬁcant network bandwidth of
up to 142,000,000 bits/second.
There are also signiﬁcant savings in CPU cores for CRS vs. OCSP, although
the time to compute the hash chains needed is non-trivial; 5.46 processor cores
for the small VA and 54.6 cores for the large VA. This under counts the number
of cores, since it does not count run-time computation needed to recompute these
hash values.
9 Most desktop, notebook, or server processor chips today have 2-4 cores, or indepen-
dent CPUs, and thus able to execute 2-4 independent programs simultaneously.
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6.3 CPR
In CPR, the VA transmits a revoker and certiﬁcate validity segment every sec-
ond. The Internet Protocol’s multicast, enables the same packet to be delivered
to an arbitrary number of Internet destinations. Two multicast groups are used,
one for revoker and another for certiﬁcate validity segment traﬃc. A relying
party can join and leave these multicast groups independently. When a relying
party is running, it is always part of the revoker multicast group; it is only part of
the certiﬁcate validity segment multicast group when recovering from a failure.
The latter is needed for making CPR reliable.
We consider ﬁrst the revoker. Its only variable component is the size of the
rv containing revoked serial numbers (see Table 3). The average number of re-
vocations/second is .032 for the small VA and .317 for the large VA. The peak
number of revocations sent is Pr · H times the average number of revocations.
We note that bandwidth usage is not too heavily related to this value for the
ranges of Pr and H considered here. Moreover, CPR is totally independent of
the number of queries.
The results for a variety of values of H and Pr are shown in Table 7. For
example, when H = 10 and P = 100 (a very conservative choice), the average
number of bits during peak load is 3,382 for a small VA and 12,512 for a large
VA. These are the only updates needed during normal operation.
Table 7. Revoker bits
avg. bits/second
H Pr Small VA Large VA
1 1 2,369.01 2,378.14
1 5 2,373.07 2,418.72
1 10 2,378.14 2,469.44
1 50 2,418.72 2,875.20
1 100 2,469.44 3,382.40
5 1 2,373.07 2,418.72
5 5 2,393.36 2,621.60
5 10 2,418.72 2,875.20
5 50 2,621.60 4,904.00
5 100 2,875.20 7,440.00
avg. bits/second
H Pr Small VA Large VA
10 1 2,378.14 2,469.44
10 5 2,418.72 2,875.20
10 10 2,469.44 3,382.40
10 50 2,875.20 7,440.00
10 100 3,382.40 12,512.00
20 1 2,388.29 2,570.88
20 5 2,469.44 3,382.40
20 10 2,570.88 4,396.80
20 50 3,382.40 12,512.00
20 100 4,396.80 22,656.00
The cost of cryptography at the VA is extremely modest (it is even less at the
relying party).
– Two RSA signatures—one signature for the revoker and one for the certiﬁ-
cate validity segment (11.90 milliseconds),
– Update of the Merkle tree for a Small/Large VA (39/347 microseconds),
using the maximum Pr = 100.
That is, the cryptographic cost is a small fraction of a single core.
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The cost to the relying party is signiﬁcantly smaller than to the VA, as
it veriﬁes a signature (150 μs) rather than signs (5,950 μs). Hence, the CPU
cost/second at the relying party is less than 1 millisecond (339/647 μs).
We next consider the certiﬁcate validity segment. The peak network band-
width on this multicast channel is dependent on Trecovery. We consider recovery
periods from one to ﬁve minutes. Our goal is to measure the bandwidth from two
points of view, the cache and the VA. The bandwidth requirements depend on
Trecovery and are a bit more than a T1 line10 (each 1.536 MBits/s) at 60 second
recovery and only a few hundred thousand bits/second at a 5 minute recovery.
Table 8. Instant revocation recovery information network costs
bits/second
Trecovery Small VA Big VA
60 187,361.19 1,854,127.85
120 94,768.59 928,201.93
300 39,213.04 372,646.37
CPR is designed for instant revocation. However, it is the only scheme an-
alyzed whose network cost decreaseswith longer revocation intervals (mostly
due to fewer signatures). All of the other scheme’s network cost depend only on
the number of queries, and are therefore independent of the revocation interval.
Hence, CPR’s absolute and relative performance advantages improve with longer
revocation intervals, making it advantageous to use at all revocation intervals.
6.4 Blended Schemes
CPR is clearly very inexpensive for the VA, so we now consider its eﬀect on
the relying party. For a relying party with a high speed Internet connection,
CPR’s bandwidth use is modest, especially given ISP practices11. However, in-
stant revocation may be impractical for computers connected intermittently or
at low-speed. These schemes can also be used to avoid ﬁrewall limitations in
large companies, by setting up a directory outside the ﬁrewall.
In general, cache schemes are either trusted or untrusted. A trusted cache
means that the relying party cannot verify that the information provided by the
cache is the same as that provided by the VA. For example, a trusted cache
might be maintained by one’s employer. An untrusted cache means that the
cache must provide a deniability resistant proof that the cache information is
the same as that provided by the VA.
10 The standard unit of commercial Internet bandwidth.
11 Cable/DSL ISP’s typically have a gap between actual vs. advertised bandwidth,
due to insuﬃcient Internet bandwidth. However, CPR is very low cost in terms of
Internet bandwidth due to multicast, and hence its bandwidth may be almost free
(decrease the gap) rather than slowing down other connections.
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There are three no-cost cache extensions—i.e., they do not increase VA band-
width or computational costs—which enable intermittent or low-speed comput-
ers to be connected:
trusted cache. Each query to a trusted cache can be answered with “revoked”
or “non-revoked”. This combines Gutmann’s on-line query with deniability
resistance from the trusted cache. An example of a trusted cache is the
webDAV cache [1].
untrusted cache (ISP). A cache provided by the relying party’s ISP does not
consume additional Internet bandwidth (only bandwidth between the relying
party and ISP)12.
untrusted cache (signing party). Cache information can be provided by the
signing party, assuming the signing party is not low bandwidth.
Untrusted caches for CPR can be implemented most easily with CRT-style query
responses as no change is needed in VA-to-cache traﬃc. The query response
includes the latest revoker, the 512-bit part of the certiﬁcate validity vector
containing the certiﬁcate’s validity bit and a logarithmic number of hash values
(3072-bits plus the revoker). The relying party can then verify that the query
response was provided by the VA 13.
Table 9. Comparison of diﬀerent schemes
Costs increased revoc period
Crypto Network Deniability Uses Reduced Reduced
Technique Cost Cost Resistance Cache Networking Crypto
OCSP High High yes no no no
CRS Medium Medium yes no no yes
CRT Low High yes yes yes yes
CPR Low Low yes yes yes yes
trusted dir. Low Low no yes no no
If the above techniques are not suﬃcient for revocations, CPR can be com-
bined with other schemes to reduce overall system costs. It is proﬁtable to do
so, because instant revocation minimizes query costs which dominate overall VA
costs in traditional schemes; hence satisfying even a fraction of the queries by
instant revocation will save Internet bandwidth.
Therefore, the VA can also do OCSP or CRS style revocation. This would
increase VA query costs, which need to go out over the Internet. To a ﬁrst order
approximation, if the percentage of requests which can be answered by CPR, the
12 This is advantageous to the ISP as it reduces Internet query costs. Fielding of such
a service is analogous to providing DNS servers, which all ISP’s do.
13 Further optimization can be achieved by splitting the revoker into two components,
one with the Merkle tree root and the other with the revoked certiﬁcate serial
numbers.
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ISP, or a trusted cache is p, then p is the savings in bandwidth over a non-blended
approach. The diﬀerences in the various schemes are summarized in Table 9.
We believe that with the no-cost cache extensions above, the vast majority of
revocations can be answered without the VA incurring Internet query costs.
7 Security Considerations
Since the VA only countersigns certiﬁcates from the CA, its security implications
are limited. A compromised VA can:
– Revoke certiﬁcates which are valid or
– Fail to revoke certiﬁcates which are invalid.
Such security violations can be detected by auditing at any relying party.
Any VA is going to depend on a correct stream of new certiﬁcate and revo-
cation information. Similarly, any VA is subject to denial-of-service attacks on
the VA or VA-to-cache path.
Other than that, the VA is the only trusted entity for the integrity of the
system. The VA signs both the changes and the hash of the certiﬁcate valid-
ity vector. Hence, assuming that its private key is kept private, the signature
and hashing scheme are not broken, and that its rather simple calculations are
performed correctly, the integrity of the system is ensured.
Further, we assume that revocations are not conﬁdential. Knowledge of cer-
tiﬁcate validity is public, and hence its disclosure does not violate security.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented, CPR, a revocation scheme which is capable of instant revo-
cation and is eﬃcient. This is the ﬁrst practical PKI revocation scheme which
meets this goal.
It is eﬃcient in network traﬃc as it reduces external network traﬃc to little
more than the rate of revocations, the slowest changing part of the revocation
system. It shows improvements in Internet bandwidth of 100s to 1000s times
over well known and widely used techniques. It is so eﬃcient that it is trivial to
add in redundancy so that the scheme is robust.
Additionally, it requires very little computational resources and can be 10s to
1000s of times more eﬃcient than other schemes. For the case of low bandwidth,
intermittently connected devices CPR can be blended with other techniques.
Several of these blends do not increase VA costs over a pure instant revocation
scheme.
CPR eliminates the VA’s need to provide caches—and the queries made by
signing or relying parties against them—by co-locating the cache with the relying
party. It does this at very low cost to the relying party. Finally, it allows the
relying party to make tradeoﬀs of availability vs. risk of fraud by using somewhat
slightly older revocation information.
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Although our goal was to meet requirements of instant revocation, the scheme
is perfectly suitable for revocations which need not be as timely, as it is even
more eﬃcient for longer revocation intervals than it is for instant revocation.
We have started to build a CPR prototype and associated infrastructure us-
ing a simpliﬁed but powerful certiﬁcate system called sayAnyting [22]. These
mechanisms are to be used, among other things, as part of an enterprise-wide
authentication system [19].
References
1. Chadwick, D.W., Anthony, S.: Using webDAV for improved certiﬁcate revocation
and publication. In: Lo´pez, J., Samarati, P., Ferrer, J.L. (eds.) EuroPKI 2007.
LNCS, vol. 4582, pp. 265–279. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
2. Fox, A., Brewer, E.A.: Harvest, yield and scalable tolerant systems. In: Workshop
on Hot Topics in Operating Systems, pp. 174–178 (1999)
3. Gilbert, S., Lynch, N.: Brewer’s conjecture and the feasibility of consistent, avail-
able, partition-tolerant web services. SIGACT News 33(2), 51–59 (2002)
4. Goyal, V.: Certiﬁcate revocation using ﬁne grained certiﬁcate space patitioning.
In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security Conference (2007)
5. Gutmann, P.: PKI: It’s not dead, just resting. IEEE Computer 35(8), 41–49 (2002)
6. Gutmann, P.: Drawing lessons. In: 3rd PKI workshop (2004)
7. Iliadis, J., Gritzalis, S., Spinellis, D., Cock, D.D., Preneel, B., Gritzalis, D.: Towards
a framework for evaluating certiﬁcate status information mechanisms. Computer
Communications 26(16), 1839–1850 (2003)
8. Iliadis, J., Spinellis, D., Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Katsikas, S.: Evaluating certiﬁ-
cate status information mechanisms. In: CCS 2000: Proceedings of the 7th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pp. 1–8. ACM, New York
(2000)
9. Kocher, P.C.: On certiﬁcate revocation and validation. In: Hirschfeld, R. (ed.) FC
1998. LNCS, vol. 1465, pp. 172–177. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
10. Koga, S., Sakurai, K.: Proposal and analysis of a distributed online certiﬁ-
cate status protocol with low communication cost. IEICE Transactions 88-A(1),
247–254 (2005)
11. Lamport, L.: Password authentiﬁcation with insecure communication. Commun.
ACM 24(11), 770–772 (1981)
12. Lopez, J., Mana, A., Montenegro, J.A., Ortega, J.J.: PKI design based on the use
of on-line certiﬁcation authorities. Int. J. Inf. Sec. 2(2), 91–102 (2004)
13. Merkle, R.: A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function. In:
Pomerance, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 1987. LNCS, vol. 293, pp. 369–378. Springer, Hei-
delberg (1988)
14. Micali, S.: Eﬃcient certiﬁcate revocation. Technical report, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA (1996)
15. Micali, S.: Eﬃcient certiﬁcate revocation. In: Proceedings of the RSA Data Security
Conference (1997)
16. Micali, S.: NOVOMODO: Scalable certiﬁcate validation and simpliﬁed PKI man-
agement. In: 1st PKI Workshop (2002)
17. Mills, D.L.: Network Time Protocol (version 3) speciﬁcation, implementation and
analysis. Internet Request for Comment RFC 1305, Internet Engineering Task
Force (March 1992)
48 J.A. Solworth
18. Online certiﬁcate status protocol, version 2. Working document of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF)
19. Radhakrishnan, M., Solworth, J.A.: Netauth: Supporting user-based network ser-
vices. In: Usenix Security (2008)
20. Rivest, R.L.: Can we eliminate certiﬁcate revocations lists? In: Financial Cryptog-
raphy, pp. 178–183 (1998)
21. Russell, S., Dawson, E., Okamoto, E., Lopez, J.: Virtual certiﬁcates and synthetic
certiﬁcates: new paradigms for improving public key validation. Computer Com-
munications 26(16), 1826–1838 (2003)
22. Solworth, J.A.: What can you say? and what does it mean? In: Workshop on
Trusted Collaboration, IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006)
23. Stubblebine, S.: Recent-secure authentication: Enforcing revocation in distributed
systems. In: Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Pri-
vacy, May 1995, pp. 224–234 (1995)
24. Vanrenen, G., Smith, S.W., Marchesini, J.: Distributing security-mediated PKI.
Int. J. Inf. Sec 5(1), 3–17 (2006)
25. Yang, J.-P., Sakurai, K., Rhee, K.H.: Distributing security-mediated PKI revis-
ited. In: Atzeni, A.S., Lioy, A. (eds.) EuroPKI 2006. LNCS, vol. 4043, pp. 31–44.
Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Optimized Certiﬁcates – A New Proposal for
Eﬃcient Electronic Document Signature
Validation
Ricardo Felipe Custo´dio1, Mart´ın A. Gagliotti Vigil1, Juliano Romani1,
Fernando Carlos Pereira2, and Joni da Silva Fraga2
1 Laborato´rio de Seguranc¸a em Computac¸a˜o (LabSEC)
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
Caixa Postal 476 – 88040-900 – Floriano´polis – SC – Brasil
{custodio,vigil,juliano}@inf.ufsc.br
2 Programa de Ps-Graduac¸a˜o em Engenharia Ele´trica
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
{fernando,fraga}@das.ufsc.br
Abstract. Optimized certiﬁcation is a new method for eﬃcient certiﬁ-
cate path veriﬁcation and digital signing. The basic idea is to issue special
certiﬁcates (called optimized certiﬁcates) for an electronic document to
replace the signer’s certiﬁcate. Optimized certiﬁcates are issued to be
only valid for a speciﬁc time, i.e., the ﬁelds notBefore and notAfter of
the certiﬁcate are the same. Therefore, certiﬁcate revocation are not a re-
quirement as it is no longer necessary to request the status of certiﬁcates
from a certiﬁcation authority repository to validate signatures.
1 Introduction
Electronic documents are normally signed using public key cryptographic algo-
rithms [1,2,3] and digital certiﬁcates issued by certiﬁcation authorities [4]. The
signature, however, can only be considered valid if the veriﬁer can trust the
signer’s certiﬁcate.
A ﬁnal CA normally issues certiﬁcates to a signer, that is part of a certiﬁcation
chain. The Root CA of this chain is a trust anchor, which both the signer and the
veriﬁer have to trust. To validate the user’s certiﬁcate it is necessary to validate
all certiﬁcates in this chain.
The validation of a digital certiﬁcate is made both when the signer and the
veriﬁer of the electronic document sign and later verify it. It is necessary for
the signer to verify if the certiﬁcate is still valid in order to be able to generate
a valid signature. Moreover, each time the veriﬁer checks the integrity and the
authenticity of a document, they need to validate the certiﬁcate of the signer.
This work presents an new way of producing artifacts for use in the validation
of the electronic document signatures. These artifacts are a new kind of certiﬁcate
called optimized certiﬁcate. They are a replacement for the signer’s certiﬁcate.
Additionally, the optimized certiﬁcate can be also used as a timestamp of the
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 49–59, 2008.
c© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008
50 R.F. Custo´dio et al.
signature or to show the time when the signature was certify as valid. The
proposed method is ideal for computational systems under special conditions of
limited energy (applications in wireless, ad-hoc nets, etc.).
Section 2 presents a discussion about validating digital certiﬁcates. This is
important for understanding the advantage of optimized certiﬁcates. Section 3
presents in detail the concept of optimized certiﬁcates, its beneﬁts and main
applications. Section 4 introduces the optimized certiﬁcate certiﬁcation authority
and adopted procedures for the issue of optimized certiﬁcates. Section 5 deals
with the validation of digital signatures using optimized certiﬁcates. Section 6
presents a comparison between optimized certiﬁcates and traditional ones and
Sect. 7 contains the conclusion of the paper and some suggestions for future
works.
2 Digital Certiﬁcate Validation
In general, certiﬁcation path processing consists of two phases: path construction
and path validation [5]. Path construction is the determination of one or more
paths between signer certiﬁcate and root CA certiﬁcate resulting in certiﬁcate
chains. The validation phase consists of verifying each certiﬁcate contained in
a chain. It includes checking its integrity, the certiﬁcate’s period of validity, the
existence of any revocation information and certiﬁcate policies [6].
The more certiﬁcates in a chain, the more expensive it is to verify the signa-
ture. Levi et al. [7] improved this process by using nested certiﬁcate-based PKI
that reduce the amount of computer power needed for certiﬁcate chain veriﬁca-
tion. However, this process comes with a high processing cost to CAs, mainly in
CAs where the number of certiﬁcates issued is high in a short period. Revocation
status checking is one of the highest costs to verify the signature. This is consid-
ered an obstacle to use of signed electronic document on a large scale [8]. This
has motivated researchers to pursue alternatives and more eﬃcient veriﬁcation
schemes to establish the revocation status of certiﬁcates [9,10,11,12,13,14,15].
Some defend the idea of eliminating certiﬁcate revocation [16], through the use
of short lifetime certiﬁcates. However, there is no consensus about the best way
of verifying a certiﬁcate’s validity.
Moreover, to validate a signature it is necessary not only to verify digital
certiﬁcate revocation status but also each signature of certiﬁcate in the path
certiﬁcation. It can be argued that the ideal PKI model would be a tree with
only one CA: the root. The Root CA would be the self-signed certiﬁcate and
common trust anchor for all users within this tree. This CA would issue all end
user certiﬁcates as illustrated in Fig. 1. The ﬁgure shows a root CA and three
end user certiﬁcates. The user certiﬁcate u has a validity period v from t1 to
t2. This scenario would conﬁgure the ideal PKI from the point of view of the
user, since it represents the simplest form of a hierarchical PKI in which only
two levels exist [17].
On the other hand, from the point of view of CA managements, a one-
level tree is inadequate, because only one CA is responsible for issuing all
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Fig. 1. One level PKI
certiﬁcates. In order to provide scalability, it
is necessary to increase the number of CAs to
distribute the certiﬁcate issuance load. These
CAs normally are intermediate CAs, which is-
sue certiﬁcates to another intermediate CA or
end users.
The major problem with certiﬁcate validation
is its high cost. Furthermore, this operation is
ineﬃcient and it often needs to be performed. To
prevent this repetitive process, certiﬁcates can
be issued moments before their use. This reduces
the likelihood of revocation and eliminates the
need for revocation schemes [16]. However, this is not common practice, as this
leads to frequent certiﬁcate re-issue.
The next section describes an optimized certiﬁcate to replace the signer cer-
tiﬁcate to give faster and less costly processing of certiﬁcate validation.
3 Optimized Certiﬁcates
Optimized certiﬁcates (OC) aim to improve the validation of electronic docu-
ment signatures, reducing the redundant processing necessary in the traditional
process. With OCs, it is possible to minimize or eliminate the necessity of check-
ing the revocation state of the signer certiﬁcate. The OC is on a basis of the
information about the conventional signer certiﬁcate, the signature of the doc-
ument and the validation of its certiﬁcate chain. The OCs are issued only once
for each document and substitute the traditional signer certiﬁcate as illustrated
in Fig. 2.
(a) Traditional (b) Signature with OC
Fig. 2. Digital signature of electronic documents
In this ﬁgure, Doc is the electronic document, Sig is a digital signature, TS is
the timestamp, CC is the certiﬁcation chain, i.e., all certiﬁcates from signer cer-
tiﬁcate to root CA certiﬁcate, RR is the list of revoked certiﬁcates that allow the
veriﬁcation of the revocation state and CA Root and RR are the Root CA cer-
tiﬁcate and the respective list of revoked certiﬁcates. Comparing the ﬁgures 2(a)
and 2(b) it can be shown that the TS and CC and RR used in the structure
of a traditionally signed document are substituted by two certiﬁcates: the Root
CA and the OC.
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In contrast from a traditional certiﬁcate, the OC is valid only for one speciﬁed
instant of time k, i.e., t1 = t2 of validity period, where t1 is the beginning of
validity and t2 = is the end of validity. This characteristic eliminates the necessity
of any revocation method associated with this certiﬁcate, as it does not make
sense to revoke it; if it was issued, it was valid.
The OC contains all information necessary to validate an electronic document
signature, this is the same information as in traditional signer certiﬁcate. It is
practically a copy of this certiﬁcate, while adding a set of extensions which
carry information related to the hash code of the document, the validity type
of optimized certiﬁcate and others parameters for veriﬁcation of the validity
certiﬁcate sender.
Despite the OC not needing a revocation scheme, it is still necessary to val-
idate the CA certiﬁcate that issued it. This CA, called Optimized Certiﬁcate
Certiﬁcation Authority (OCCA), uses NOVOMODO [18] to include in all OCs
issued an extension that will allow the users to verify its revocation state without
consulting the CA that issued its certiﬁcate. The OCCA, when issuing an OC,
request a proof about validity of its own certiﬁcate to the Root CA. If it is valid,
the OCCA inserts it into the OC. This means that the OC is inherently valid,
because it was veriﬁed when it was issued, it possess in its body a proof that the
OCCA certiﬁcate was valid at the same moment when the OC was created.
The proof of validity of the OCCA certiﬁcate is the parameter Yn−k of
NOVOMODO that allows the veriﬁcation of the state of a certiﬁcate at instant k.
4 Optimized Certiﬁcate Certiﬁcation Authority
4.1 The OCCA
The OCCA must provide services on-line, once it can receive a request certiﬁcate
for issuing an OC. Based on this requirement, on the necessity of scalability
and the reducing number of certiﬁcates in the certiﬁcation chain, the OCCA is
proposed to be subordinated directly to a root CA.
The method NOVOMODO proposed by Silvio Micali [18] eliminates the ne-
cessity of using CRL or to consult the CA when the status revocation of a
certiﬁcate is veriﬁed. In this method, the knowledge of few simple parameters
can be used to determine if the certiﬁcate was valid at one instant of time k.
This parameter and other information needed by NOVOMODO are available in
OCCA’s certiﬁcate and issued OCs.
The OCCA certiﬁcate is a conventional certiﬁcate that contains data related
to NOVOMODO in its extensions. The Root CA chooses a hash function F ,
a period of time t, a resolution l of validity and two random values Y0 and
N0, keeping these two last private. The resolution of validity l is the interval of
time between one revocation and another one and n = t/l the number of time
intervals. The Root CA applies n times the value Y0 to the function F resulting
in the value Yn. N0 is applied once to F , resulting in N1. Yn, N1 and the hash
function F are available in OCCA’s certiﬁcate through inclusion of an extension
named Novomodo − Ca.
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In addition, there is some information left which is needed for checking the
OCCA’s certiﬁcate through NOVOMODO validation method. It is data ex-
tracted from certiﬁcate revocation status service (CRS) [18] and it corresponds
to parameters Yn−k, n and k - discussed in Sect. 3 - which are available in OCs
through inclusion of an extension named Novomodo − Oc. Its ﬁelds
certificateStatus, last, instant correspond respectively to the parameters Yn−k,
n and k. Moreover, there’s a ﬁeld called digestAlgorithm which is related to hash
function F mentioned later.
In order to verify if the OCCA certiﬁcate is valid at the determined time
interval k, the value of Yn−k of the CRS must be checked. If Fk(Yn−k) = Yn,
where Yn is obtained from the OCCA certiﬁcate, then it is guaranteed that
certiﬁcate was valid in k. The revocation can be veriﬁed using the equation
N ′ = F (N0), where N0 must be in the CRS. If N ′ = N1, where N1 is obtained
from the OCCA certiﬁcate, then this certiﬁcate has been revoked.
If a determined period of time k does not possess the corresponding value
Yn−k in the CRS, OCCA cannot prove that its certiﬁcate is valid in this period.
The OCCA must verify if N0 is in the CRS. If this has happened, the OCCA
certiﬁcate has been revoked. If the OCCA cannot prove that its certiﬁcate is
valid, it cannot issue new certiﬁcates.
If the OCCA does not have proof that its certiﬁcate is valid, the OCCA cannot
issue OCs.
The OCCA also must presents other necessary functionalities for issuing of
OCs. An important ﬁeld of an OC is its validity. To be able to include the
date and time, the OCCA must have its internal clock synchronized with a
trustworthy time source. The best known method to do this is the NTP [19].
However, many critics of the impossibility of assuring, with a reasonable cost,
that the date and time are really used by the OCCA and that this is in fact
synchronized with trustworthy sources of time. To resolve this problem Haber
and Stornetta [20] argue that the documents should be interlinked in a chain
to conﬁrm that they are dated. This method is known as relative timestamp.
Thus, the OCCA must link the OCs, and insert an absolute date and time into
the OCs.
The interpretation of OC validity depends on the type of requirer, who can
be a signer or a veriﬁer of the signature. This information is contained in the
extension called validityT ype, which is included in the OC and is shown in
Sect. 3.
Figure 3 shows an OPKI with ﬁve levels and an OCCA. In this ﬁgure CRLi is
the certiﬁcation revocation list issued by CAi. CRL1 is issued by the Root CA.
Ui is the signer certiﬁcate of user i. v is the validity of the certiﬁcate. h is the
hash of the document. OCi is an optimized certiﬁcate for the signer certiﬁcate
Ui. Yn and Yn−ki are parameters, which latter is obtained from CRS. These
parameters are used to assure that the OCCA certiﬁcate was valid when the OC
was issued. f is the parameter that indicates the validity type of the OC.
In this ﬁgure, the numbers 1 indicates the CRLs which should be consulted
by the user to verify the CA certiﬁcates. 2 represents where information about
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Fig. 3. Optimized PKI
OCCA revocation is published. 3 shows that OCCA certiﬁcate status data is
obtained from CRS and it is included in OCs. Finally, 4 illustrates the exchange
of a traditional certiﬁcate to a optimized certiﬁcate.
4.2 Attainment of Optimized Certiﬁcates
The parameter f of the OC indicates how the ﬁeld Validity must be interpreted
for the document to which it is related. This parameter can assume four diﬀerent
values, as is shown in the Table 1. Parameter f is equal to f1 when the request
for a new OC is made by the signer and is equal to f2, f3 or f4 when it is made
by a veriﬁer.
When f = f1 this means that the validity of the OC must be interpreted
as the date and time when the document was signed. Therefore, only a signer
could request an OC with f = f1. The signer sends the document’s hash and
its classical certiﬁcate C to the OCCA. The OCCA, through a challenge-reply
protocol, veriﬁes if the requester has ownership of key pairs. If this is conﬁrmed,
the OCCA veriﬁes the validity of C, the entire certiﬁcation chain and the revo-
cation status, and checks if the whole process conforms to certiﬁcation policies
stated. If all the information is valid, the OCCA issues the OC and sends it to
the signer. The signer has the responsibility of conﬁrming the OC and attaching
it to the document.
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Table 1. Parameter f
f Interpretation
f1 The date and time of the OC correspond to the time when the document was
signed and also it is a proof that the document existed at this moment.
f2 The document signature was valid when the OC was issued and the document
already existed at this moment.
f3 The document signature was valid at the date and time requested by the
veriﬁer.
f4 The document signature was valid at the date and time of the signature’s
timestamp and it is evidence that the document already existed at this mo-
ment.
When f = f2, f3 or f4, the request for an OC can be made by the signer or a
veriﬁer. The objective of the veriﬁer is to replace the original signer certiﬁcate
with an OC to optimize future validation of the signature document. In this
case, the OCCA is responsible for checking the validity of documents submitted
at the instant of time contained in the request.
When f = f2 and f4, the OCCA initiates the veriﬁcation procedure at the
moment of receipt of the request and when f3, the request is processed at a
moment deﬁned by the user. If f4, the request contains the TS of the original
signature. The OCCA validates the TS and uses this date and time in the
validity ﬁeld of the OC.
The OCCAs register all operations carried when the OCs are issued. This per-
mits auditing procedures by a third party. These records are bound to a precise
time using NOVOMODO in the same way as shown by Haber and Stornetta [20]
to timestamp an electronic document.
The initial value of the chain is the value Y1. Each issued OC is linked with
the previous one keeping all OCs connected in a chain. This chaining is made
during the period l, for example, one day. After this period if a new element is
added to the chain, the next value will be Y2. This continues successively until
the period n, or when the Root CA publishes N0.
5 Digital Signature Validation
An OPKI is a PKI that issue optimized certiﬁcates. OPKI compares favorably to
a traditional PKI in analysis of performance validation processes, as the number
of signature validation during the life time of an electronic document is greatly
reduced.
In contrast to the signature generation process which occurs only once, the
signature veriﬁcation is normally repeated innumerable times. This validation
can be made by diﬀerent entities at diﬀerent times. Thus, in evaluation terms,
the cost functions of a conventional signature and signatures using OCs are in
terms of the computational eﬀort demanded by veriﬁers and signers.
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Most of the processing power in traditional PKI deployments is used to val-
idate digital certiﬁcates. With OPKIs, only two additional certiﬁcates need to
be veriﬁed, the OCCA certiﬁcate and the OC. The OCCA certiﬁcate is veriﬁed
by the user through the hash function of NOVOMODO, by Fk(Yn−k), where k
is a speciﬁc instant of the lifetime n.
The value Yn is contained in the OCCA certiﬁcate and Yn−k is included
the OC, as discussed in Sect. 3 and 4. After simple calculations these can be
easily compared. This is suﬃcient to verify the signature without consulting any
additional information. The OCs do not need to be veriﬁed about revocation
since it’s only validity at an instant.
6 Considerations
The signer must validate his digital certiﬁcate when he issues the signatures
of electronic documents. And, the recipients must validate the signatures each
time they need to verify the documents’ authenticity. These tasks require many
cryptographic signature validation. A reasonable strategy to avoid an overload
on the recipients’ computers would be to delegate those computations to an
external service.
The delegation of the digital certiﬁcates validation to a third party entity is not
a new idea. Peifang Zheng [21] calls this entity a veriﬁer. The protocol Online
Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) [22] is considered a veriﬁer. OCSP is an
Internet protocol used for obtaining the revocation status of a digital certiﬁcate.
It was created as an alternative to certiﬁcate revocation lists (CRL), speciﬁcally
addressing certain problems associated with using CRLs. However, this protocol
cannot be used as evidence that a certiﬁcate was valid in the past without
additional services like timestamping. The veriﬁer could be used either by the
signer or by the recipients to improve the eﬃciency of certiﬁcate and signature
validation. Although this strategy may appear attractive, there needs to be at
least one server inquiry for each certiﬁcate or signature validation.
The use of OCs in electronic documents eliminates the necessity of consulting
an external entity for this task. The veriﬁcation is made by the OCCA, which
already is part of the optimized PKI. Each time the OCCA needs to issue a new
OC, it requests from the Root CA a proof of the validity of its own certiﬁcate, as
described in Sect. 4. This proof is inserted into the OC. Then, when the recipient
veriﬁes the OCCA certiﬁcate, he only uses that proof, without consulting a
database or even the CA. Additionally, an OC is issued for a speciﬁc date and
time, it is valid only for this date and there is no sense in revoking it.
The main advantage in the use of an OC is to get a self-suﬃcient electronic
document, where there is no necessity to consult any external service to validate
its signature. The OC itself is a proof that the certiﬁcation chain was validated
by a trust entity.
The fact of the OC was issued with validity only for one k instant gives it
the same positive features described by Rivest [16], where a certiﬁcate has low
probability of revocation soon after its emission. Moreover, the method does
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not present the problems of short term certiﬁcates [23] with generation of new
cryptographic keys and certiﬁcates each time that the subscriber needs to renew
its certiﬁcate.
The publication of a CRS involves the use of the Root CA private key to au-
thenticate the values Yn−k. However, this check may be waived, as the authentic
values for CRS are kept private by the CA. The maintenance of the signature
assures that even discovery of values Y0 and N0 is not enough to compromise
this scheme.
A positive point of OPKI approach is that even having the OCCA’s private key
at any instant of li, an attacker can only issue false OCs until li ends since he can
not generate and include in an OC a fake proof of OCCA’s certiﬁcate validity
in li+1. Therefore, to compromise an OPKI an attacker needs to compromise
OCCA’s private key and the secret value Y0, which is stored in root CA, that is
likely kept oﬄine.
This means that the recipient does not need to check the Root CA certiﬁcate
status during signature veriﬁcation. This is a great advantage of this proposal
compared to the classical approach.
In the case of any fraud that should occur, the attacker may use a compromised
root CA private key to create a false OCCA. However this problem is easily
countered by publication of the hash of the true OCCA certiﬁcate in a public
directory.
Users should register the trusted OCCAs by taking hashes from the public
directory and saving them into their computers before beginning to use the
OCAs.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes optimized digital certiﬁcates as a way to eﬃciently sign
and verify signature of electronic documents. Optimized certiﬁcation and the
corresponding subject certiﬁcate veriﬁcation methods improve certiﬁcate path
veriﬁcation time and signature in signed electronic documents.
An optimized certiﬁcate is a certiﬁcate valid for a speciﬁc time and date and
it can be used to substitute the signer’s certiﬁcate. Optimized certiﬁcates are
not revoked as they are valid only for that time and date. These certiﬁcates are
issued by an optimized certiﬁcate certiﬁcation authority (OCCA) and contain
all the information needed to turn the electronic document into a self-veriﬁed
signed document, i.e., it is not necessary to consult a certiﬁcation authority
or a database to verify the certiﬁcation chain as in the classical PKI. By us-
ing optimized certiﬁcates, it is possible to have eﬃciently veriﬁable electronic
documents.
In this paper, the design of the OPKI has been presented. This incorporates
both classical and optimized certiﬁcates. The OPKI includes an new optimized
certiﬁcate certiﬁcation authority which is a service directly subordinate to the
Root CA. The OCCA issues optimized certiﬁcates whenever it is request to. Be-
fore the OCCA issues the certiﬁcate, it veriﬁes the signer’s classical certiﬁcate.
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The optimized certiﬁcate is bound to the electronic document through its hash
and includes proof of validity of its own certiﬁcate. This proof is obtained from
the Root CA. The proof is a hash from a chain as speciﬁed in the NOVOMODO
validation scheme. Both veriﬁcation eﬃciency and the revocation advantage of
optimized certiﬁcates make them suitable for hierarchical PKIs of wireless appli-
cations using signed electronic documents where wireless end users have limited
bandwidth and processing power.
Next steps will be design and implement a prototype of an OCCA and a
formal analysis of its protocols.
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Abstract. We present an eﬃcient and provable secure identity-based
identiﬁcation scheme in the standard model. Our proposed scheme is
secure against impersonation under passive attack based on the Com-
putational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption, and secure under active and con-
current attacks based on the One-More Computational Diﬃe-Hellman
assumption.
Keywords: identity-based cryptography, identiﬁcation scheme, stan-
dard model.
1 Introduction
Background. An identiﬁcation scheme allows a prover to prove himself to a
veriﬁer without revealing any information of his private key. For conventional
identiﬁcation schemes, a certiﬁcate is used to bind the public key to a user in
order to prove the authenticity of a user’s ownership of his public key. In 1984,
Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography [18]. The idea
was to eliminate public key certiﬁcates by using a public key that is bound to
a users identity like an identity (ID) string of the entity involved (e.g. email
address, telephone number, etc.). A private key generator (PKG) is in charge
of computing and distributing the private keys corresponding to the ID from a
master secret key.
Shamir proposed an identity-based signature (IBS) in the same paper [18].
However, the ﬁrst provable secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme in
the random oracle model was not constructed until Boneh and Franklin in [5]
and later by Cocks [8]. Subsequently, several other IBS schemes were constructed
in the random oracle model [7,9,15]. Boneh and Boyen in [4] ﬁrst attempted to
construct an IBE to be proven secure in the standard model, but unfortunately it
was weaker in security and impractical. Finally, Waters succeeded in constructing
a fairly eﬃcient IBE scheme without random oracles [19].
While work in the areas of IBE and IBS schemes ﬂourished and still continues
to do so, identity-based identiﬁcation (IBI) schemes remained untouched. It was
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not until the year 2004 that IBI was given rigorous deﬁnition in two indepen-
dent papers [1] and [10]. In their work in [10], Kurosawa and Heng proposed
transforming any standard digital signature (DS) scheme having 3-move honest
veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol to an IBI scheme. They also
proved that the newly derived IBI scheme is secure against impersonation under
passive attack if the underlying DS is existentially unforgeable under adaptive
chosen message attack. Taking a diﬀerent approach from [10], [1] provided secu-
rity proofs of attacks for a large number of IBI and IBS schemes deﬁned either
explicitly or implicitly in existing literature. [1] ﬁrst provides security of an un-
derlying standard identiﬁcation scheme before proving the security of IBI or IBS
schemes. Also, [1] does not touch IBI and IBS schemes in the standard model.
A random oracle produces a bit-string of inﬁnite length that can be truncated
to a desired length. It is used in cryptographic proofs when there are no practical
functions that provide suﬃcient mathematical properties to satisfy the proof of
security [2]. Bellare and Rogaway originally proposed the random oracle model
to be used in providing proof of security for cryptosystems. Open to be accessed
by all parties, good and bad alike, a random oracle acts as an idealistic hash
function will return a random response if queried for the ﬁrst time, and provide
the same corresponding response for a repeated query.
Canetti et al. demonstrated, however, there exist certain cryptosystems that
while proven secure using the random oracle model, is totally insecure when
the oracle is replaced by a conventional hash function [6]. Therefore, although
it is still widely accepted that to have a proof in the random oracle model for
a cryptosystem is better than to have no proof of security at all, it would still
be better to prove cryptosystems secure in the standard model without using
random oracles.
Recently, Kurosawa and Heng proposed two IBI schemes in the standard
model, one secure against impersonation under passive attack and the other se-
cure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks [11]. The two
schemes were based on the Strong Diﬃe-Hellman assumption. Another scheme
was proposed by the same authors also based on the Strong Diﬃe-Hellman as-
sumption [12] and [13]. The latest work by Yang et al. was to come up with a
general methodology to construct IBI schemes secure against active and con-
current attacks, but the framework is also shown to work in the random oracle
model only [20].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose an eﬃcient IBI scheme based on
the Waters signature scheme [19]. We prove the scheme secure against imper-
sonation under passive attacks based on the intractability of the Computational
Diﬃe-Hellman Problem. We proceed to show the scheme secure against imper-
sonation under active and concurrent attacks based on the intractability of the
One-More Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide some preliminary
background information and deﬁnitions in Section 2, followed by a review of
the deﬁnition of IBI schemes in Section 3. In Section 4 we show our scheme
62 J.-J. Chin, S.-H. Heng, and B.-M. Goi
construction and verify its correctness. In Section 5, we analyze the eﬃciency
and security of the proposed IBI scheme. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Let k denote the security parameter. We say that ε(k) is negligible if ε(k) ap-
proaches zero faster than 1kc for any constant c > 0.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Deﬁnition 1. Let G and GT be ﬁnite cyclic groups of prime order p and let g
be a generator of G. The map e : G×G → GT is said to be an admissible map
if it satisﬁes the following three conditions:
1. Bilinearity. e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy. e(g, g) = 1.
3. Eﬃciently computable.
2.2 Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (CDHP)
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group generated by g with prime order p. The
CDHP is described as follows: Given (g, ga, gb), calculate gab.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that the CDHP is (t′, ε′)-hard in G if Pr[A calculates gab]
≤ ε for any A that runs in time t′.
2.3 One-More Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (OMCDHP)
The intractability of the strong One-More problems were ﬁrst introduced in the
area of identiﬁcation schemes in [3] to prove the security of the GQ and Schnorr
identiﬁcation schemes. The OMCDHP was ﬁrst used to prove pairing-based IBI
schemes secure against active and concurrent attacks in the random oracle model
in [1] and [10].
Let G be a ﬁnite cyclic group of large prime order p and let g be a generator
of G. The OMCDHP is described as the following game played by an adversary
A. A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that is given input
g, g1 = ga where a ∈ Zp is randomly chosen. A is given access to a challenge
oracle CHALL and a computational Diﬃe-Hellman oracle CDH . CHALL when
invoked (without input) will return a random challenge point W ∈ G. CDH
when invoked with input h ∈ G returns ha ∈ G. To win the game, A must
invoke CHALL to get W0, . . . ,WqCDH ∈ G challenge points, and output the
solutions to all the challenge points W a0 , . . . ,W
a
qCDH ∈ G by using strictly less
than qCDH + 1 queries to CDH .
Deﬁnition 3. We say that the OMCDHP is (t′′, qCDH , ε′′)-hard in G if
Pr[A wins] ≤ ε′′ for any A that runs in time t′′, where qCDH is the total number
of queries made to CDH.
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3 Formal Deﬁnitions of IBI
3.1 Deﬁnition for IBI
An IBI scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Setup
S, Extract E, Prove P and Verify V )
1. Setup(S): S takes in the security parameter 1k. It publishes the master
public key mpk and keeps the master secret key msk to itself.
2. Extract(E): E takes in the public identity ID and msk, and returns the
corresponding user private key usk.
3. Identiﬁcation Protocol(P and V ): P receives mpk, ID and usk as input
while V receives mpk and ID. The two will then run an interactive protocol
where V will decide whether to accept or reject P after each iteration. The
interactive protocol consists of the following steps:
(a) Commitment: P sends a commitment CMT to V.
(b) Challenge: V sends a challenge CHA randomly chosen from a prede-
ﬁned set.
(c) Response: P returns a response RST where V will either choose to
accept or reject.
3.2 Security Model for IBI
The goal of an impersonator towards an IBI scheme is impersonation. An im-
personator is considered successful if it interacts with the veriﬁer as a cheating
prover with public identity ID and is able to be accepted by the veriﬁer with
non-negligible probability.
We describe three types of adversaries for IBI schemes:
1. Passive Attacker. This type of adversary merely eavesdrops on conversa-
tions between an honest prover and veriﬁer and attempts to extract infor-
mation from their transcripts.
2. Active Attacker. This type of adversary interacts with honest provers
sequentially as a cheating veriﬁer several times to extract information before
the impersonation attempt.
3. Concurrent Attacker. This type of adversary is similar to the active at-
tacker with the only exception being it can interact with multiple provers at
the same time.
Two diﬀerences between security for IBI and conventional identiﬁcation
schemes is that ﬁrstly an impersonator can choose a public identity ID of his
choice to impersonate as opposed to a random public key. Secondly, it is also as-
sumed that the impersonator already has some private keys of some other users
in his possession. This deﬁnition allows the impersonator to obtain a private key
associated with any identity of his choice besides the one being attacked.
The impersonation attack between an impersonator I and the challenger is
described as a two-phased game as follows:
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1. Setup. The challenger takes 1k as input and runs setup. The result of system
parameters mpk is given to the impersonator I while msk is kept to itself.
2. Phase 1. I issues some extract queries IDi to S. The challenger responds by
running the extract algorithm to generate and returns the private key usk,
corresponding to the identity IDi to I. The queries may be asked adaptively.
I issues transcript queries for passive attacks or requests to act as a cheating
veriﬁer (identiﬁcation queries) corresponding to some IDi for active and
concurrent attacks.
3. Phase 2. Finally, I outputs a challenge identity (ID = IDi) which it
wishes to impersonate. I can still continue to issue extract and transcript/
identiﬁcation queries on condition that the challenge identity ID is not
queried. I now acts as a cheating prover to convince the veriﬁer based on
information gathered in Phase 1 and I wins the game if it is successful in
doing so.
Deﬁnition 4. We say an IBI scheme is (t, qI , ε)-secure under passive or ac-
tive/concurrent attacks if for any passive or active/concurrent impersonator I
who runs in time t, Pr[I can impersonate] < ε, where I can make at most qI
extract and transcript/identiﬁcation queries.
4 Construction
Let G and GT be a ﬁnite cyclic group of large prime order p and let g be a
generator of G. Let e : G×G → GT be an eﬃciently computable bilinear map.
Use a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n to hash identities
of arbitrary length to a bit string of length n.
1. Setup: Randomly select a secret a ∈ Zp, a generator g ∈ G, random values
g2, u
′ and an n -length vector 〈u〉 whose elements u1, . . . , un ∈ G. Set g1 = ga.
The master public key msk is (G,GT , e, g, g1, u′, 〈u〉, H). The master secret
key usk is ga2 .
2. Extract: Let ID be an n-bit identity string with dι denoting the ιth bit of
ID. Let ID ⊆ 1, . . . , n be the set of all ι in which dι = 1. Randomly select
r ∈ Zp and construct the user secret as
usk = (S,R) = (ga2 (u
′ ∏
ι∈ID
uι)r, gr)
3. Identiﬁcation Protocol: Prover P and Veriﬁer V do the following:
(a) P chooses a random z ∈ Zp, computes
X = (u′
∏
ι∈ID
uι)z , Y = gz2
and sends X,Y,R to V.
(b) V picks a random challenge c ∈ Zp and sends to P.
(c) P calculates Z = Sz+c and sends Z as a response to V.
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(d) V accepts if
e(Z, g) = e(Y gc2, g1)e(X(u
′ ∏
ι∈ID
uι)c, R)
To verify the correctness of the identiﬁcation protocol, we have:
e(Z, g) = e((ga2 (u
′ ∏
ι∈ID
uι)r)(z+c), g)
= e((ga(z+c)2 , g)e((u
′ ∏
ι∈ID
uι)r(z+c), g)
= e((gz2g
c
2, g
a)e(((u′
∏
ι∈ID
uι)z(u′
∏
ι∈ID
uι)c), gr)
= e(Y gc2, g1)e(X(u
′ ∏
ι∈ID
uι)c, R)
5 Security Analysis
5.1 Security Against Passive Attacks
Theorem 1. The above IBI scheme is (t, qI , ε)-secure against impersonation
under passive attacks in the standard model if the CDHP is (t′, ε′)-hard where
t′ = t + O(ρ(2n(qI) + τ(qI )), ε ≤
√
4qe(n+ 1)ε′ +
1
p
where ρ represents the time taken to do a multiplication in G, τ is the time taken
to do an exponentiation in G, qe represents the number of extract queries made,
qi represents the number of transcript queries made and qI = qe + qi.
Proof. Assume there exists an impersonator I who (t, qI , ε)-breaks the IBI
scheme. Then we show that there is an algorithm M who (t′, ε′)-solves the CDHP
with the help of I. In order to do this, we utilize parameters from [16]. M will
be given a group G, a generator g ∈ G, and elements ga, gb ∈ G. M will then
attempt to simulate a challenger for I as follows.
1. Setup. M sets l = 2qe and randomly chooses k ∈ Zn. Assume that l(n+1) < p
for the given values of qe and n. Furthermore, M randomly chooses x′ ∈ Zl,
a vector 〈x〉 of length n with xι ∈ Zl for all ι, a randomly selected integer
y′ ∈ Zp and a vector y of length n with yι ∈ Zp for all ι. Deﬁne the following
functions:
F (ID) = x′ +
∑
ι∈ID
xι − lk, J(ID) = y′ +
∑
ι∈ID
yι
M now sets g1 = ga and g2 = gb. M also sets u′ = gx
′−lk
2 g
y′ and a vector
〈u〉 of length n consisting of elements uι = gxι2 gyι . M publishes mpk as
66 J.-J. Chin, S.-H. Heng, and B.-M. Goi
(g, g1, g2, u′, 〈u〉). Note that through the functions F (ID) and J(ID) we
have
u′
∏
ι∈ID
uι = g
F (ID)
2 g
J(ID)
2. Extract Queries. When I queries M for the private key of identity IDi, I
checks if F (IDi) = 0 mod l and aborts if it is. This is because given the
assumption, l(n + 1) < p implies 0 ≤ lk ≤ p and 0 ≤ x′ +∑ι∈IDi xι ≤
p. Therefore F (IDi) = 0 mod p implies that F (IDi) = 0 mod l and the
simulator aborts because it is unable to construct a private key. Otherwise,
if F (IDi) = 0 mod l, M constructs the private key by randomly selecting
ri ∈ Zp and computing usk as
(S˜i = g
−J(IDi)
F (IDi)
1 (u
′ ∏
ι∈IDi
uι)ri), (R˜i = g
−1
F (IDi)
1 g
ri)
To I, all private keys generated by M will be indistinguishable from those
generated by a true challenger.
3. Transcript Queries. There are two scenarios when I queries M for a round of
interaction on IDj , namely if F (IDj) = 0 mod l or not.We assume without
loss of generality that I will not issue an identiﬁcation query on an identity
that it has already issued an extract query on.
(a) If F (IDj) = 0 mod l, M can simulate a cheating prover for I by the
running same extract algorithm and then using the valid private key to
produce a valid transcript for I.
(b) If F (IDj) = 0 mod l, M generates a valid transcript for I by choosing
random rj , cj , zj ∈ Zp and sends the transcript to I as:
(X = (u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι)zj , Y =
gzj
g
cj
2
, R = grj , cj , Z = g
zj
1 (u
′ ∏
ι∈IDj
uι)rj(zj+cj))
Impersonation phase. After some time, I outputs an identity ID∗ = IDi
that it wishes to be challenged on. M will abort if F (ID∗) = 0 mod p. I
can still issue some extract and transcript queries on the condition that it
cannot query the challenge identity ID∗. I now plays the role of the cheating
prover trying to convince M that it knows the user secret of ID∗. Thus M is
able to obtain two valid transcripts (X,Y,R, c1, Z1) and (X,Y,R, c2, Z2) by
resetting I to where it sent X,Y,R after the ﬁrst interaction. Based on the
Reset Lemma [3], M can extract S from two conversation transcripts with
probability more than (ε − 1p )2. M extracts the secret key by calculating
S = (Z1Z−12 )
(c1−c2)−1 and outputs the solution to the CDHP by calculating
S
RJ(ID∗)
=
gab(u′
∏
ι∈ID∗ uι)
r
gJ(ID∗)r
= gab
This completes the description of the simulation.
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It remains to analyze the probability of M winning the game and solving
the CDHP. First oﬀ we have the probability that M can extract S from
two conversation transcripts as Pr[M computes gab|¬abort] ≥ (ε − 1p )2 by
the Reset Lemma. Note that upon extraction S, A is able to compute gab.
Therefore the probability of M winning the game by solving the CDHP is
given by
Pr[M solves CDHP] = Pr[M computes gab ∨ ¬abort]
= Pr[M computes gab|¬abort] Pr[¬abort]
≥ (ε− 1
p
)2 Pr[¬abort]
It remains to calculate Pr[¬abort]. We deﬁne the following events:
(a) Let Event Ai: M answers all extract queries where F (IDi) = 0 mod l.
(b) Let Event A∗: I outputs challenge ID∗ where F (ID∗) = 0 mod p.
The probability of event A∗ occurring can be calculated by
Pr[A∗] = Pr[F (ID∗) = 0 mod p ∨ F (ID∗) = 0 mod l]
= Pr[F (ID∗) = 0 mod l] Pr[F (ID∗) = 0 mod p|F (ID∗) = 0 mod l]
=
1
l
(
1
n+ 1
)
We also have that
Pr[
qe⋂
i=1
Ai|A∗] = 1− Pr[
qe⋃
i=1
Ai|A∗]
= 1−
qe∑
i=1
Pr[¬Ai|A∗]
= 1− qe
l
Therefore the probability of M not aborting is given by
Pr[¬abort] = Pr[
qe⋂
i=1
Ai ∧A∗]
= Pr[A∗] Pr[
qe⋂
i=1
Ai|A∗]
=
1
l(n+ 1)
(1 − qe
l
)
=
1
4qe(n+ 1)
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since l = 2qe as in the simulation. Hence we have
Pr[M solves CDHP] ≥ (ε− 1
p
)2
1
4qe(n + 1)
ε′ ≥ (ε− 1
p
)2
1
4qe(n + 1)
ε ≤
√
4qe(n+ 1)ε′ +
1
p
The time complexity of M is dominated by exponentiations and multiplications
performed in the extract and transcript queries. We can approximate the time
complexity of M as t′ = t+O(ρ(2n(qI)) + τ(qI)) since there are O(n) multipli-
cations and O(1) exponentiations in both the extract and transcript stages, ρ
representing the time taken to do a multiplication in G, τ is the time taken to
do an exponentiation in G , qe represents the number of extract queries made,
qi represents the number of transcript queries made and qI = qe + qi. unionsq
5.2 Security Against Active and Concurrent Attacks
We prove our proposed IBI scheme secure against active and concurrent at-
tacks using the OMCDHP. Most of the parameters are analogous from the proof
against passive attacks.
Theorem 2. The above IBI scheme is (t, qI , ε)-secure against impersonation
under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model if the OMCDHP is
(t′′, qCDH , ε′′)-hard where
t′′ = t + O(ρ(2n(qI) + τ(qI )), ε ≤
√
4qe(n+ 1)ε′′ +
1
p
where ρ represents the time taken to do a multiplication in G, τ is the time taken
to do an exponentiation in G, qe represents the number of extract queries made,
qi represents the number of identiﬁcation queries made and qI = qe + qi.
Proof. Assume there exists an impersonator I who (t, qI , ε)-breaks the IBI
scheme. Then we show that there is an algorithm M who (t′′, qCDH , ε′′)-solves
the OMCDHP with the help of I. In order to do this, we use some parameters
from [16]. M will be given a group G, a generator g ∈ G, an element ga ∈ G
and access to oracles CHALL and CDH . M will then attempt to simulate a
challenger for I as follows.
1. Setup. M sets l = 2qe and randomly chooses k ∈ Zn. Assume that l(n+1) < p
for the given values of qe and n. Furthermore, M randomly chooses x′ ∈ Zl,
a vector 〈x〉 of length n with xι ∈ Zl for all ι, a randomly selected integer
y′ ∈ Zp and a vector y of length n with yι ∈ Zp for all ι. Deﬁne the following
functions:
F (ID) = x′ +
∑
ι∈ID
xι − lk, J(ID) = y′ +
∑
ι∈ID
yι
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M now sets g1 = ga, queries CHALL for the initial challenge W0 and sets
g2 = W0. M also sets u′ = gx
′−lk
2 g
y′ and a vector 〈u〉 of length n consisting
of elements uι = gxι2 g
yι . M publishes mpk as (g, g1, g2, u′, 〈u〉). Note that
through the functions F (ID) and J(ID) we have
u′
∏
ι∈ID
uι = g
F (ID)
2 g
J(ID)
2. Extract Queries. M responds to extract queries by I the same way as it does
in section 5.1.
3. Identiﬁcation Queries. There are two scenarios when I queries M for a round
of interaction on IDj, namely if F (IDj) = 0 mod l or not. M starts with m =
1. We assume without loss of generality that I will not issue an identiﬁcation
query on an identity that it has already issued an extract query on.
(a) If F (IDj) = 0 mod l, M can simulate a cheating prover for I by the
running same extract algorithm and then using the valid private key to
engage in an interaction with I.
(b) If F (IDj) = 0 mod l, M simulates a cheating prover for I as follows
i. M queries CHALL for a random point Wm and lets Y˜j = Wm. M
randomly selects rj ∈ Zp and computes
(X˜j = gJ(IDj) = (u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι), R˜j = g
rj
1 )
M sends X˜j, Y˜j and R˜j to I.
ii. I issues a randomly selected challenge c ∈ Zp
iii. M queries CDH with
Wm(u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι)rj (W0(u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι)rj )cj
and sends I the reply
Z˜j = [Wm(u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι)rj (W0(u′
∏
ι∈IDj
uι)rj )cj ]a
(c) M increments m by 1.
Impersonation phase. After some time, I outputs an identity ID∗ = IDi
that it wishes to be challenged on. M will abort if F (ID∗) = 0 mod p. I can
still issue some extract and identiﬁcation queries on the condition that it
cannot query the challenge identity ID∗. I now plays the role of the cheating
prover trying to convince M that it knows the user secret of ID∗. Thus M is
able to obtain two valid transcripts (X,Y,R, c1, Z1) and (X,Y,R, c2, Z2) by
resetting I to where it sent X,Y,R after the ﬁrst interaction. Based on the
Reset Lemma [3], M can extract S from two conversation transcripts with
probability more than (ε − 1p )2. M extracts the secret key by calculating
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S = (Z1Z−12 )
(c1−c2)−1 and outputs the solution to the primary challenge W0
by calculating
S
RJ(ID∗)
=
W a0 (u
′∏
ι∈ID∗ uι)
r
gJ(ID∗)r
= W a0
M then proceeds to solve the other m challenge points by calculating
Zj
g
rjJ(IDj)(cj+1)
1 W
acj
0
=
[W amW
acj
0 (u
′∏
i∈ID∗ ui)
arj (u′
∏
i∈ID∗ ui)
arjcj ]
g
rjJ(IDj)(cj+1)
1 W
acj
0
=
[W amW
acj
0 g
J(IDj)arj(cj+1)]
g
rjJ(IDj)(cj+1)
1 W
acj
0
= W am
where j corresponds to the identiﬁcation queries on IDj where F (IDj) =
0 mod l. Thus M is able to solve m + 1 challenge points of CHALL with
only m queries to CDH . This completes the description of the simulation.
It remains to analyze the probability of M winning the OMCDHP game.
First oﬀ we have the probability that M can extract S from two conver-
sation transcripts as Pr[M computes W a0 |¬abort] ≥ (ε − 1p )2 by the Reset
Lemma. Note that upon extraction S, A is able to compute W a0 . Therefore
the probability of M winning the OMCDHP game is given by
Pr[M wins OMCDHP] = Pr[M computes W a0 ∨ ¬abort]
= Pr[M computes W a0 |¬abort] Pr[¬abort]
≥ (ε− 1
p
)2 Pr[¬abort]
Following the same arguments in section 5.1, we have
Pr[¬abort] = 1
4qe(n+ 1)
Therefore
Pr[M wins OMCDHP] ≥ (ε− 1
p
)2
1
4qe(n+ 1)
ε′′ ≥ (ε− 1
p
)2
1
4qe(n+ 1)
ε ≤
√
4qe(n + 1)ε′′ +
1
p
The time complexity of M is similar to that of section 5.1 as well. unionsq
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Table 1. Complexity cost for each algorithm in the proposed IBI
Multiplication Exponentiation Pairing
Setup 0 2 0
Extract Max:n+2, Avg:(n/2)+2 2 0
Prove Max:n+1, Avg:(n/2)+1 3 0
Verify Max:n+3, Avg:(n/2)+3 2 3
5.3 Eﬃciency
Our scheme has a private key size of 2 group elements. The public key and
parameters consists of the description of the groups G,GT , the pairing e and
n+4 group elements in G. It is possible to reduce the number of group elements
needed by utilizing the technique of Naccache [14] and Chatterjee-Sarkar [17].
With the vector 〈u〉 of length n, the maximum number of group operations,
Max, involved in the Waters hash function is n+1 (inclusive of operating on u′).
Avg follows by dividing n/2 to dictate the average number of group operations
for the entire set of IDs to be used for the scheme.
Table 2. A Comparison with other IBI schemes in the standard model
Eﬃciency (Prove and V erify) imp-pa Assumption imp-aa/ca
Assumption
HKIBI05a[11] 6G,6E,4P q-SDH Unknown
HKIBI05b[11] 12G,12E,6P q-SDH q-SDH
HKIBI06[12,13] 9G,11E,3P,1SOTSS q-SDH q-SDH
Proposed Scheme (n+4)G,5E,3P CDH OMCDH
Legend: G-Group Operations, E-Exponentiations, P-Pairings, SOTSS-Strong One-
Time Signature Scheme, imp-pa:passive attack, imp-aa/ca:active/concurrent attack.
We provide the complexity costs for each algorithm in Table 1 and provide a
comparison with other existing IBI schemes in the standard model in Table 2. We
emphasize on the Prove and Verify computational costs as they will be iterated
whenever users wish to participate in the identiﬁcation protocol. Based on the
analysis in Table 2, the eﬃciency of our proposed scheme is signiﬁcantly better
than existing schemes that are secure against active and concurrent attacks as it
utilizes far lesser pairing and exponentiation operations. We claim our scheme is
eﬃcient as the computational cost for a group multiplication is negligible when
compared to that of an exponentiation. It is also known that pairings cost even
more than exponentiation. Therefore, with reduced exponentiations and pairings
in our scheme, even though we have more group multiplications, our scheme is
still more eﬃcient when compared to schemes in [11] and [12,13].
Another merit over the other schemes is that we manage to provide a di-
rect security proof to a hard problem rather than just proving it in contrast to
the security bound of a digital signature scheme or conventional identiﬁcation
scheme. Thus we are able to derive a more concrete security bound for the newly
proposed scheme.
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6 Conclusion
We presented an eﬃcient and provable secure IBI scheme based on the Waters
signature scheme. The proposed scheme is secure against impersonation under
passive attack based on the Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption, and se-
cure under active and concurrent attacks based on the one-more computational
Diﬃe-Hellman assumption. Our construction is shown to be eﬃcient and also
the ﬁrst IBI scheme proven secure in the standard model by direct reduction to
a hard problem.
It still remains an open problem to be able to construct a scheme that is
provable secure in the standard model against active and concurrent attacks
using a weaker assumption like the Computational Diﬃe-Hellman or Discrete
Logarithm assumption.
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Abstract. We present an authentication scheme and new protocol for
domain-based scenarios with inter-domain authentication. Our protocol
is primarily intended for domain-structured Peer-to-Peer systems but is
applicable for any domain scenario where clients from diﬀerent domains
wish to authenticate to each other. To this end, we make use of Trusted
Third Parties in the form of Domain Authentication Servers in each do-
main. These act on behalf of their clients, resulting in a four-party pro-
tocol. If there is a secure channel between the Domain Authentication
Servers, our protocol can provide secure authentication. To address the
case where domains do not have a secure channel between them, we ex-
tend our scheme with the concept of trust-rating. Domain Authentication
Servers signal security-relevant information to their clients (pre-existing
secure channel or not, trust, . . . ). The clients evaluate this information
to decide if it ﬁts the security requirements of their application.
Keywords: Authentication, Protocols, PKI, Trust-Rating, Multi-
Domain, Distributed Systems, Peer-to-Peer.
1 Motivation
Emerging technologies like Peer-to-Peer networks or Identity Federation have
revived interest in concepts for distributed authentication. Identity Federation is
a use case where authentication has to be conducted across domain boundaries,
i.e. members of one domain wishing to authenticate to members of another
domain. Peer-to-Peer networks are often formed in an ad-hoc manner and are
decentral by deﬁnition. Thus, these networks exhibit the need for distributed
authentication even more as no a priori context between peers may exist.
According to the work of Boyd [1], however, authentication protocols need at
least one secure channel in order to be safe against a Dolev-Yao intruder [2].
Boyd proved that where ‘a principal has, at some state of the system, estab-
lished a secure channel with another principal, such a channel must already have
existed at all previous states’ [1]. This means that principals cannot establish
an authenticated session without having established keys previously in a secure
manner. This can only be circumvented by introducing a Trusted Third Party
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 74–88, 2008.
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(TTP) which can mediate between the principals (e.g. by certifying their keys) –
which eﬀectively introduces secure channels by other means.
Where security is a requirement, Peer-to-Peer networks typically rely on a cen-
tral entity that acts as a TTP, often as a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA). Skype [3]
uses such an approach. However, such a central component (‘server’) conﬂicts
with the Peer-to-Peer paradigm. While practical for a single network with one
administrative domain, it would probably be utopian to assume a single global
entity for all Peer-to-Peer networks and, if the networks are to inter-operate,
their peers. Moreover, Ellison and Schneier point out that CAs might imply
more security than they actually achieve [4], in particular if a single CA is re-
sponsible for identity veriﬁcation on a global scale. Given its limited resources,
it may not verify identities carefully enough as a consequence.
Another option that Peer-to-Peer networks may rely on are Web of Trust-like
certiﬁcation chains. However, these are susceptible to the Sybil Attack [5]. The
concept can be strengthened by reputation mechanisms such as those for PGP
[6] or as described in [7]. While arguably suitable for low-risk use cases, this
remains unsatisfactory in general.
It is an interesting observation that most of these solutions may ﬁt well for
small Peer-to-Peer networks but become unrealistic for large scenarios (do not
scale, cannot verify all identities, etc.). We consider a domain-based Peer-to-Peer
network to be a good compromise - a large network consisting of easier-to-secure
small networks (each being one domain). Note that such domains may also reﬂect
social and trust relations. This is similar to so-called darknets where peers only
connect to their human friends, thus avoiding direct contact with attackers.
Yet, similar to Identity Federation, domain-based solutions still need inter-
domain authentication. Of course, Boyd’s theorem applies to inter-domain com-
munication as well. Most protocols for inter-domain authentication thus assume
the existence of a secure channel to provide their service. The drawback is that
they do not cover the use case of domains without previous knowledge of each
other. This dilemma can only be mediated, but never resolved completely.
Our contribution is an authentication scheme that explicitly addresses this
situation. We present a 4-party authentication protocol for domain scenarios,
and extend it with a Trust-Rating Mechanism. The novelty in our scheme is
that it covers the case of non-secure channels or untrusted systems by supplying
the authenticating principals with means to assess the situation and make a
well-founded authentication decision. Terminology-wise, our scheme can also be
viewed as a PKI for domain-structured systems without a priori knowledge of
each other. We have implemented a prototype, but put the focus on the concepts
in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe the scheme and the underlying
ideas in Section 2. Section 3 contains the formal description of protocol and
protocol goals for the scheme. We verify that the goals are achieved in Section
4 and discuss protocol security in Section 5. Section 6 discusses further aspects.
Related work is presented in Section 7.
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2 Authentication Scheme with Trust-Rating
2.1 Domain Authentication Servers and Trust Tokens
In the following, we use the term ‘domain’ generically to indicate a group of prin-
cipals that share a common context and desire communication with principals
in other domains to be authenticated.
We introduce TTPs in each domain, which we call Domain Authentication
Servers (DAS). We structure communication in our scheme by distinguishing
between intra-domain and inter-domain communication. The latter takes place
on one of two channels: either between two DAS or between two clients. An
authentication process between two principals B and A includes activity on the
part of their DAS, SB and SA. If the channel between SA and SB is secure,
our protocol (see Section 3) will provide secure authentication, with part of the
process delegated to the DAS.
This scheme is now extended with the Trust-Rating mechanism, which is
somewhat orthogonal to the authentication. The idea is that the DAS, at one
point of the protocol, also communicate their knowledge about the inter-domain
channel and about the other domain to their clients. This takes the form of a
Trust Token that the DAS sends to its client.
We explain this by example. Let us assume an authentication process between
B in domain DB and A in DA. Let SB be the DAS for B and SA the DAS for
A. The information that SB can pass to B can be described with the following
two categories. First, whether there exists a secure channel with SA. Second,
collected ‘knowledge’ about SA, DA and A itself.
The ﬁrst is a simple yes/no statement. Where the DAS of two domains have
exchanged their keys in a secure manner, the Trust Token will signal to the client
that there is a secure channel. The protocol ﬂow ensures that secure authenti-
cation is possible in this case. Where the Trust Token signals no such secure
channel (and the DAS have to exchange their keys on an insecure channel), the
decision whether to proceed remains with the client principals1. For this case,
we have information of the second category.
Knowledge about SA is delivered in the form of a set of properties, for example
information about the channel on which the key exchange between SB and SA
has taken place, or recent information from observations, e.g. whether SA has
acted faithfully so far or whether there are negative reports from other client
principals (feedback). The only requirement is that there is a domain-speciﬁc
conﬁguration that deﬁnes the set of properties which both B and SB must be
able to interpret. The software may evaluate the Trust Tokens automatically or
delegate it to a human user (which makes sense in interactive settings). Informa-
tion about DA may take a similar form, e.g. whether members of DA have been
known to have conducted fraud etc. The evaluation is again a domain-speciﬁc
process. If SA has not been acting faithfully, this will usually mean that the
description of DA will change, too. Information about the responder peer, A, is
given in the same style.
1 The DAS could theoretically also stop the authentication process, of course.
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An example of a Trust Token may thus look like this:
SecureChannel no
KeyExchange SinglePathLookup
OtherDomain SelfCertifyingID: no
OtherDomain PriorContacts: yes(10)
OtherDomain KnownFrauds: no(0)
OtherDomain HumanFeedback: yes(3)/no(0)
OtherPeer NoInformation
Upon receiving it, a client will know that the DAS have looked up each other
via a standard look-up without further hardening and exchanged their keys
during this process. The other DAS can also not prove its identity as it is not
bound to a public/private key pair. However, there have been 10 prior contacts
with that domain before, and no frauds reported yet by other clients. The DAS
received feedback for the other domain from 3 clients, all positive and based
on human interaction, e.g. from voice sessions like in Zfone [8] (see Section 7).
There is no information about the other peer.
A ﬁnal remark: Note that even in the case of a secure channel and successful
authentication of some entity A, this does not imply that A will necessarily
be honest and act faithfully – merely that its identity has been ascertained.
Information of the second category can thus also be useful in the case where the
Trust Token indicates a secure channel between SA and SB.
2.2 Strengthening the Insecure Channel
Although not the primary focus of this paper, it is worthwhile to observe that
there are measures to address the situation where DAS have no secure channel.
The methods we propose are the following.
First, in the Peer-to-Peer case, we propose to strengthen the Peer-to-Peer sys-
tem against network-related attacks. The other domain is given as an identiﬁer
within the system (a name, a number, etc.). The Peer-to-Peer system is used
to look-up the other domain and its DAS. An attacker could set up a man-
in-the-middle attack. To strengthen the communication, the DAS may attempt
to communicate over multiple paths in the hope that a man-in-the-middle can-
not control all of the paths. The multiple path aspects can be divided into two
mechanisms: a) storage of location information at multiple places, b) multiple
independent paths towards a target. Furthermore, we need to ensure that the
paths and the corresponding peers are diverse.
Second, where possible, we suggest self-certifying IDs for the DAS to avoid
man-in-the-middle attacks and impersonation. A self-certifying identiﬁer is e.g.
ID = hash(PublicKey). With the knowledge of the private key a peer can prove
ownership of the ID. This is quite useful and does not need a central authority,
but it does not solve all problems. We can bind an ID to an entity with a key,
but we cannot bind a name to an ID. If we need to resolve a human-readable or
application-speciﬁc name, we still have no guarantee to reach the correct domain.
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Third, where possible, we suggest to use user feedback to the DAS to report
errors in authentication and misbehavior (although this can also be a ﬂaw if
users purposefully inject false information). Only user and application are able
to judge if the authentication decision of an insecure session was correct or not.
Furthermore, this is also true for the behavior of other entities.
None of these methods can solve the underlying dilemma, but the DAS can
include information about which methods were used in the Trust Token to aid
the client to some degree. This does not provide us with a secure channel, but
rather acts as means of a risk assessment.
2.3 PKI Aspects
From the perspective of key distribution, our scheme represents a PKI with
the following properties. It is distributed over several domains, yet can operate
without a single global authority. This makes it more ﬂexible and eliminates
the need for manual interaction, yet allows manual setup of secure channels
between domains and leverages trust evaluation. We argue that our concept
oﬀers better scalability as only domains that need to communicate are involved
in the authentication scheme.
3 Authentication Protocol with Trust-Rating
In the following, we give a formal description of the protocol for our authentica-
tion scheme. We begin with the notion of authentication and state the protocol
goals against this background.
3.1 Deﬁning Authentication
There are several deﬁnitions for authentication in academic literature. We use
the relatively strong deﬁnition by Lowe [9], ‘Injective Agreement’, against which
we have deﬁned our protocol. The Model Checker that we used to verify and
check our protocol with also operates on this deﬁnition. We cite it here in the
form of Fresh Injective Agreement:
Deﬁnition 1. We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator A Agreement
with a responder B on a set of data items ds if, whenever A (acting as initia-
tor) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B, then B has
previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was acting as
responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values correspond-
ing to all the variables in ds, and each such run of A corresponds to a unique
run of B. Fresh Agreement means that if any initiator A completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with B, using particular values for the nonces, then A can
be sure that at some time in the past, B believed that he was acting as responder
in a run of the protocol with A, using the same values for the nonces.
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3.2 Protocol Goals
We now state the goals that our protocol must achieve. There are several goals
in addition to Agreement.
Goal 1: Authentication as Agreement. We specify this as Fresh Injective Agree-
ment. The principals which authenticate each other are A and B. Authentication
must be mutual.
Goal 2: Key Establishment. As an outcome of the protocol, the principals A and
B establish a session key. We insist that the DAS must not be able to obtain or
derive this key.
Goal 3: Freshness of the Session Key. A and B must be able to verify that the
session key is a new one, and not the result of an earlier protocol run.
Goal 4: Mutual Belief in Session Key. In the style of Boyd [10], we call a session
key K that is only known to A and B (Goal 2) and is fresh (Goal 3) a good key.
Mutual Belief in K is achieved if and only if B believes K is a good key for use
with A and A also believes K to be a good key for use with B.
Optional Goal: Perfect Forward Secrecy. We include Perfect Forward Secrecy as
an optional goal.
3.3 Notation
We use the same notation as in [10]. The identity of a principal is denoted by a
capital letter. An arrow indicates the process of one principal sending a message
to another. A symmetric key is denoted by the letter K with an index indicating
between which principals the key is shared. We denote a public key as PKX ,
where X indicates the principal to which the key belongs. Encryption with a
symmetric key is written as {m}K . Encryption with a public key is denoted by
EX(m). A signature with a private key is denoted by SigX(t): token t, signed
with the private key of agent X . Nonces are denoted by a capital N with an
index.
We assume that all messages are integrity-protected without explicitly adding
this to our notation.
3.4 Assumptions
We require clients and DAS to execute certain actions when a client becomes
a member of a domain. A client principal X and its DAS SX must agree on
a secret symmetric key KXSX when X joins. X and SX also exchange their
public keys. Both is assumed to happen securely. SX uses the cryptographically
secure hash function h to calculate h(X.PKX) and signs this with its private
key. SigSX (h(X,PKX)) will be referred to as a Public Key Token.
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Two client principals B and A can later exchange their public keys through
the following message exchange:
B → A : (B,A, PKB, SigSB(h(B,PKB))) (Key Exchange Query)
A → B : (A,B, PKA, SigSA(h(A,PKA))) (Key Exchange Response)
Note that this does not achieve key authentication. If DAS exchange their
keys, this corresponds to exchanging self-certiﬁed keys.
3.5 Protocol Speciﬁcation
We describe our protocol and motivate each message ﬁeld.
In general, we take care to follow the guidelines by Abadi and Needham [11]
wherever possible. Note that we encrypt every message, which adds to security.
Step 1: Requesting a Credential. We let B from domain DB initiate the au-
thentication run. The ﬁrst step is to acquire a Credential from B’s Domain
Authentication Server, SB, to use for authentication with A in domain DA.
B → SB : {B,SB, A, PKA, SigSA(h(A,PKA)), NB}KBSB (Message 1)
It is our protocol convention to indicate sender and receiver in the ﬁrst two
message ﬁelds. The message then states the responder (A), her public key (PKA)
and the Public Key Token from a previous key exchange. B refers to this authen-
tication run by the nonce NB, used for freshness and to avoid that principals
mistake a message from one run for a message from a diﬀerent run.
Step 2: Granting the Credential. If SA’s public key is known, SB can verify
the Public Key Token and thus ensure that B uses the correct public key to
communicate with A. In addition, as described in Section 2, SB’s answer depends
on its knowledge about the channel to SA, SA itself, the domain DA and A itself.
SB creates a Trust Token containing at least the following information:
1. Whether SB is in possession of the correct public key for SA (secure channel).
If the key is not known: through which operation SB can acquire SA’s public
key.
2. Information about SA, DA and A that is supposed to help B in estimating
whether SA and A will be ‘honest’ and act faithfully. These are not numerical
values but string descriptions that SB and B can interpret. Such knowledge
may also be derived from previous encounters.
SB creates a Credential for B to use with A. It sends the Credential together
with the Trust Token:
SB → B : {SB, B, SigSB(h(B,A, PKB, NSB)), NB , NSB , trustDA}KBSB
(Message 2)
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The Credential in the third ﬁeld binds and signs B’s identity, A’s identity,
B’s public key and a nonce that SB has freshly generated for this run, NSB .
This is crucial to ensure that principals cannot mistake a message from one run
for a message from another. Also note that the Trust Token is not part of the
Credential. From this point on, B and SB can identify this conversation by the
tuple (NB, NSB ).
Step 3: Forwarding the Credential to A. If B is satisﬁed with the information he
obtains from the Trust Token, he may initiate the conversation with A. B sends:
B → A : EA(B,A, SB, SigSB(h(B,A, PKB, NSB )), NB, NSB ) (Message 3)
Note that this is a mere forwarding action. B indicates its responsible DAS;
the nonces serve to counter replays.
Step 4: Forwarding the Credential to SA. A cannot verify the Credential (because
she does not have SB’s public key), thus she forwards it with necessary additional
information to SA.
A → SA : {A,SA, B, SB, PKB, SigSB(h(B,A, PKB, NSB )), NSB , NA}KASA
(Message 4)
B, SB, PKB and NSB are forwarded in order for SA to be able to verify
the Credential. From this point on, A refers to her conversation with SA by
nonce NA.
Step 5: Verifying Freshness. If SA is in possession of SB’s public key, it can
immediately verify the Credential. Else it must acquire the public key by other,
possibly insecure, means. Either will be indicated in the Trust Token for A later.
With the Credential veriﬁed, two issues remain. The ﬁrst is the freshness of
the Credential. This can only be veriﬁed with another message exchange. The
second issue is that A needs a token that enables her to authenticate to B. Thus,
SA sends
SA → SB : ESB (SA, SB, B,A,NSB , NSA) (Message 5)
SA indicates the initiator B (ﬁeld 3) and the responder (ﬁeld 4). It uses
information from the Credential to verify that SB has indeed participated in
this authentication run. Note that the triplet (B,A,NSB ) is enough for this
purpose. SA also adds a nonce NSA by which it will refer to this conversation
from now on.
Step 6: Freshness and Credential for A. SB can identify the authentication
run through the triplet (B,A,NSB ). In order to answer the freshness query, it
responds with nonce NSA plus an Authentication Token for A to use with B:
SigSB(h(A,NSB )). This binds A’s identity to nonce NSB , which is known to B.
SB → SA : ESA(SB , SA, SigSB(h(A,NSB )), NSA) (Message 6)
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Step 7: Authentication Decision. SA can verify the Authentication Token, and
it has now veriﬁed that the nonce NSB refers to a fresh authentication run. SA
can now create a Trust Token for A, just as SB did for B in the other domain.
SA → A : {SA, A, SigSB(h(A,NSB )), NA, trustDB }KASA (Message 7)
Step 8: Authentication Response. A can evaluate the Trust Token to decide
whether to continue.
If A decides to proceed, she generates a new session key KAB and sends:
A → B : EB(A,B, SigSB(h(A,NSB )), NB ,KAB) (Message 8)
Note that A can safely use B’s public key which it now knows to be the correct
one. This establishes a secure channel between A and B.
B is in possession of SB’s public key and can thus verify A’s Authentication
Token. This completes the authentication.
3.6 Perfect Forward Secrecy
It is straight-forward to enable Perfect Forward Secrecy with a Diﬃe-Hellman
Key Exchange. We replace KAB with Diﬃe-Hellman values:
A → B : EB(A,B, SigSB(h(A,NSB )), NB , gA, p,DHA) (Message 8)
B → A : EA(B,A,NB, DHB) (Message 9)
4 Veriﬁcation of Protocol Goals
In the following, we verify that each of the protocol goals is achieved by our
protocol.
Goal 1: Trust-rated Fresh Injective Agreement. There are secure channels be-
tween the DAS and their clients because we may assume that the respective
shared keys are not compromised.
We must distinguish between the communication between SA and SB and
the communication between A and B. The communication between A and B
is clearly a Dolev-Yao channel and it is not secure until both principals have
veriﬁed the authenticity of the public keys. The channel between SA and SB,
however, is a secure channel if the DAS have been able to verify the authenticity
of each other’s public keys. Otherwise it is also a normal Dolev-Yao channel,
and insecure. We can therefore simplify the discussion: either the channel is
secure or it is not. There is no need to discuss the latter case as there is no way
to achieve secure authentication. Thus it is suﬃcient to examine the case of a
secure channel between SA and SB.
We examine the case of B wishing to authenticate to A. In Step 2 of the proto-
col, SB generates a Credential for B by creating and signing h(B,A, PKB, NSB).
The hash function binds these four values together. The signature SigSB can only
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be created by SB (because only SB is in possession of the necessary private key).
When SA receives this token in Step 4 and veriﬁes the signature, it can be sure
of the fact that B wishes to authenticate to A, that B is a member of DB, that
B has public key PKB and that SB refers to this authentication run by the
nonce NSB . Note that all values that SA needs to calculate and check the hash
value are included in the message. The only thing that SA still has to check is
the freshness of the nonce NSB .
This happens in Steps 5 and 6. SA queries SB by referring to the tuple
(B,A,NSB). SA shows that it knows the value of NSB and is referring to the
correct authentication run. It also sends the identity of A, thus assuring SB that
A is a member of DA. In Step 6, SB answers SA’s request by replying with the
Authentication Token SigSB(h(A,NSB )). This token binds the identity of A to
NSB, and SA knows that NSB is fresh. After Step 6, SA can be sure of B’s iden-
tity and authenticity. It forwards this authentication information to A in Step
7, and A can accept (forward the Authentication Token) or refuse (stop there).
We examine the authentication of A to B. SB creates the Authentication
Token SigSB(h(A,NSB )) for A to authenticate to B. When A receives the Au-
thentication Token in Step 7 and forwards it to B in Step 8, B can be assured of
A’s identity. B can verify SB’s signature and knows that SB must have created
the Authentication Token – and thus that SB believes the information about A
to be correct.
We compare this with the deﬁnition of Agreement. The set ds of values that
the principals need to agree on are exactly the Credential and the Authentica-
tion Token: SigSB(h(B,A, PKB, NSB )) and SigSB(h(A,NSB )). The principals
obviously agree on these values if and only if the protocol has been completed
successfully. The condition of injectivity holds as well. When B completes his
run as initiator, apparently with A, then A was acting as responder in her run,
apparently with B. All principals refer to each authentication run with a nonce
of their own, plus their peering principal’s nonces in their replies. Thus it cannot
happen that a principal mistakes a message to be from a diﬀerent run, or vice
versa. Thus each run of B corresponds to a unique run of A. This is Agreement.
It is trust-rated due to the Trust Tokens.
For the Freshness property, we observe that all principals create and maintain
their own nonces by which they refer to a combination of channel and run. Thus
all entities can be sure that the messages they receive are fresh ones and contain
fresh values.
Goal 2: Key Establishment. In message 8, A creates and sends a session key
KAB to B.
Goal 3: Freshness of the Session Key. In message 8, A replies with nonce NB
and a new session key.
Goal 4: Mutual Belief. A generates KAB for the purpose of communicating with
B. A knows that it is a good key. It is obviously fresh, and it can only be
known to A and B because A encrypts it with PKB, which A knows to be B’s
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public key (thanks to SA checking SB’s signature). If the authentication run was
successful, B can also be sure that the session key is valid and fresh. Since A has
sent the session key, B can deduce that the session key must be valid for this
communication. Thus it must be a good key. In other words, B believes KAB to
be a good key for communication with A, and A believes KAB to be a good key
for communication with B. This is Mutual Belief.
Goal 6: Perfect Forward Secrecy. Perfect Forward Secrecy can be achieved with
the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Exchange described above. The channel between A and
B is secure because A’s and B’s public keys have been veriﬁed by their respec-
tive DAS.
5 Discussion of Security
Our security model is the Dolev-Yao model ([2]), generally considered to rep-
resent the strongest possible attacker (only limited by the cryptographic primi-
tives). We evaluated the security of our protocol with the AVISPA Model Checker
[12] (OFMC backend).
We will now describe how the speciﬁcation was modeled in AVISPA, which
also uses the Dolev-Yao model. Information can be passed in two ways in
AVISPA. The ﬁrst is as a constant (environment parameter). This value cannot
be interfered with, in contrast to the second method, which is to pass information
to a principal during a run (a ‘variable’).
The (symmetric and asymmetric) keys between the clients and their DAS plus
the Public Key Tokens are thus passed as environment parameters. To model the
secure channel between SA and SB, the respective public keys are also passed as
environment parameters. A and B learn each other’s Public Key Tokens during a
message exchange, thus such a principal’s Public Key Token is always a variable.
The same applies to Trust Tokens.
The intruder I may try to impersonate any principal but he does not know
their secret or private keys. I is allowed to be a member of both DA and DB,
i.e. I has established KISA and KISB with the DAS and has received Public Key
Tokens. The intruder is allowed to participate in protocol runs (under his own
identity) or be a non-participant, or both, at the same time.
The protocol goals are modelled as follows:
1. Authentication as Injective Agreement can be modelled directly in AVISPA.
This is applied to Credential, Authentication Token, Trust Tokens and KAB.
2. We model Freshness by having each principal create a fresh nonce for each
conversation with another principal and checking the value of this nonce
when the reply arrives. We require Agreement on the value of the nonce
between the principals using it.
3. We deﬁne the goal ‘secrecy’ for KASA , KBSB , KAB, the private keys and the
Trust Tokens – i.e. these values must remain unknown to the intruder.
We evaluated all possible combinations of A, B and I interacting. However,
due to the ‘explosion of the state space’, our evaluation was limited to three
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concurrent sessions. The evaluation showed our protocol to be secure for these
scenarios. We also found during our veriﬁcation that runs with three parallel
sessions did not ﬁnd any new attacks compared to just two parallel sessions.
A formal proof for arbitrarily-sized systems is diﬃcult to provide and remains
future work (just as for many other cryptographic protocols). One possibility to
extend the model checking results could be Lowe’s ‘Completeness Checking’ [13],
which provides a proof that under certain constraints a protocol, which is secure
for a small system, is also secure for arbitrarily-sized systems. However, this the-
ory only covers secrecy and not Agreement. A diﬀerent approach would be to em-
ploy other model checkers like Scyther [14], which can also deal with unbounded
scenarios. However, Scyther in its current form is geared towards checking au-
thentication as Non-Injective Synchronization [14] and does not cover Injective
Agreement. The deﬁnition of Synchronization is subtly diﬀerent from Agreement.
6 Further Considerations
Our scheme exhibits a few properties that are worthy of some consideration.
For example, we expect our scheme to scale reasonably well: it eﬀectively
‘decouples’ domain activities. The DAS only need to know the keys of their
client principals and those DAS that they have already communicated with.
There is no need for a priori key veriﬁcation, and there are no certiﬁcation
chains to follow. It is thus easy to introduce new domains. Where this results in
an insecure channel between domains, our scheme remains ﬂexible: clients can
make an informed decision in such situations.
Key revocation can be easily added, without the need to distribute Key Re-
vocation Lists. When a client revokes a key after Public Key Tokens have been
exchanged, the DAS will refuse to create Authentication Tokens. Keys can also
be updated easily: peers send a new key to their DAS (via a domain-internal
protocol) and the DAS responds with a new Public Key Token.
One can also observe that the scheme provides a rudimentary defense against
Denial-of-Service attacks. The DAS in the responder’s domain DA, for example,
only becomes active if it receives a valid message from A. There is no way that
other principals can trigger a computationally expensive answer, especially if
they’re from outside DA. The protection for the initiator’s SB, meanwhile, lies
in the fact that it can drop messages from outside its domain that do not include
one of the nonces that SB has recently created for an authentication run.
Our scheme could be extended to enable DAS load distribution within a do-
main: several DAS could share their (symmetric and asymmetric) keys. An any-
cast mechanism, possibly with proximity property, would enable clients to address
their DAS.
7 Related Work
X.509 and the PGP/GPG Web of Trust are probably the best-known PKIs.
X.509 uses CAs, and some argue that this concept oﬀers the highest degree of
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security that is possible today. Proponents of Webs of Trust counter that a CA is
not per se trustworthy and that the user can determine better whom to trust. A
problem of PKIs is key revocation. This is usually handled with Key Servers and
Key Revocation Lists, requiring great diligence. We do not intend to take sides
here but rather point out that our concept establishes itself between hierarchical
PKIs with CAs and ‘ﬂat’ Webs of Trust.
The Kerberos protocol [15] can be used for authentication between domains.
The foreign Ticket Granting Server must be registered with the local Key Au-
thentication Server. The concept is transitive but requires manual conﬁguration,
resulting in higher maintenance.
Protocols for Identity Federation (IF) (e.g. [16]) extend this with the notion of
‘Circles of Trust’. They enable the portability of an identity between domains.
Keys must be exchanged a priori and out-of-band. Many IF protocols addi-
tionally use TLS in the underlay, thus establishing secure channels over which
the actual authentication protocols are deﬁned. Our scheme is diﬀerent in both
regards.
Other approaches try to eliminate the CA by distributing its functionality, e.g.
by using Multiparty Computation (MPC) as presented by Narasimha and Saxena
et al. in [17], [18]. They describe a decentral method for group membership
control. The scheme requires all principals to execute the protocol faithfully
and does not aim to counter the Sybil Attack. If intruders gain access to the
group, the scheme is compromised. Defenses can be established with Veriﬁable
Secret Sharing Schemes, e.g. as in [19], but this requires either a high number of
broadcast operations or needs to introduce a CA.
If there is no secure channel yet, authentication cannot be secure. The Resur-
recting Duckling [20] model assumes that the ﬁrst contact is not compromised
by an intruder and establishes a context for future contacts. The Voice-over-IP
system Zfone [8] extends this approach by taking measures against a man-in-
the-middle attack on ﬁrst contact: it requires the (human) users to initiate their
conversation by reading a ‘Short Authentication String’ (SAS) to each other that
is derived from the exchanged Diﬃe-Hellman values.
Concerning trust, Maurer presented a model for reasoning about trustworthi-
ness in a PKI context in [21]. Similar methods could be developed for a client’s
evaluation of a Trust Token.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a four-party authentication scheme and a new protocol for
domain-based scenarios. The protocol is an attempt to design an authentication
process that is largely decentralized yet remains eﬃcient. We have evaluated its
security with model checking. A rigorous proof remains future work.
Since the applications we have in mind include use cases where no prior
knowledge exists, we have introduced the concept of trust-rated authentication.
Trust-rated authentication uses a Trust Token to signal important information
(pre-existing secure channel or not, trust in other server, trust in its peers, . . . )
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from the authentication server to its client. The client can then decide depending
on its current security requirements.
Our overall scheme positions itself somewhere between hierarchical PKIs and
Webs of Trust: principals trust distinguished principals in their domain.
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Abstract. This paper presents a generic proposal for improving existing IdM
systems, by enabling service providers to determine whether the SSO credentials
presented by a user satisfy some minimum requirements. For example, a service
provider may require the users to have been authenticated using a method
labelled with a particular level of assurance or a credential issued by a specific
identity provider. Thus, a user initially authenticated by a username and password
might not access a service that requires a stronger mechanism, such as public
key certificates. Similarly, the access to some critical service may be restricted to
users belonging to a specific organization. The main contribution of this paper
is a generic infrastructure that defines the mechanisms to enforce access control
policies based on levels of assurance and multiple identities, and it also provides
the means to find and redirect the users to the appropriate authentication service
when reauthentication is required.
Keywords: SSO, reauthentication, authorization, LoA, federation, eduGAIN.
1 Introduction
Nowadays organizations offer users more and more on-line services. Most of those ser-
vices require some kind of authentication step in order to determine the set of resources
that can be accessed, the preferred appearance and other user-dependent conditions.
Usually, the factor that imposes the different level of security required to access these
services is the possible consequences derived from an authentication error and misuse
of credentials. That is, nobody worries too much if someone accesses the customized
session of the digital newspaper he reads, but the problem is somewhat greater if an
unauthorized bank transfer is carried out. Therefore these organizations are interested
in the definition of the authentication strength required to assure that an entity is indeed
the claimed entity, which is known as Level of Assurance (LoA).
Besides, in recent years we have experienced the emergence of federated approaches
to resource sharing. In these approaches, trust links are established between different
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autonomous organizations in order to grant users in any of them access to shared re-
sources with a single identity stated by the organization the user belongs to. Usually,
federations make use of SSO mechanisms to allow users access to the resources offered,
without the need to reauthenticate each time. In those scenarios, organizations offering
resources are known as service providers, while organizations stating the identity of
users are known as identity providers. Important examples of these approaches are the
establishment of academic federations worldwide like InCommon [4], HAKA [2] and
SWITCH [5], which are based on Shibboleth, or eduroam [13].
In this kind of scenarios, where the user usually owns several identities provided by
different identity providers, there are situations where the user needs to reauthenticate.
For example, when the user is at home, he connects to Internet through a commercial
ISP using an identity provided by the ISP, but when he is at work, the identity used
by the same person to access the corporate network may differ. A common situation is
when the user is browsing the Web at home, using the identity provided by the ISP, and
he wants to access some site restricted to users belonging to his organization. Conse-
quently, he needs to authenticate against his organization and, thus, to play the corporate
identity. Another slightly different situation occurs when several authentication mech-
anisms with different LoAs are available. For example, a mechanism based on login
and password can be used during the initial access to the network or to read an e-mail,
and another one based on the use of a smartcard to digitally sign electronic documents.
In that case, a SSO mechanism bootstrapped from the network access after providing
the username and password pair cannot be used to gain access to the other services
requiring higher LoAs.
This paper presents an infrastructure to facilitate the reauthentication process in fed-
erated environments where SSO mechanisms are used and authentication is required
initially to access the network. This process is necessary to manage the use of multi-
ple user’s identities and LoAs in a federated environment. Moreover, this functionality
should be added without modifying the existing IdMs, such as Shibboleth. That is, the
new services should be included at a confederation level, connecting different existing
federations without modifying their internal protocols. In order to do this, these features
are included in a confederation middleware such as eduGAIN [15], which can also be
used for single federations. This work is being developed in the DAMe project [1],
whose main goal is to define a unified authentication and authorization system for fed-
erated services hosted in the eduroam network. Specifically, one of the tasks of this
project is the development of a global Single Sign On (SSO) service [19]. This SSO
service is based on the eduroam authentication process and the eduGAIN authorization
infrastructure.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, related work is shown in Sec-
tion 2. Section 3 describes what level of assurance means and which factors affect this
measure. Next, Section 4 provides an overview of the infrastructure supporting the fed-
eration services which has been used in this work. The overall description of the reau-
thentication proposal, with in-depth study of the key elements such as those involved
or the structure of the messages, is shown in Section 5. The application of this infras-
tructure to enable the use of LoAs is described in Section 6. Section 7 defines the trust
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model and the threats that can affect the infrastructure described. Finally, conclusions
and some statements of direction are shown in Section 8.
2 Related Work
This section describes other works related to the management of different levels of
authentication. First, a Shibboleth extension to make use of LoA is described. Second,
the mechanism used by CardSpace and Higgins to specify the kind of authentication
required is analyzed.
FAME (Flexible Access Middleware Extension) [6] is a Shibboleth [20] extension
designed for providing multi-level user authentication, that is, the use of LoAs in Shib-
boleth. This system, based on the cryptographic strength of the authentication protocol
used to authenticate the user, calculates a LoA value that is added to the set of user’s
attributes in the identity provider. Then, when the user is accessing some protected
resource, the LoA is passed through Shibboleth to the authorization decision engine,
together with other user’s attributes, for an authorization decision to be taken in the ser-
vice provider. Besides, as one of the characteristics of Shibboleth, FAME provides web
SSO. There are several differences between FAME and the proposal we are going to
describe in this paper. Firstly, as FAME extends Shibboleth, it is oriented to web-based
resources. Therefore it provides web SSO, but it does not link the initial authentication
to access to the network with the authentication in the Shibboleth IdP, so the user has
to authenticate twice, when he accesses the network and the first time he accesses the
IdP. In contrast, our proposal provides unified SSO, which means that SSO is boot-
strapped from the network authentication. Regarding the LoA, the SP obtains the LoA
related to the user after querying the idP about the attribute containing such LoA. Since
our proposal includes this information in the SSO token, if only authentication and not
authorization is required, there is no need for this additional exchange of messages.
Finally, besides the capabilities shared with FAME, the proposal presented here also
defines a mechanism to redirect the user to the appropriate authentication service if
either, the LoA or the identity, are not valid to access the requested service.
CardSpace [17] and Higgins [3] are two Identity Metasystems (IMeS) which define
a similar mechanism to allow service providers, or relying parties (RP), to specify the
authentication requirements of the services they offer. Both IMeS are built around the
abstraction of the information card, which is a standard representation of the user in-
formation. Basically, in these systems, when the user tries to access some service, the
information card client installed in his computer recovers the RP policy to determine the
requirements of the service, including the allowed authentication mechanisms. Based
on this policy, the application displays to the user his information cards satisfying the
policy requirements. When the user selects one of the cards, the information card appli-
cation contacts the IdP that issued that card to get a signed token with the appropriate
data. Finally, this token is sent to the RP to get access to the service. In the sense
that the required LoA for a service depends on the authentication requirements for the
service, the use of the RP policy in these IMeS provides the same functionality that
the infrastructure that is described in this paper. But we have to take into account that
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the scenarios, and therefore the requirements, are different. CardSpace and Higgins are
user-centric systems defined to create open user communities, where the main principle
to attract people is to give the user the maximum control over thier identities and the
identification process. On the other side, the scenario for our proposal is based on the
existence of previously established organizations with their own users, which want to
collaborate during a specific period of time. Despite these users retain certain control
over their identities and the information about them, each organization is responsible for
its users to the other organizations. Therefore, the organization must control the process
to guarantee the existence and value of certain attributes. Consequently, the organiza-
tions maintain the control of the identification process and a solution at a confederation
level should be provided.
3 Level of Assurance
An authentication level of assurance (LoA) is defined as the strength of authentication
required for a relying party to be assured that an entity is indeed the claimed entity [22].
This definition implies two different factors. On one side, the degree of trust to which
the credential being presented actually represents the entity named in it, called identity
proofing. On the other side, the degree of confidence to which the represented entity
actually is the entity engaging the electronic transaction, called identity binding.
From the identity provider point of view, these levels are discrete assurance indica-
tors that quantify the degree of protection that the organization provides in the identity
management. On the other hand, from the service provider point of view, LoAs are mea-
sures of the authentication trustworthiness required to authorize the access to services
or resources. Thus, higher LoAs are required to mitigate higher levels of risk.
The UK government was the first organization interested in regulating the security
of its on-line services. To do so, it published a security framework to regulate the elec-
tronic delivery of government services [18]. With this framework, the UK government
provided an approach for determining the security requirements and assuring the pres-
ence and proper operation of security countermeasures meeting these requirements.
This framework proposes a methodology for identifying functionality and the assur-
ance required to minimize risk. Besides, it defines four types of LoA based on the level
of control needed. In this way, services classified as level 0 do not require assurance.
Level 1 does not require formal assurance, but threats and vulnerabilities should be
considered. The use of level 2 recommends some form of assurance. And finally, the
highest level implies that certain security profiles must be satisfied.
The US federal government, continuing with the work done in the UK, defined four
different LoAs based on the potential impact of an authentication error [8]. Besides, this
document specifies the criteria for determining the LoA required to identify citizens
when they access on-line services provided by federal agencies. The levels defined are
minimal assurance of identity, moderate assurance of identity, substantial assurance
of identity and high assurance of identity. Each LoA is appropriate for a different
kind of electronic transaction. For example, minimal assurance is suitable for a user
presenting a registered identifier to a web page that offers customized contents while
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high assurance is suitable for a law enforcement officer accessing a law enforcement
database containing criminal records.
Later, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) contributed with
supplementary guidelines [21] specifying the technical authentication requirements for
the authentication LoAs defined previously. This document specifies the requirements
of each LoA related to the process of registering an identity with a Register Authority
and which obtains the credential, the type of tokens used for authenticating a claimant’s
identity, the authentication protocol used by the authentication service, the assertion
mechanism used to communicate the results of the remote authentication to a relying
party, and how the credentials are managed in the user’s home institution. For example,
based on this specification, simple password challenge-response protocols belong to
level 1, the use of a password through a secure authentication protocol belongs to level
2, soft cryptographic tokens belong to level 3, and finally, hard cryptographic tokens
belong to level 4.
Furthermore, there is an alternative outlined in [7] that, instead of defining a fixed
number of LoA, proposes developing an algorithm that models the factors involved in
the identity proofing and binding. This algorithm must provide a value that represents
the LoA of a specific credential.
As outlined in the previous section, this concept of LoA and the management is-
sues it implies will be included in eduGAIN. Therefore, the next section presents this
confederation infrastructure, which will be extended to enable the use of LoAs and to
manage multiple identities.
4 eduGAIN
The main goal of the eduGAIN [12] middleware is to build an interoperable authentica-
tion and authorization infrastructure to interconnect different existing federations. Thus,
as Figure 1 shows, eduGAIN is responsible for finding the federation which a roaming
user belongs to, for translating the messages between the federation internal protocols
and eduGAIN and vice versa, and guaranteeing the trust among the participating in-
stitutions. For example, as has been proved in DAMe, it can be used to interconnect a
Shibboleth-based federation with eduroam.
Fig. 1. eduGAIN infrastructure
94 M. Sánchez et al.
This goal is achieved by defining a set of common services for the confederation,
for example the Metadata Service (MDS) and a confederation-aware element called
Bridging Element (BE) that is responsible for connecting the different federations to
eduGAIN. Metadata related to federations are published by means of the MDS. These
metadata include information for locating the authentication, attribute and authorization
services of the member institutions. In this way, the home federation of a roaming user is
located by the BE obtaining the information published in the MDS. Then, the appropri-
ate authentication, attribute and authorization requests are translated and routed by the
remote BE toward the user’s home institution. This scheme is also valid to communicate
different institutions belonging to the same federation. The specific way the authenti-
cation and authorization processes are carried out in eduGAIN is defined by different
profiles [15]. Currently, a profile compatible with Shibboleth, called Web SSO, and an-
other that does not require human intervention, called Automated Client, are defined.
After the infrastructure needed to set up the federation has been described, we pro-
pose a specific profile for eduGAIN that enables the reauthentication process when a
particular authentication credential does not satisfy the requirements imposed by a par-
ticular service provider.
5 Infrastructure for Reauthentication
Starting from the eduGAIN infrastructure and taking advantage of the points of exten-
sion it provides, this section details the necessary elements, policies and protocols to
implement the reauthentication process for a user belonging to an eduGAIN confed-
eration. As we will see later, when the user is authenticated in his home institution, he
obtains some kind of token, like the one described in [19], which contains data about the
authentication process such as the identity provider or the LoA associated to the authen-
tication method. Afterwards, when he tries to access a protected service, it is possible
to check whether the user has been authenticated with a suitable LoA or if he plays a
valid identity. When the token is valid to access to the service, the authorization process
goes on, otherwise the user is redirected to the appropriate authentication service to be
reauthenticated and to obtain a new token.
Specific details about the entities, policies and protocols involved in the validation
and redirection processes are described in the following subsections.
5.1 Architecture
Initially, as Figure 2 shows, the scenario is composed by several organizations acting as
identity provider, the ISP that provides him access to Internet at home or the organiza-
tion where he works, and the service provider which offers the service the user wants
to access. Identity providers are equipped with different authentication mechanisms.
Furthermore, through the eduGAIN BEs, these organizations are members of the same
federation or belong to different federations that form a confederation. Since the user
belongs to several organizations, he can try to access to the resources offered by the
service providers using different identities with different properties. Thus, the service
provider must check that the user makes use of the proper identity to access the service.
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Fig. 2. Federation scenario
Furthermore, after the user’s authentication token has been validated, an authorization
process may be necessary to enable the access to the service.
The validation process proposed must be transparent to the service provider, that is, it
only has to deal with authentication and attribute queries to the appropriate BE, and this
element will be responsible for recovering the user’s authentication token, validating it
and redirecting the user to the appropriate authentication service if necessary. Regard-
ing the validation step, instead of including this functionality in the BE, authorization
decisions can be delegated to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), which receives the ap-
propriate data and returns the decision response. These decisions are based on a set of
policies defined by the service provider. Furthermore, if the reauthentication of the user
is needed, the location of the authentication services defined by an identity provider can
be obtained from the confederation Metadata Service (MDS). It is important to note
that the validation of the token and the reauthentication processes in the infrastructure
proposed are carried out at the (con)federation level, because they depend on global
agreements among all the organizations. On the other hand, each service provider can
perform a local authorization process to control the access to the resources it offer, that
is independent of the other organizations.
Next, as is detailed in the following section, after the appropriate authorization ser-
vice is discovered, the user is redirected to that site to get a new authentication token.
5.2 Communication Profile
This subsection describes in detail the process needed to validate the user’s authentica-
tion token when he tries to access a protected service, and the subsequent redirection
to the appropriate authentication service if this token is not valid. However, before this
process, the user has to obtain the initial token during the network authentication. The
network authentication process is described in detail in [19]. Basically, as Figure 3
shows, the authentication is based on eduroam. In eduroam, access control is carried
out following the 802.1X standard. That is, the user associates with the wireless
access point (AP), which contacts its local RADIUS server in order to authenticate
the user. But when this server identifies that the user belongs to a different domain the
authentication request is forwarded through a RADIUS hierarchy to the server located
in the user’s home institution. Then, the user is authenticated and the response is routed
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back to the remote institution, where the AP enables the requested connection. Thus, at
the end, the user is authenticated through an EAP method, specifically PEAP, because it
provides a protected channel that can be used to send data to the user in a secure way. At
this point, the eduroam authentication process is extended by means of the generation of
the SSO token, which is built by an eduGAIN BE. Finally, this token is sent to the user.
Fig. 3. Initial network authentication
Once the user obtains the authentication token he can try to access a protected ser-
vice. As Figure 4 shows, this process can be split into several steps:
– Access. The user tries to access a protected service, such as a website, from the
service provider.
– Validation. The user is redirected to the BE and the token is sent directly by the
user’s device middleware to the BE. However if he owns several tokens from previ-
ous authentications, he must select one. This selection can be based, for example,
on the organization that issued the token, the LoA associated to the token or any
other characteristic. The token is validated by the PDP against specific policies
defined in the organization.
– Redirection and reauthentication. If the validation fails, the BE consults the MDS to
get the list of authentication services in the federation that satisfy its requirements.
Based on the information obtained from the MDS, the BE presents the user with the
list of authentication services allowed that can be used to access the service. Once
the user has selected one of them he is redirected and reauthenticated, obtaining a
new authentication token.
– Validation. Finally, the user is redirected again to the BE, which takes the new token
and validates it.
– Local authorization. Now, if the validation is successful, the user is redirected to the
protected service, where additional authorization verifications can be carried out.
Specific details about the MDS mentioned above and the specific mechanism used
by the BEs to contact it, are described in the next section.
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Fig. 4. LoA message profile
5.3 Management of Metadata
Metadata in eduGAIN follows the SAML 2.0 metadata specification [10]. Therefore, as
Figure 5 shows, an authentication service is described by means of an XML document
with an EntityDescriptor element. It includes information about the home institution
and its authentication services using the Organization and the AuthnAuthorityDescrip-
tor elements respectively. The latter contains an AuthnQueryService element for each
different authentication point that the institution defines. This element specifies the lo-
cation and binding of the service. Besides, this example also uses the extensions points
defined in the SAML metadata specification to define the LoA provided by the authen-
tication service.
The specification of eduGAIN [12] defines three messages to interact with the MDS:
MetadataPublish for publishing the metadata in the MDS; MetadataSearch for query-
ing the MDS for specific information; and finally MetadataResponse for sending the
information from the MDS to the BE that is requesting that information. The Metadat-
aPublish message includes, besides the XML document with the metadata, the identifier
of the BE publishing the information. The MetadataSearch contains the search parame-
ters, HomeLocatorIndicators, used to specify the information to search for. Finally, the
MetadataResponse message contains the requested metadata if the result of the search
is successful.
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Fig. 5. Metadata describing the authentication service
Now the general process to validate the user’s authentication token and the redirec-
tion of the user to the proper authentication service to reauthenticate have been de-
scribed, the next section defines a specific profile to use the LoA of the authentication
to guide the validation of the token.
6 Support for Different Levels of Assurance
6.1 LoA Validation Model
This section defines a model for the LoA validation process carried out when a user is
trying to access a protected service in a federated environment. In the proposed scenario,
institutions acting as service providers offer a set of services (S) to the users who belong
to the federation:
S = (S1..Sn)
A set of LoAs (L) related to the security needed in the interaction between users
and services is also defined at the federation level. A precedence operator (I) is defined
among these levels, based on the potential impact of an authentication error and misuse
of credentials. In this way, LoAs can be arranged on the basis of the security they
guarantee.
L = (L1..Lm), I(L1) < .. < I(Lm)
These levels are associated with both users and services. On the one hand, the cre-
dential (Cu) obtained by the user (U) after his authentication in the Identity Provider,
contains the LoA (Lu) provided by the authentication method used. In this way, if the
user authenticates using a different authentication method, he will obtain a credential
with a different LoA. This process is shown in Figure 4, when the BE from the Identity
Provider generates an AuthNStatement which contains the LoA attribute.
Cu = (U,Lu)
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On the other hand, each institution defines a LoA validation policy (LVP), where
each service (Si) they offer is associated to the minimum LoA (Lj) required to access
it. Specifically, this policy would correspond with the Token Validation Policy from
Figure 4.
LV P = (Si, Lj), ∀Si ⊂ S,Lj ⊂ L
Taking into account the previous definitions when a user tries to access to some
service (Si), the system or specifically the BE from the Service Provider in Figure 4,
generates a LoA validation request (R). This request is used to check if the LoA as-
sociated with the user’s credential used for authentication (Lu) is valid to access the
requested service.
R = (Lu, Si)
Then, based on this request, the LoA of the user (Lu) will be valid to access the
requested service (Si), if the LoA associated with the service (Lj) is lower than or
equal to the user’s.
∃(Si, Lj) ⊂ LV P/I(Lj) ≤ I(Lu)
The specific mechanism used to include the LoA information in the SSO token is
specified in the next section.
6.2 Including the LoA in the SSO Token
As previously outlined, after the authentication process in his home institution the user
receives the token, which contains some information that specifies the LoA of the au-
thentication service. According to the proposal for SSO in DAMe [19], the user’s token
is a signed SAML v2.0 [9] Assertion containing an Authentication Statement. There-
fore, the LoA can be included using an AuthnContext [14] element, as Figure 6 shows.
Fig. 6. Example of AuthnContext including LoA
The AuthnContext is a new element defined in SAML v2.0 to enable the authenti-
cation service to include some information related to the authentication process. This
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information can be used by the assertion consumer to assess the level of confidence that
it can place in that assertion. SAML has defined several authentication context classes
to be used with the most common authentication mechanisms, as for example X.509
public key certificates or login and password. Furthermore, it is possible to create new
classes thanks to the extensibility points included in this specification. Altough it is clear
that this is the appropriate element to include the information about the LoA, the way
to specify it is under discussion. Due to the flexibility of this element, there are several
possibilities to express the LoA information. One option is to use the existing Authn-
Context schemas that identify the authentication mechanism used, and let the service
provider to calculate the LoA associated with that authentication mechanism. Another
option is to specify directly the LoA in the AuthnContext when it is created. This can
be done by defining a new schema for each LoA. Finally, another option, following the
same approach, is to include a SAML attribute specifying the LoA in the AuthnContext.
Any of these three options can be used, and the changes introduced by the use of any of
them are minimal. Therefore, although the example from Figure 6 is based on the last
alternative, any of the other options could be used in this proposal.
After the eduGAIN BE from the service provider receives the authentication token,
the system uses the appropriate policies to check if the user’s LoA is enough to access
to the resource. These policies are defined in next section.
6.3 XACML Policies to Guide the LoA Validation
The decision as to whether the user’s LoA is appropriate to access a service should
be based on some policies defined in the federation. These policies are based on the
Fig. 7. LoA Validation Policy
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model defined in Section 6.1. Therefore, first it is necessary to have a policy to define
the different LoAs and the precedence relation among them, LoA Definition Policy.
Second, another policy is necessary to specify the LoA associated with each service,
LoA Validation Policy. The first one is a global policy that must be widely available
for all the members of the federation, while the second is defined by each member
organization to protect the its resources.
These policies can be specified using XACML [11], such as in [16]. XACML is a
standard flexible XML-based access control language and, besides, there are free im-
plementations available. Figure 7 shows an example of LoA Validation Policy defined
using this language. The policy is part of a hierarchy, in such a way that each level of
the policy includes the rights of the inferior levels. Specifically, this policy indicates
that at least LoA 2 value is necessary to access the wireless network.
The next section describes the trust model needed to guarantee the trust among the
entities of the architecture presented and analyzes the possible threats.
7 Trust and Threats Models
The improved SSO architecture presented in this paper is based on eduGAIN. There-
fore, the trust model of this proposal is mainly based on its model but including
some specific details. As described in [15], the trust model of eduGAIN is based on
a PKI model, so each component owns an X.509 digital certificate to identify itself.
The eduGAIN confederation offers a PKI, named eduGAIN PKI1, that can be used
to provide the certificates to these entities. In this way, trust is guaranteed by the
establishment of TLS connections between the peers in each interaction. XML-Sig
digital signatures are also used to protect the integrity of the appropriate assertions
exchanged. More specifically, we can analyze the security issues of each different
interaction of the system.
The first step in the process is the publication of the metadata by the member organi-
zations. Problems can arise if metadata are sent to the MDS by an unauthorized entity
or if the metadata are modified without authorization. The former is solved by the mu-
tual authentication performed in TLS by the eduGAIN entities before any interaction,
because the MDS can be sure about the identity of the sender of the metadata. The latter
is solved if the message with the metadata is digitally signed. But it is also necessary to
protect the metadata in the MDS, once these data have been received.
The user authentication and the delivery of the token is the responsibility of each
individual organization. Specifically, this is one of the factors that determine the LoA
provided by an authentication services. But regarding the token, what can affect the rest
of the federation is the protection of the token once it is on the user’s device. On the
one hand, the token is digitally signed to avoid possible modifications by a malicious
user. On the other, the problem of the token is that, since it is for SSO, the impact of a
theft of the token is bigger than with traditional credentials. Therefore, the token must
be stored encrypted in the filesystem and only the necessary software elements must
have access to it.
1 http://sca.edugain.org/
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The instant when the user accesses a protected resource is another tricky moment for
the security of the token, because it must be sent to the service provider. This process
must be properly protected to avoid the theft of the token. To do this, the channel used to
send the token must be secured, but the user also must be sure that the entity receiving
the token is really the entity that should receive it. Again, the identity certificates from
the eduGAIN infrastructure are used, firstly, to identify the BE that is requesting the
token to the user, and secondly, to create the secure channel to send it.
Finally, when the remote BE queries the MDS to obtain the information to redirect
the user to an appropriate authentication service, the critical aspects are the identifica-
tion of the MDS to avoid a malicious user providing false metadata, and the security of
the transmission of the metadata to the requesting BE. The TLS mutual authentication
and the resulting secure channel solve both problems.
Another problem arises regarding the use of the LoA to guide the token validation. In
the scenario described above, the LoA information is included in the SSO token by the
identity provider, and later this information is used by the service provider to determine
if the user is allowed or not to access some service. In this way, the service provider
must trust this information issued by the identity provider. The legal agreements of the
federation mitigate in part the risk of this situation. These agreements, which must be
signed by an organization when it joins the federation, must specify the security requi-
sites that an authentication service must support to provide a specific LoA. Therefore,
if these requisites are not satisfied, the organization must be expelled from the federa-
tion. This situation implies that some kind of periodic audits need to be carried out in
the member organizations to verify that the requirements demanded are satisfied by the
authentication services.
To end this paper, the next section shows the conclusions and some statements of
direction are also outlined.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes the existence of different situations in an SSO federated environ-
ment where it is necessary for a user to reauthenticate, for example when the identity
provider from the user is not accepted by the service provider or when the authenti-
cation mechanism used to authenticate the user, that is its related LoA, is not secure
enough to access the requested service.
Given this situation, this paper proposes to improve the SSO mechanism by means
of an infrastructure for validation and re-generation of SSO credentials. This goal has
been achieved by extending eduGAIN, a middleware for confederations, with the nec-
essary services, protocols and policies for managing the validation of the user’s identity
and the redirection process. The use of this middleware also provides the advantage
that different kinds of federations such as Shibboleth and PAPI can interact. Moreover,
a specific profile to base the identity validation in the LoA of the user credentials is de-
scribed. Furthermore, the security analysis of the infrastructure presented in this work
has shown that the main security risks can be avoided by deploying the proper digital
certificates. These certificates are then used to provide mutual authentication, digitally
sign assertions and to establish secure communication channels.
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Finally, as a statement of direction, we are currently working on a prototype of the
system to include the use of LoAs in a real environment such as eduroam. We are also
analyzing how to integrate this proposal into the security infrastructure of the Grid.
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Abstract. In Japan, three government PKI systems are constructed as
Bridge Model PKI, and they are also bridged with each other. Up to now,
all of the three PKI systems have issued certiﬁcates mainly for digital
signature on digital documents. Only recently, a concern to issue cer-
tiﬁcates for entity authentication has been raised. Not only “KeyUsage”
but also “CertiﬁcatePolicies” and related extensions should be carefully
used in Bridge Model. As a potential international issue, we have started
to discuss on the migration of cryptography in PKI systems. Due to
Bridge Model and vertically divided administration, diﬃculties in en-
forcing consistent policies thoroughly in these PKI systems is expected
in Japan.
Keywords: eGovernment, Bridge CA, Interoperability, Policies, Level
of Assurance, Migration.
1 Overview of Government PKI Systems in Japan
In Japan, there are three government PKI systems: namely Government Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (GPKI)1, Local Government Public Key Infrastructure
(LGPKI)2 and Jumin Public Key Infrastructure (JPKI)3.
GPKI was constructed to conﬁrm that digital documents, which are exchanged
between government and citizens via the Internet, can be validated if it was truly
written by the insisting party and the content of the digital document is not
altered. LGPKI is the PKI system for local authority, and JPKI is provided as
a public service for citizens.
Japanese PKI systems have two characteristics:
– Trust model is Bridge Model
– They have been constructed as PKI systems for digital signature and non-
repudiation on digital documents.
1 http://www.gpki.go.jp/
2 http://www.lgpki.jp/
3 http://www.jpki.go.jp/
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1.1 Characteristic 1: Trust Model Is Bridge Model
For all of the three PKI systems, Bridge Model [22] has been adopted as its
trust model. As the background for GPKI to have adopted this trust model, the
requirement that each ministries can set up theirs own CAs and prepare their
speciﬁc application had been valued; i.e. vertically divided administration had
been considered at the beginning. As single certiﬁcate policy is adopted for local
authorities within LGPKI, LGPKI is operated in the same way as hierarchical
model. But, to keep each local authority as trust point, and to implement that
there is not legally superior body, Bridge Model is adopted. JPKI is also designed
in the same way as LGPKI.
The bridge CA of GPKI and that of LGPKI are issuing cross certiﬁcate each
other, and the bridge CA of GPKI and that of JPKI are issuing cross certiﬁcate
each other. Arrows in the following ﬁgure (Fig. 1) shows the insurance of cross
certiﬁcates. In this way, multi-domain PKI systems are operated.
Fig. 1. Trust model of government PKI systems in Japan
As Japanese government and local authorities have adopted Bridge Model as
a trust model, there have been several diﬃculties in keeping its interoperability
regarding the path building and path validation. If Bridge Model is adopted, fol-
lowing extensions of X.509 must be used in cross certiﬁcates issued by CAs: Cer-
tiﬁcatePolicies (CP), PolicyMappings, BasicConstraints and PolicyConstraints.
In building and validating a trust path, applications should process additional
path established by the PolicyMappings in each cross certiﬁcates, from the top of
respective root CA. Thus, if there were not for valid CPs, the trust path cannot
be built and veriﬁed to the end.
GPKI’s speciﬁcation for interoperability [1], which is based on RFC 3280 [11],
has been disclosed since the system was started to operate in 2000.
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1.2 Characteristic 2: PKI for Digital Signature on Digital
Documents
Ministries had been issuing variety of paper certiﬁcates before information tech-
nology has been utilized. It was inevitable that government have concern to
digitally sign digital documents for non-repudiation purpose. Japanese govern-
ment PKI systems were constructed under the circumstances, where replacing
oﬃcial paper documents into digital documents had been regarded top prior-
ity. For all of the three PKI systems, Certiﬁcates for non-repudiation has been
issued mainly, and there have been little attention to certiﬁcates for entity au-
thentication. In Japan, ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CER-
TIFICATION BUSINESS [9] was enacted in April 2001. It took after German
Electronic Signature Law. Under this Law and related Ministerial Ordinance,
digitally signed documents were given eﬀects equivalent to that of paper docu-
ments, which was physically signed or stamped. In Japan, stamping is common
practice rather than signing. And, in this Law, time stamping to proof eﬀective
term is not provided for. But, in this Law, accrediting conditions for CAs to
allow issuing certiﬁcates whose certiﬁcate has eﬀect in terms of this law’s aim
is also prescribed. Of course, accredited CAs are external entity to government
PKI system, and there are eighteen CAs at the end of 2007. These accredited
CAs are also bridged with GPKI.
As stated above, Japanese government PKI systems had been constructed
mainly to play the role of infrastructure to validate signatures on digital docu-
ments. Although certiﬁcates for Web server authentication are issued by LGPKI
CA, it was not regarded important in other PKI systems. For GPKI CA, it is
going to issue Web server certiﬁcates soon.
2 Current Status
2.1 Current Status 1: Interoperability in Bridge Model
Client applications for Japanese government PKI systems have to implement
path building and validation function for Bridge Model PKI. It may require
applications to go through multiple steps of bridged paths. So, to conﬁrm the
interoperability of the applications become diﬃcult.
To assist the development of applications for Bridge Model PKI, we have
developed a testing tool, and made it available for public use with some testing
data since 2002 [6].
At this time, there is not a responsible body caring about the consistent
policies between PKI systems in Japan. This kind of body is existing in US: The
Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI) Policy Authority4.
2.2 Current Status 2: Digital Signature on Digital Documents
General Condition. Unfortunately, these government PKI systems are not
well used widely. The only exception may be for using electronic bidding and
4 http://www.cio.gov/fpkipa/
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procurement systems for government. Each ministry has made it mandatory
to use the system, and the system requires digital certiﬁcates. But for other
applications, those systems are not well used.
There may be several causes for this. First, the measure to enforce the use may
be insuﬃcient. Second, the potential users may be limited to professionals who
have rights and abilities, so, assumed users are few. (e.g.: Licensed tax accoun-
tant, Public consultant on social insurance and Administrative scrivener) Al-
though there are a various kinds of professional jobs, those respective ministries
may be diﬀerent, and their policies also tend to be diﬀerent. It is hard to develop
aver all strategy to promote the use of PKI systems for non-repudiation purpose.
Also, CA business related to certiﬁed CAs under Law Concerning Electronic
Signatures and Certiﬁcation Services is not so active. In fact, it may have been
diﬃcult to be operated as dedicated CA for Non-repudiation. At present, how
to promote the use of these PKI systems is a diﬃcult issue.
Diﬀerent Types of Digital Signatures. It is supposed that certiﬁcates which
are compliant with ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CERTIFICA-
TION BUSINESS are issued only to natural person. But there are several PKI
application systems in which diﬀerent kind of certiﬁcates are issued and used.
An example is the PKI system for commercial register system5. On this sys-
tem, certiﬁcates are issued for legal entity, enterprises.
As the second example, regarding certiﬁcates for government oﬃcials, irregular
procedure is adopted: certiﬁcates for the posts, corresponding to its rolls, are
issued to government oﬃcials. GPKI CAs and LGPKI CAs are mainly issuing
this kind of certiﬁcates. Attribute Certiﬁcates are not used for them.
Time Stamping for Electronic Documents. ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIG-
NATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS in 2001 has aimed to make
digitally signed documents have similar eﬀects as physically signed or stamped
paper documents. There had been a fundamental problem that basic conditions
regarding digital documents are lacking.
First, a lot of laws so far had been required corresponding oﬃcial documents
with some format to be archived as physical paper. So, there had been few
electronic documents. To respond this problem, Electronic Document Law was
enacted and enforced in 2005. As it is not so long since then, it is not certain if
the use state for digital signature has improved.
Second, in this law, time stamping to proof eﬀective term is not provided for.
For oﬃcial documents, the date must be written there. But, it is also true that,
there is no requirement which need second accuracy for time on those documents.
At present, although there is a semi-governmental time stamp service, Time
Business Accreditation Center6 in Japan, it is not well utilized in public sector.
As stated above, Japanese government PKI systems were constructed under
the circumstances that replacing oﬃcial paper documents into digital documents
had been regarded top priority. But, current using status is not comfortable. As
5 http://www.moj.go.jp/ONLINE/CERTIFICATION/
6 http://www.dekyo.or.jp/tb/
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certiﬁcates for non-repudiation are supposed to be related to tight requirement
of authorizing behavior, it may be natural consequence.
Credentials for Citizens. In Japan, certiﬁcates and corresponding private
keys are also issued to citizens [10], but it is only for applicant of more than ﬁfteen
years old. As a PKI system to issue certiﬁcates to citizens, JPKI is operated.
And its certiﬁcates are also for non-repudiation. Those credentials, certiﬁcate
and corresponding private key, are issued to whom wants to get it with some
fee. The price varies from municipality to municipality.
Usually, some kind of ID number which can be used over network is in-
cluded in credentials. But, within JPKI’s certiﬁcate, there is no network ID
number in credentials, and the following four attribute elements are included in
“subjectAltName”:
– commonName
– dateOfBirth
– gender
– Address
Historically, there is not ID number or ID code for citizens on this certiﬁcate,
reﬂecting the early discussion on privacy issue. It does not mean that ID number
or ID code is not contained in this smart card. Its concept itself does not exist
oﬃcially in Japan. There is not Social Security No. like US.
As a device to contain the credential, smart cards are used mainly. But, there
is not uniﬁed speciﬁcation for smart cards. And, unfortunately, all of those smart-
card speciﬁcations are not able to contain multiple credentials now. And much
worse, its speciﬁcation is not disclosed.
3 Recent Undertakings
3.1 Optimization for GPKI System
In current GPKI system, each ministry has its own CA, so, there are fourteen
CAs around the bridge CA of GPKI. Those CAs are mainly doing similar func-
tion in distributed manor: issuing certiﬁcates for their staﬀs. From overall view,
this issuance function can be centralized, and the system monitoring can be
done more eﬃciently if they were centralized. Thus, project to optimize GPKI
structure has begun. Responsible ministry is going to achieve it by the end of
FY 2008.
In principle, CAs of ministries will be combined to so-called Common CA.
Ministries will focus on RA function. In this way, GPKI, which is a complicated
Bridge Model PKI, will become simpler than ever. But, Bridge CA function will
still remain. Several ministries are still willing to operate special CAs to sup-
port some Government to Business service. (e.g.: Commercial register system7
operated by The Ministry of Justice).
7 http://www.moj.go.jp/ONLINE/CERTIFICATION/
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3.2 Concern for PKI Systems for Entity Authentication
As stated above, certiﬁcate for authentication, which has Certiﬁcate Policy for
authentication, have never issued from government PKI system’s CA in Japan
up to now. But, the ﬁrst case is now under discussion.
In the latter half of 2007, it turned out that citizen’s pension database sys-
tem had been carelessly managed, and many data have been lost. So, it became
important social issue. The requirement to make people possible to inspect their
own pension record became to get attention. About the credentials to be dis-
tributed for citizens, necessity of certiﬁcate for authentication purpose became
recognized. Several issues related to them also got attention as follows.
Related Issue 1: Level of Assurance for Authentication. Regarding
authentication services which are provided by the Internet servers, there is a
project to develop guideline documents for setting requirements of authenti-
cation systems. The basic idea was taken after from US federal government’s
e-Authentication8. Its technical requirements are speciﬁed in SP 800-63 [5] is-
sued by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in US, which
covers remote authentication of users over open networks. It deﬁnes technical
requirements for each of four levels of assurance in the areas of identity prooﬁng,
registration, tokens, authentication protocols and related assertions. Under this
criterion, not all of the four Levels are corresponding to PKI technology. PKI
authentication is required for higher level of assurance.
In Japan, it is necessary to avoid an excessive system investment, because ﬁ-
nancial situation has deteriorated. From viewpoint to avoid excessive functional
requirements, the idea to set several levels for authenticating function is sup-
ported. Basically, we support the concept of Level of Assurance such as four
levels deﬁned in SP 800-63 in this ﬁeld.
In countries other than US, The University of Manchester in UK has con-
ducted a study [25] regarding the acceptance of SP 800-63’s criteria. In Japan,
such a study has not been done yet.
From the viewpoint of avoiding excessive functional requirements, it may be
also important to deﬁne the Levels which require hardware tokens clearly, and
make it possible to determine which requirement is applied. In SP 800-63, it cor-
responds to Level 3 and Level 4. In Japan, smart card will continue to be typical
hardware token device. It should be avoided to procure many authentication
systems requiring hardware tokens, causing excessive investments.
Level 4 in SP 800-63 requires tokens to be tested under FIPS 140 series
criteria [18] in Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)9. Regard-
ing this, Japan also started Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(JCMVP)10 hardware security testing based on FIPS 140- series and ISO/
IEC 19790. So, it is potentially possible to adopt similar operation as US.
8 http://asc.gsa.gov/portal/template/welcome.vm
9 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
10 http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/jcmvp/index.html
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Related Issue 2: Smart Card Format to Contain Multiple Creden-
tials. Issuing certiﬁcates for authentication aﬀects the speciﬁcation of citizen’s
smart card format, because current speciﬁcation can not contain multiple cre-
dentials, certiﬁcates and corresponding private keys. Issuing multiple cards per
a person may require multiple times of expense, and it does not become even
user’s convenience. For smart card as a token, the speciﬁcation should be ap-
propriately deﬁned to allow containing credentials for both non-repudiation and
authentication.
Also, to make a card usable for multiple systems, and to make multiple venders
can develop consistent system, inter-operability for the cards is required. The
speciﬁcation is expected to be open, but currently, it is not disclosed.
Related Issue 3: Proper Use of Certiﬁcate Policies (CP). Until now,
Japanese government PKI systems have experienced issuance of certiﬁcates for
non-repudiation and Web server authentication, but not for authentication yet.
So, it is doubtful that the CPs for already issued certiﬁcates are described
properly, as there was no need for that. When newly issuing certiﬁcates for
authentication purpose, CPs must be distinguished properly.
In several Asian countries, there are cases in which certiﬁcates for non-
repudiation and those for authentication are not distinguished. (e.g.: Korea and
Singapore) But, they should be explicitly distinguished from security point of
view. Here is an attack scenario as follows:
We describe a man in the middle attack if a certiﬁcate is abused; if a digital
certiﬁcate for entity authentication is not explicitly described as for such a use,
there is a plausible attack. Suppose that a client C tries to log-in a server S
following a challenge-response authentication given in ISO/IEC 9798-3. We now
consider the case that C has a certiﬁcate for non-repudiation, but tries to use it
for challenge-response authentication. Let us recall that in a challenge-response
scheme, a server S generates a random number r and sends it to the client C
as a challenge and then C generates a signature of the random number r. The
signature is returned and S checks whether or not the signature is generated by
C using his/her secret key. If so, S accepts the user as an authentic client.
Now suppose that an attacker E tries to forge a signature generated by a client
C. SupposeC start an entity authentication. Then E intercepts the message from
C to S to ask a session, and generates a document D for which S want to forge
a signature generated by C. For example, D may be a document saying that “I
owe one million dollar to E and pay back by the end of the year”. Note that a
challenge r is supposed to be a random number and so it can be any binary bit
unless the size or format of a challenge is speciﬁed. Here, we make the situation
simple for easy understanding. E sends D to C as if it was a challenge r from
S. If C is not careful enough, C generates a signature of D and sends it back
while C believes this is a part of authentication process. Then E receives the
signature of the document D generated by C. If the certiﬁcate for the key of C
is speciﬁed as an entity authentication use, the signature cannot be a proof of
the authenticity of the signature of the document D.
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On the other hand, if the certiﬁcate for the key of C is speciﬁed as a non-
repudiation even though C uses it as an entity authentication, the signature
obtained by E is actually generated by C and proves the eﬀectiveness of the
signature of D. Then C has responsibility for this signature because C cannot
repudiate it. See Figure 2.
C S
E
chooses a document D
C
generates a signature SigC(D)
SigC(D) E
gets a siganature of D
Fig. 2. Plausible man in the middle attack
Therefore, it is quite important to distinguish certiﬁcates according to its use,
that is, one must completely ﬁll in the extension ﬁeld “keyUsage” in the X.509.
Not only “KeyUsage”, but also “CertiﬁcatePolicies” should be used appropri-
ately in Bridge Model.
Note that the same attack can be applied if multiple certiﬁcates are issued for
a secret/public key pair. Such a use is not explicitly prohibited in the current
X.509 speciﬁcations, however, this type of use must be avoided. Thus, CPs should
be deﬁned clearly, and should be operated appropriately. Due to the vertically
divided administration and the adoption of Bridge Model, it will be diﬃcult to
enforce the CP thoroughly.
3.3 Revising ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND
CERTIFICATION BUSINESS and Its Ministerial Ordinance
Recently, in December 2007, discussion to revise ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIG-
NATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS and its Ministerial Ordinance
has started. As a part of the discussion, the strict description for digital signa-
ture technologies and recommended parameters is under review, and is to be
revised. In current Ministerial Ordinance, cryptographic algorithms such as
– sha1WithRSAEncryption and id-RSASSA-PSS [21] whose modulus are 1024
bits length or over respectively,
– ecdsa-with-Sha1 [2] whose base point order is 160 bits length or over and
– id-dsa-with-sha1 [19] whose modulus is 1024 bits length
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are strictly described. The revision discussion is aiming to include additional
more secure algorithms.
At the discussion, the strategy to promote electronic signatures is also an
issue.
3.4 Estimating the Improvement of Factoring Power
For the secure use of cryptographic techniques, it is important to evaluate the
lower limit of computational cost. The security of RSA depends heavily on the
diﬃculty of integer factoring problem and the general number ﬁeld sieve method
[16] is the fastest mathematical algorithm for solving the integer factoring prob-
lem at present. There are two main kinds of computation in the general NFS
method; the sieving step and the linear algebra step.
It is extremely diﬃcult to evaluate the computational cost to factor 1024 bits
RSA type composites using the general NFS method. Last year, Cryptography
Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC)11 in Japan investigated
computational complexity of the general NFS method [8].
As a standard PC for this evaluation we chose an Athlon 64 2.2GHz CPU.
In terms of cost performance it is an extremely good PC for trying to break
the current world record for integer factoring. For actual results for 1536 bits
and 2048 bits we relied on the evaluations of Dr. T. Kleinjung [14,15], one of
the current holders of the world record for integer factoring. We also used re-
sults for 1024 bits obtained using almost same procedures [13]. We follow the
projected performance graph of computational power of supercomputers given
in the TOP500 project12.
The graph below (Fig. 3) indicates a time when we are able to factor RSA
type composites. However, we only consider the sieve part of the general NFS
method.
According to the result, CRYPTREC reported that future high-performance
supercomputers will rise to the level of computing power required to solve RSA-
1024 in one year at some future point between 2010 and 2020, as shown in
Fig. 3. Improvement of factoring power poses a security threat to cryptographic
algorithms based on integer factoring problem. These also force us to replace
several cryptographic algorithms.
CRYPTREC also provides a projected estimate to ﬁnd a collision for SHA-
1. It is estimated that the complexity of the collision attack by Wang et al.
is 263 ∼ 269 work [23,24] and a clock cycle required for a SHA-1 operation is
approximately 600 cycles/block [17]. It is also estimated that the complexity of
generic second-preimage attacks is over 2105 work [12,4]. See Figure 4.
3.5 Migration Plan for Cryptography on PKI Systems
The necessity to replace vulnerable cryptographic techniques by more secure ones
and adjust security parameters, such as the size of composite numbers in the RSA
11 http://www.cryptrec.go.jp/english/
12 http://www.top500.org/
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Fig. 3. Projected estimates of the GNFS sieving step
Fig. 4. Projected estimates of ﬁnding a collision of SHA-1
schemes, is not limited to the context of ACTON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS. The computational complexity of RSA-
1024 has been deteriorated steadily, and currently, the possibility of attacks for
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SHA-1 is also considered simultaneously. For the case of replacement of SHA-1,
It is discussed in [3]. The attack against hash functions by Wang et al. [23,24]
attracted more and more attention to the security of existing hash functions.
Some of them are no longer secure enough for signing. Thus, we have to replace
vulnerable techniques by more secure ones.
In Japan, these algorithms, which are used in critical portion in government
systems, are subject matter now. PKI systems are aﬀected by this problem, be-
cause many functions are using cryptographic techniques. To solve this problem,
long-term view is required, and we have to replace many functions and data.
So, we call this plan, “Migration Plan”. The PKI systems owner ministries have
already recognized the problem, and they are expecting to have the migration
plan. As each PKI system is operated under vertically divided administration,
it will be diﬃcult to migrate consistently. Also, to take an initiative for private
sector is expected. It is planned to draw over all roadmap and schedule, and
several guideline documents will be prepared.
For certiﬁcates in PKI systems, there is an operational life cycle based on the
validity of certiﬁcates. (e.g.: ﬁve years) In principle, shortening the valid period of
certiﬁcates is not our concern. The opportunity to change the algorithms should
be the timing when the due date of certiﬁcates issued by each PKI system has
come. It is expected that credentials which has more secure algorithms to be
issued in order. Although there may be an opinion to insist rekeying even within
the valid term, it may not be realistic. Procedures, which require excessive ﬁscal
expenditure, will not be allowed.
The viewpoint of eﬃciency and cost are important in considering these migra-
tion plans. For newly issued smart card tokens and credentials in it, it should be
considered to synchronize with the valid term of the cards and that of creden-
tials to avoidable procedure and its cost. Of course, for newly issued credentials,
secure algorithms should be used at the beginning. In this way, in developing mi-
gration plan for cryptography in PKI systems, eﬃcient and economic procedure
should be discussed.
3.6 Reference Cases in Europe
Government PKI Systems for Entity Authentication. The case for entity
authentication function about which we have concerns is using database systems
over the Internet. For example, we have a concern on Estonian X-road13. Al-
though the size and ﬂexibility of Estonian administrative system may be quite
diﬀerent from that of Japan, it is instructive in designing PKI systems as national
infrastructure.
Citizen’s Smart Card Data Format. From view point of data format and its
interoperability, attentions are paid to OpenSC project14. Also, Belgian Personal
Identity Card (BELPIC) [7] is getting attention, because BELPIC project has
13 http://www.riso.ee/en/information-policy/projects/x-road
14 http://www.opensc-project.org/
Current Status of Japanese Government PKI Systems 115
disclosed its middleware and applications as open source software. We believe
that similar approach should be taken to conﬁrm the interoperability in Japan.
Long-Term Archiving and Validation. According to the legislation his-
tory of ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSI-
NESS, we had been gazed upon movements in Germany. The concern about
long-term archiving of digital documents is high in the same way in Germany.
ECOM15, a private sector organization to promote electric commerce, had
been working to develop some proﬁles for the long-term signature format based
on RFC 3126 [20] and ETSI TS 101 733. They are still developing it in cooper-
ation with ETSI, and domestic standard is also to be prepared.
4 Future Work: Domestic Issue and International Issue
4.1 Domestic Issue: Legislation Concerning Identiﬁcation
Requirement and Evidence
Although the later half of SP 800-63 in US is worth to consider adopting its
scheme internationally, the former half, describing requirement for identiﬁcation
and its evidence, is a matter regulated by domestic law and ministerial ordinance.
So, it might be impossible for a while to assume these issues as precondition.
In Japan, it is said that, there are multiple laws and regulations which deﬁne
some requirements and evidences to identify a person. Actually, there is a pro-
vision in the Ministerial Ordinance of ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS, and there are other laws speciﬁc to bank-
ing industry and cellular phone industry. Here again, we can see instances of
vertically divided administration. Current situation is complicated, and there
may be even other laws. As social systems and rules for identiﬁcation are funda-
mentals to PKI systems, some action will be needed to clarify the requirements
and evidences.
4.2 International Issue: Migration Plan for Cryptography in PKI
System
As explained above, In Japan, regard to RSA-1024 and SHA-1 in use, discussion
on developing migration plan has started.
Potentially, it will become an internationally common issue. This issue requires
long term view, and several guideline documents should be written to cope with
this new issue. (e.g.: re-keying procedure and procedures about the insurance of
roll-over certiﬁcates) And, to experiment if the interoperability of PKI systems
can be kept in and after the migration, it may be necessary to set up some testing
environment. It will worth sharing this kind of knowledge internationally.
Ideally, some technical scheme which can deal with the smooth change of
criptographic algorithms is expected.
15 http://www.ecom.jp/en/index.html
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the current situation of government PKI systems
in Japan, and explained about new undertakings. Especially, we discussed on
two major characteristics: Bridge Model and certiﬁcates for non-repudiation.
Regarding the ﬁrst characteristic, we believe that our experience of keeping
interoperability is worth to be referenced by European countries. And for the
second characteristic, it will be inevitable for Japan to introduce certiﬁcates
for entity authentication. Then, we will refer to instructive European cases. We
will continue to discuss on improving Japanese government PKI systems as a
national identity management infrastructure.
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Abstract. Real world healthcare systems are generally large and overly
complex systems. Designing privacy-friendly protocols for such systems
is a challenging task. In this paper we present a privacy-preserving pro-
tocol for the Belgian healthcare system. The proposed protocol protects
the patients’ privacy throughout the prescription handling process, while
complying with most aspects of the current Belgian healthcare practise.
The presented protocol relies on standard privacy-preserving credential
systems, and veriﬁable public key cryptography, which makes it readily
ﬁt for implementation.
Keywords: anonymous credentials, electronic healthcare, privacy.
1 Introduction
Healthcare represents one of the main pillars reﬂecting the quality of public ser-
vice in our society. Over the years, countries around the world have experimented
with a multitude of technical choices and policies to improve the quality of their
health service. One technical choice that seems to be turning into a trend is the
migration from traditional paper-based healthcare to electronic healthcare. The
latter has a number of advantages. Among them we note the greater convenience
and speed to access health data, which translates into shorter treatment delays,
less medical errors, better statistics, higher cost-eﬃciency, better fraud detection
mechanisms, and shorter refund delays for patients covered by health insurance
plans.
Despite all the above beneﬁts, patients around the world have shown a cer-
tain reluctance and skepticism towards new electronic healthcare systems. The
reason for this skepticism is mainly attributed to the lack of assurances about
the way patient data is handled, and the implications that may result from it
on patients’ privacy.
To help reduce this lack of trust one should design ehealth protocols with both
security and privacy in mind. Due to the sensitive nature of health data, such pro-
tocols should be based on well established cryptographic primitives, and should
provide defences against possible user inadvertencies such as ID card losses.
Designing protocols however without consideration for the current procedures,
practices, and existing infrastructures, represents a great obstacle to the adoption
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 118–133, 2008.
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of these protocols regardless of their ingenuity. This is due in part to the high
costs required to change the existing infrastructure before the new system can
be used. In some cases the proposed protocols require the elimination of entire
parties. Sometimes these parties represent on the ground a government agency
or a ministry, and removing them is simply unrealistic.
In this work, we design a protocol that protects the privacy of patients
throughout the prescription handling process, while complying with most as-
pects of the current Belgian healthcare practice 1. The Belgian healthcare system
is a large and complex system with many players who do not necessarily share
the same interests. The ehealth protocol we propose protects (1) the privacy
of patients by eliminating any information leak that may harm the interests of
the patient, (2) the privacy of doctors, their prescription habits, and their inter-
actions with patients, and (3) the interests of the government by avoiding any
provable evidence of a doctor’s prescription behaviour, which could be sold to
pharmaceutical companies for example. Moreover, our protocol has mechanisms
to handle disputes and retrace fraudsters, all without changing the structure of
the current Belgian healthcare practice.
Furthermore, healthcare systems with a structure similar to that of the Bel-
gian system, can beneﬁt from the protocol proposed in this paper modulo a few
minor adaptations.
Paper Organization. First we start with related work in section 2. Then in
section 3 we introduce the Belgian healthcare system. In section 4 we describe the
security and privacy requirements achieved by our protocol. In sections 5 and 6
we describe the building blocks as well as the protocol we propose to achieve the
previous requirements. In section 7, we evaluate the the proposed protocol. We
conclude in section 8, and discuss a few ideas to extend our work.
2 Related Work
A signiﬁcant amount of work related to ehealth can be found in the literature.
One of the major focus points so far has been on the issue of migrating services
from the paper-based setting to the electronic one. A great deal of work for
instance has been dedicated to features such as semantic web and interoperability
between various healthcare organizations [12,13,14,19]. Other issues have been
addressed as well, such as reliability, accessibility, availability, storage integrity,
and fault-tolerance [16,18].
Privacy in healthcare has also been addressed. Ateniese et al. [1] propose an
ehealth protocol compatible with the healthcare system in the US. The pro-
posed protocol provides pseudonymous privacy to the patients, and protects the
identity as well as the prescription patterns of doctors. The patient’s privacy
relies on a tamper-resistant smartcard solution based on conventional public key
certiﬁcates. The doctors’ privacy however is based on a group signature scheme,
allowing them to issue prescriptions to patients on behalf of an accredited group
1 There are auxiliary procedures in the Belgian healthcare system that are not covered
in this paper. The proposed protocol can be slightly modiﬁed to include them.
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of doctors. The doctors’ anonymity can be revoked by an escrow party, and all
the prescriptions issued by a given doctor are linkable to each other by the insur-
ance company. Prescription linkability is an added feature in [1], and is intended
to allow insurance companies to gather statistics. The protocol we propose uses
privacy-preserving credentials equipped with a selective disclosure feature, and
provides stronger privacy guarantees for the patient and doctors. Moreover our
protocol is more eﬃcient than that of [1] owing to the higher performance of
credential systems in comparison with group signatures.
Yang et al. [21] propose a smartcard-enabled electronic prescription system
compatible with the healthcare system in the US, similar to that of [1]. They also
present a signature delegation feature that allows a patient to authorize a dele-
gate (e.g., family member) to pick up prescribed medicines, and sign a reception
pad on the patient’s behalf, without the patient giving his signing key to the del-
egate. Unlike Ateniese et al.’s construction, the scheme in [21] advocates for stor-
ing all patient health data on the smartcard in order to facilitate patient mobility,
and spare doctors the burden of querying remote medical databases through an
unreliable network. The smartcard in [21] is also used to store patient sign-
ing keys and certiﬁcates, as well as to compute signatures. While the smartcard
paradigm is interesting in many ways, the protocol as described in [21] makes the
security and privacy the patients completely dependant on the tamper-resistance
of the card. Moreover, the construction in [21] is such that the identity of the
pharmacist is ﬁxed by the doctor at the time of issuing the prescription. This
is clearly too restrictive from the patient’s point of view, since no alternative
is given if the patient cannot obtain all prescribed medicine at the designated
pharmacist, or if he decides to ﬁll his prescription at a pharmacist of his choice.
Moreover, allowing doctors to designate a particular pharmacist at prescription
issuing time, may result in kickback schemes between doctors and pharmacists.
In [20], Yang et al. present a password-based authentication scheme for health-
care delivery systems. The rationale behind their scheme is to allow patients to
authenticate to healthcare providers using long-term short passwords, as opposed
to public-key certiﬁcates which assume the existence of a public key infrastruc-
ture. It is a well known fact [4,11] however that password-based authentication
systems are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. To protect against dictionary at-
tacks, the authors in [20] propose a special network architecture with a front-end
service server known to users, and a back-end control server hidden from users.
To authenticate to the system, the user interacts with the service server, who in
turn cooperates with the control server in order to validate the authentication
request. The system in [20] is purely for authentication purposes; it provides no
privacy for the patient, and does not consider issues such as controlling access
to health data.
In [9], a system for privacy-preserving electronic health records is presented,
which allows a patient to control who has access to her health records. Fur-
thermore, both patient and doctor will remain anonymous towards any central
authority. Since this system is also based on anonymous credentials, our system
could easily be augmented with these privacy-preserving health records.
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3 Brief Overview on the Belgian Healthcare System
A typical workﬂow in the Belgian healthcare system involves a doctor, a patient,
a pharmacist, a Medical Prescription Administration (MPA), a Health Insurance
Institute (HII), a public safety organization denoted IFEB2, and a social secu-
rity organization denoted RIZIV3. Every patient is member of one of the existing
HIIs. Every pharmacist is attached to one of the existing MPAs. The latter is
called the pharmacist’s local MPA. An MPA processes all the prescriptions ﬁlled
by its client pharmacists, and plays the role of an intermediary between phar-
macists and the patients’ HIIs. Similar to a router, it sorts received prescriptions
by HII, and then forwards them in batch to the right HIIs.
A basic healthcare scenario can be described as follows. The patient visits a
doctor and receives a prescription. The patient then takes his prescription to a
pharmacist. The pharmacist checks the validity of the prescription, and charges
the patient only a portion4 of the cost. The remaining cost of the prescription
will be paid for by the patient’s Health Insurance Institute (HII). The pharma-
cist delivers the prescribed medicine to the patient, and forwards a copy of the
prescription as well as an invoice to his local MPA. The MPA in turn processes
the received data and forwards it to the patient’s HII. The patient’s HII checks
the validity of the data, updates the patient’s records (e.g., total medical ex-
penses so far this year) and sends a reimbursement back to the MPA, who in
turn relays it to the pharmacist.
Concurrently with executions such as the one above, the IFEB gathers sta-
tistical data from MPAs and interprets it. The IFEB also watches for fraud
instances involving restricted drugs such as methadone. The RIZIV also plays a
major role in the Belgian healthcare system. It ﬁnances the healthcare system by
compensating the HIIs. In addition, the RIZIV oversees the overall healthcare
system by retrieving and auditing sample prescriptions from the MPAs. The
RIZIV is assumed to have direct access to the IFEB database.
System Model. Each player in the system above possesses a number of identity
attributes. We describe the most important ones in the following.
Doctor: has a credential DrCred asserting that he is allowed to practise as a
doctor. The Doctor has a unique identiﬁer DrID, and a pseudonym
DrNym. The correspondence between DrID and DrNym is known
only to a trusted oversight authority such as the ”College of Physi-
cians”. The Doctor’s credential DrCred contains DrID and DrNym
in addition to other identity attributes.
Patient: has an identiﬁer PtID, and a social security status PtSSS. In addi-
tion, the patient has a “health expense account” PtAcc maintained
by his HII. The latter is denoted PtHII. The value of PtAcc indi-
cates the amount the patient has spent sofar in the current year on
2 “Instituut voor farmaco-epidemiologie van Belgie¨” in Dutch.
3 “Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering” in Dutch.
4 The size of this portion is determined by the patient’s social security status.
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health expenses. Admissible health expenses charged to the patient
beyond a predetermined maximum amount will be covered by the
HII. Finally, the patient has a pseudonym PtNym. The correspon-
dence between PtIDand PtNym is known only to the patient’s HII.
In summary, the patient’s credential contains the attributes {PtID,
PtNym, PtHII, PtSSS, PtAcc, ...}
Pharmacist: has an identiﬁer PharmID, and a corresponding MPA denoted
PharmID MPA. The pharmacist’s credential contains a number
of attributes including PharmID and PharmID MPA.
MPA: has a publicly known identiﬁer MPA ID, and a credential certifying
its identity. The MPA serves a set of pharmacists, and generates
statistics on prescription data on request from authorized organi-
zations such as IFEB.
HII: has a publicly known identiﬁer HII ID, and a credential certifying
its identity. The HII maintains the health expense accounts PtAcc
of aﬃliated patients, and covers their admissible medical expenses.
IFEB: has a publicly known identiﬁer IFEB ID, and a credential certifying
its identity. It gathers statistics, and conducts studies on public
safety.
RIZIV: has a publicly known identiﬁer RIZIV ID, and a credential certify-
ing its identity. it performs various oversight activities, and controls
organizations such as IFEB.
4 Requirements
In this section, we discuss the main security and privacy properties we want to
achieve in the proposed ehealth protocol. The functional requirements can be
easily derived from the workﬂow described the previous section.
4.1 Security Requirements
General Security Requirements
– Entity authentication (S1). All parties should be able to properly au-
thenticate each other. No party should be able to succeed in claiming a false
identity, or false information about his identity.
– Item integrity (S2). Transcripts generated during the prescription lifecycle
cannot be tampered with, without being detected with an overwhelming
probability.
– Revocability (S3). It should be possible to revoke the credentials as well
as the anonymity/pseudonimity of abusing parties.
Security Requirements Speciﬁc to the Belgian Healthcare System
– Multiple prescription issuance detection capability (D1). Oversight
authorities such as the RIZIV should be able to detect malicious patients
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who visit multiple doctors for the same illness in order to get multiple pre-
scriptions of a particular drug.
– Single prescription spending (D2). A patient must not be able to ﬁll
the same prescription multiple times.
– Prescription non-transferability (D3). It should not be possible for a
party to ﬁll a prescription, if he is not the patient to whom the prescription
was originally issued.
– Inappropriate prescribing patterns detection capability (D4). It
should be possible to detect doctors who systematically prescribe expen-
sive drugs (instead of generic, and hence, cheaper ones), or doctors who
prescribe signiﬁcantly more drugs of a certain type (e.g. antibiotics) despite
known counter-indications etc. In such cases, the doctors involved might be
served a warning, or an investigation might be initiated.
– Correct pharmacist reimbursement (D5). A pharmacist who is not
correctly refunded by the MPA, should be able to prove it in order to be
compensated.
– Payment fraud detection capability (D6). The pharmacist should be
refunded only if he has indeed delivered the medicine to the patient. It should
be possible to detect pharmacists who claim expenses for non delivered
medicine.
– Correct statistics (D7). The IFEB must be ensured that the received
statistics are correct.
4.2 Privacy Requirements
– Minimum disclosure (P1). During a medical consultation, the patient
and doctor should be able to selectively (and provably) reveal to each other
any property or predicate about their respective identities. In addition, par-
ties involved in the prescription processing workﬂow should not be able to
learn any information about the patient and doctor except what the lat-
ter willfully disclose to them. Data exchanged during the ehealth protocol
execution should satisfy the access control requirements deﬁned in table 1.
– Patient unlinkability (P2). Prescriptions issued to the same patient
should not be linkable to each other, except by the patient’s HII, or by the
doctor (if the patient accepts to reveal such information to the doctor.) On
the other hand, two patient prescriptions that cross the same MPA should
be linkable to each other, but not to the patient’s identity.
– Patient untraceability (P3). No party involved in the prescription work-
ﬂow, except the HII and RIZIV, should be able to determine the identity of
the patient. The RIZIV identiﬁes patients only in case of abuse.
– Absence of provable doctors’ prescription behaviour (P4). To pre-
vent elicit kickbacks and bribery between doctors and pharmaceutical
companies, pharmacists should not be able to provide evidence to phar-
maceutical companies about doctors’ prescription behaviour.
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Table 1. Access control matrix
Party\Data Patient Presc. Doctor Pharm. MPA HII
Patient ID (trivial)
all
content
ID ID ID ID
Doctor nym
PrescID,
data
(trivial)
ID
(trivial)
— — —
Pharm. ss status data
ID (if
anomaly)
ID
(trivial)
ID —
MPA
nym,
ss status
PrescID,
data
nym ID
ID
(trivial)
ID
HII ID
PrescID,
cost
— — ID
ID
(trivial)
IFEB
nym,
ss status
etc.
anon.
stat. data
nym
geog.
location
— —
5 Building Blocks: Brief Overview
5.1 Commitments
A commitment scheme [17,10] allows a committer to hide a set of attributes
inside a token, also called commitment. Later the committer can open the com-
mitment by revealing the underlying attributes. The former phase is called the
commitment phase, while the latter is called the opening phase. The commit-
ment scheme is such that the committer cannot open the commitment to a set
of attributes that is diﬀerent from the one embedded in the commitment phase.
Notation. For a commitment comm with attributes (x1, · · · , xp), the expres-
sion comm.xj denotes the jth attribute embedded in comm. To further conceal
the values of the attributes underlying a commitment, one of the embedded at-
tributes can be chosen at random and used as a blinding factor. A commitment
can be opened by revealing the attributes in it. The latter is called opening
information, and denoted openInfo.
5.2 Digital Credentials
A digital credential issued to user U is typically a set of assertions made by an
certiﬁcation authority about the identity attributes of U . To be viable, a creden-
tial system should satisfy a number of security properties such as unforgeability,
and integrity. These properties are further discussed below. The X.509 public
key certiﬁcate standard [15] is a well known example of digital credentials.
Privacy-preserving digital credentials (e.g., [5,6,7]) represent a more elaborate
type of credentials, also referred to as anonymous credentials. In addition to the
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usual security properties necessary for traditional digital credentials, privacy-
preserving credential systems possess a number of properties intended speciﬁcally
to protect the identity of honest credential holders. Among these we note selec-
tive disclosure, token untraceability, tokens unlinkability, multi-show unlinkabil-
ity, limited-show untraceability, and signed audit trails [5,6,7]. Privacy-preserving
credentials are used as a major building block in this paper.
We distinguish three types of participants in a privacy-preserving credential
system:
(1) An issuer, generally a recognized certiﬁcation authority, who issues creden-
tials to users in an issuing protocol.
(2) A user, to whom credentials are issued. The user, also referred to as the cre-
dential holder, shows his credentials, in a showing protocol, to third parties
in exchange for goods and services. The user can selectively reveal any in-
formation about any subset of the attributes underlying his credential. The
credential showing can be turned into a non-interactive signed proof. The
resulting transcript can be used then as a signed audit trail. One desirable
feature of this type of credentials is token untraceability. This feature en-
sures that no party, including the issuer can link a showing transcript to the
identity of the credential holder. When diﬀerent credentials owned by the
same user are unlinkable to each other, we say that the credential system
satisﬁes token unlinkability. When multiple showings of the same credential
are not linkable to each other we say that we have multi-show unlinkability.
The limited-show untraceability property is achieved when the identity of the
credential remains hidden as long as the credential is not shown more than
a predeﬁned maximum number of times.
(3) A veriﬁer to whom the user shows his credential. The veriﬁer may later
deposit the showing transcript at the credential issuer, for instance to redeem
e-coins in the context of ecash. The latter protocol is called a depositing
protocol.
Notation. For a credential Cred with attributes (a1, · · · , an), the expression
Cred.a denotes the th attribute of Cred. For example if we assume that the
Doctor has an anonymous credential denoted DrCred, then DrCred.ID and Dr-
Cred.exp denote the identiﬁer and expiry date of DrCred respectively.
Let A be a party holding an anonymous credential Cred and commitment
comm encoding attributes (a1, · · · , an) and (x1, · · · , xp) respectively. Party A
can selectively disclose any information about the attributes underlying Cred
and comm. Given (1) a predicate P on attributes (a1, · · · , an) and (x1, · · · , xp),
and (2) a message m, the expression SPK{P(a1, · · · , an, x1, · · · , xp)}(m) denotes
a signed proof of knowledge on message m, of attributes a1, · · · , an, x1, · · · , xp
underlying Cred and comm respectively, and satisfying predicate P . The expres-
sion SPK{comm.DrID == DrCred.ID ∧ DrCred.exp ≥ today}(m) for example,
denotes a signed proof of knowledge on message m, where the prover convinces
a veriﬁer that (1) he knows all the attributes underlying comm and DrCred, (2)
that the ID embedded in DrCred is the same as the one embedded in comm, and
(3) that credential DrCred has not expired yet.
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5.3 Veriﬁable Encryption
A veriﬁable encryption scheme (e.g., [8]) for a relation R is a protocol that allows
a prover to convince a veriﬁer that a ciphertext is an encryption of a value w
under a given public key such that w satisﬁes R, and no other information about
w is disclosed. In a veriﬁable encryption scheme, the ciphertext is checked with
respect to a public key associated with a known “decryptor”.
Notation. The expressions VEncA(·) and EncB(·) denote the veriﬁable encryp-
tion under party A’s public key, and the conventional public-key encryption
under party B’s public key respectively.
Let M be the message space of VEnc(·) the veriﬁable encryption scheme, and
let P a boolean predicate on M. The expression
vc = VEncRecID(m){P(m)}
denotes the veriﬁable encryption of m under the public key of RecID, the in-
tended recipient. Given the public key of RecID, any veriﬁer can be convinced
that vc is an encryption under RecID’ public key of a non-disclosed message that
satisﬁes predicate P .
6 The Proposed Protocol
6.1 Setting
Based on the system model and requirements described in Sections 3 and 4,
we made a number choices regarding the type of credentials needed by each
participant involved in the ehealth protocol. The patients and doctors are widely
considered as private entities with high expectations of privacy; we therefore
equip them with anonymous credentials. The other parties however are all public
entities; it is suﬃcient to simply identify them with conventional X.509 public
key certiﬁcates. These choices are summarized in Table 2.
The credentials of the MPAs, HIIs, RIZIV, IFEB, and pharmacists are issued
by trusted government-approved certiﬁcation organizations. The doctors’ creden-
tials are issued by amedical certiﬁcation authority such as the college of physicians.
The patients’ credentials are issued by a central government-approvedcertiﬁcation
authority CA. The patient’s pseudonymPtNym embedded in the patient’s creden-
tial is not known to CA. The correspondence between PtNym and PtID is known
only to the patient’s HII. Issuing anonymous credentials on secret but committed
attributes is easily done by standard techniques such as those in [5,6].
Table 2. Credential material per participant
Cred. type
Party
Patient Dr. Pharm. MPA HII IFEB RIZIV
Anon. Cred.  
X.509 Cert.     
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6.2 Protocol Description
I. Doctor (Dr.) ↔ Patient (Pt.)
(a) Dr. anonymously authenticates to Patient using his DrCred.
(b) Patient computes commitment comPt := comm(PtID),
(c) Patient anonymously authenticates to Doctor using his credential
PtCred. Moreover, Patient sends comPt to Doctor, and proves that
comPt.PtID == PtCred.PtID
(d) Dr. computes commitment comDr := comm(DrNym)
(e) Dr. sets Presc text := {plain prescription text}
(f) Dr. computes the prescription’s serial number PrescID, e.g., as a hash
of Presc text, comPt, and comDr.
(g) Dr. computes
Presc := SPK{DrCred.DrNym ==
comDr.DrNym}(Presc text,PrescID, comDr, comPt),
and sends it to the patient, along with the opening information of comDr.
II. Patient ↔ Pharmacist
(a) Pharmacist authenticates to Patient using his X.509 pharmacist certiﬁ-
cate PharmCred.
(b) Pt. recovers PharmCred.MPA ID, the identity of the MPA serving the
pharmacist.
(c) Pt. anonymously authenticates to Pharmacist using PtCred, and prov-
ably discloses his social security status.
(d) Pt. computes:
i. vc1 = VEncMPA(PtHII){PtHII = PtCred.PtHII}
ii. vc2 = VEncMPA(DrNym){DrNym = Presc.comDr.DrNym}
iii. vc3 = VEncRIZIV(PtNym){PtNym = PtCred.PtNym}
iv. vc′3 = VEncRIZIV(PtHII){PtHII = PtCred.PtHII}
v. vc4 = VEncMPA(PtNym){PtNym = PtCred.PtNym}
vi. vc5 = VEncPtHII(PtNym){PtNym = PtCred.PtNym}
vii. c5 = EncMPA(vc5)
(e) Pt. sends to pharmacist:
i. Presc. and SPK{PtCred.PtID == Presc.comPt.PtID}(nonce)5
ii. vc1, vc2, vc3, vc′3, vc4, c5
6
5 The nonce can be chosen jointly by the patient and pharmacist, and may include
information such as the date, PharmID etc.
6 The patient Pt. sends c5 to the pharmacist instead of vc5, because Pt. wants to hide
the identity of his HII from the pharmacist. In Belgium, health insurance institutes
(HIIs) are managed by socio-political groups, and revealing the identity of a patient’s
HII, may disclose personal information about the patient’s political inclination for
example. That is why in the protocol above, the patient hides the identity of his
HII from the pharmacist. Only the MPA (downstream) needs to know the identity
of the patient’s HII. The correctness of vc5 = DecMPA(c5) will be checked by the
MPA, prior to forwarding it to the right HII. Additional data that may be useful for
statistics, such as PtAge, can be handed to the MPA inside vc4.
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(f) Pharmacist checks if Presc., SPK, and vc1, vc2, vc3, vc′3, vc4 are correct. If
all is correct then continue, else abort. If Presc. contains an anomaly (e.g.
unusual or possibly lethal dosage), the pharmacists asks Pt. to name the
doctor. The pharmacist will contact the doctor to correct the problem.
(g) Pharmacist charges patient, gets payed, and delivers drug.
(h) Pharmacist issues an invoice to Patient with the prescription’s serial
number PrescID embedded in it.
(i) Patient computes:
reception ack := SPK{PtCred}(PrescID,
PharmID, vc1, vc2, vc3, vc′3, vc4, c5),
and sends it to Pharmacist. This proves that the patient has indeed
received the medicine from the pharmacist.
(j) Pharmacist checks if reception ack is correct. If correct continue, else
abort.
III. Pharmacist ↔ MPA (PharmCred.MPA ID)
(a) Pharmacist and MPA mutually authenticate
(b) Pharmacist forwards to MPA Presc., vc1, vc2, vc3, vc′3, vc4, c5, and recep-
tion ack.
(c) If all is correct, the MPA continues. Else if DecMPA(c5) is incorrect, then
forward vc3, vc′3, and rest of transcript to RIZIV and request patient
deanonymization.7
(d) MPA computes:
i. PtNym = DecMPA(vc4),
ii. PtHII = DecMPA(vc1),
iii. DrNym = DecMPA(vc2),
iv. vc5 = DecMPA(c5)
(e) MPA adds a DB entry indexed by PrescID, PtNym, DrNym, and stores
any information relevant to the prescription.
IV. MPA ↔ HII (PtHII)
(a) MPA and HII mutually authenticate
(b) MPA forwards reception ack and vc5 to the patient’s HII
(c) HII checks the integrity of reception ack and vc5
(d) If correct, HII recovers PtNym = DecHII(vc5), else abort and forward
transcript to RIZIV for patient deanonymization.
(e) HII recovers PtID corresponding to PtNym
(f) HII updates patient PtID’s account PtAcc with proper amount
(g) HII sends reimbursement amount due to the MPA, along with the cor-
responding invoice containing PrescID.
(h) HII creates a database entry for the processed invoice with information
such as PtID, PrescID, prescription cost, date etc.
(i) After receiving the refund from the HII, the MPA compensates the
pharmacist.
7 The RIZIV ﬁrst recovers PtNym and PtHII) from vc3 and vc′3), then ﬁles a complaint
with the judicial authorities who can subpoena the HII to provide the real identity
of the fraudulent patient.
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V. IFEB ↔ MPA
(a) MPA and IFEB mutually authenticate
(b) IFEB requests statistics
(c) MPA provides statistics on prescription data anonymized according to
the privacy laws in place.
The data available to the MPA is identiﬁed only by Doctor and Pa-
tient pseudonyms. This data is suﬃcient to generate meaningful statis-
tics, including measurements requiring the aggregation of prescription
data per patient or per doctor. The data available to the MPA, and the
subsequently released statistics do not compromise the real identities of
patients or doctors.
Alternatively, the IFEB can obtain statistics from the HIIs. This can
be done without weakening the privacy of the patient or inducing ad-
ditional disclosures, since the HIIs already know the prescription data
of their aﬃliated patients. The IFEB ﬁrst queries the diﬀerent HIIs
for a speciﬁc statistical measurement, and then aggregates the sepa-
rate anonymized results to derive the global measurement for the whole
population. Data from the HIIs can also be used to double-check the
accuracy of statistics collected from the MPAs.
Remarks
– In step I-(g) the Doctor computes the prescription as a signed proof of knowl-
edge on the tuple (Presc text,PrescID, comDr, comPt). The predicate being
asserted in the proof is that comDr contains the same attribute DrNym em-
bedded in DrCred. This results in the following observations:
• Because the prescription is a signed proof, any one can check its validity
non-interactively.
• The prescription is tied via (comDr, comPt) to the identity of both the
Doctor and the Patient. Recall that the Doctor issues the prescription
only if the value of PtID underlying comPt is consistent with PtCred
(the consistency proof was performed by the Patient in step I-(c).)
• The Doctor discloses the opening information of comDr to the patient, to
allow him to veriﬁably encrypt DrNym under the public key of the phar-
macist’s MPA (in step II-(d-ii).) Note that the Doctor cannot encrypt
DrNym in advance since the identity of the pharmacist where the patient
will buy his drugs is usually not known at the time of the prescription
issuing.
7 Protocol Evaluation
In the following we provide proof sketches and arguments supporting the security
of our protocol. we assume all underlying building blocks secure. A more formal
and complete analysis will be given in the full version of the paper.
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7.1 General Security Requirements
– Entity authentication (S1). This property follows immediately from the
soundness and unforgeability of the underlying anonymous and public key
certiﬁcates.
– Item integrity (S2). All binding data (e.g., prescription, acknowledgement,
veriﬁable encryptions) exchanged during the protocol of Section 6, are signed
either by a conventional public key signature or signed proof of knowledge,
and are therefore resistant to any tampering.
– Revocability (S3). In case of abuse (which can be detected either by the
MPA, the patient’s HII, or the RIZIV), the user’s identity is unveiled by
opening one of the veriﬁable encryptions vc3, vc4, or vc5. It is then possible
to revoke the patient’s credentials and prescriptions through blacklisting.
7.2 Security Requirements Speciﬁc to the Belgian Healthcare
System
– Multiple prescription issuance detection capability (D1). When ﬁll-
ing a prescription, the patient reveals information that will allow the MPA
to recover his pseudonym (cf. step II-(d-iv)). Because multiple prescriptions
issued to the same patient are linked to each other through the patient’s
pseudonym, oversight organizations such as the RIZIV or IFEB are able to
detect abusive behaviour and stop malicious patients.
– Single prescription spending (D2). Follows from the fact that prescrip-
tions are uniquely identiﬁed by a PrescID, and resistant to tampering.
– Prescription non-transferability (D3). This Follows from the soundness
of the signed proofs of knowledge in step II-e of the protocol. The patient
proves to the pharmacist that the nym in the prescription corresponds to
the nym in its PtCred.
– Prescription fraud detection capability (D4). This can only be de-
tected by the RIZIV by searching for abnormal behaviour in the IFEB
database. The IFEB database contains only doctor pseudonyms, which can
be linked to doctors’ real identities with the help of an authority such as the
“college of physicians”.
– Correct pharmacist reimbursement (D5). For each prescription, the
patient generates a reception ack, which is a patient conﬁrmation of pro-
vided services by the pharmacist. This proof is veriﬁed and stored by the
pharmacist, MPA and HII. If something goes wrong, this proof can be used
as evidence.
– Payment fraud detection capability (D6). The reception acknowledge-
ment reception ack issued by the patient guarantees to the HII that the
patient has indeed received the medicine.
– Correct statistics (D7). The IFEB needs to rely on the trustworthiness
of the MPAs to make sure it receives correct statistics. The latter property
cannot be enforced by cryptographic means alone, since a malicious MPA
could just ignore half of the transactions it has recorded. For better as-
surances, oversight organizations (e.g., RIZIV) in practice request random
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sample data from health insurance institutes (HIIs) and cross-check them
against data returned by the MPAs. A malicious MPA who fails to return
consistent data, or returns incomplete data, will be further investigated and
may have its licence revoked.
7.3 Privacy
– Minimum disclosure (P1). Owing to the selective disclosure feature of-
fered by the zero knowledge proofs of knowledge, the security of the com-
mitment and veriﬁable encryption schemes, the protocol of section 6 satisﬁes
the access control requirements of table 1. This can be easily veriﬁed by sim-
ple examination of the protocol. Due to space limitation we leave the more
formal proof of this property to the full version of the paper.
– Patient unlinkability (P2). Prescriptions are tied to the patient’s
pseudonym PtNym which can be recovered only by the MPA processing the
prescription and the patient’s health insurer (PtHII). All other parties have
no access to the patient’s identity or pseudonym, and thus cannot link any
two prescriptions of the same patient. In the case of a treating doctor, the
patient may freely decide to disclose his pseudonym to allow the linkability.
– Patient untraceability (P3). An examination of the protocol of section 6
shows that the identity of the patient is accessible only to the patient’s
HII who knows the correspondence between PtNym and PtID. In case of
apparent abuse, the RIZIV may also have access to the patient’s identity by
ﬁling a complaint with the judicial authorities who can subpoena the HII to
deanonymize the fraudulent patient.
– Absence of provable doctor’s prescription behaviour (P4). The pro-
tocol is designed in such a way that the real identity of a doctor is never
associated with the prescriptions’ content. The only exception occurs when
the pharmacist sees a prescription anomaly (e.g. lethal dosage), in which
case he asks the patient to name the doctor. This information however is
not a reproducible proof, and thus cannot be used to convince a bribe-giver.
8 Concluding Remarks
The paper presents a privacy-preserving protocol for the Belgian healthcare sys-
tem. The proposed protocol protects patients’ privacy throughout the prescrip-
tion handling process, while complying with the current Belgian practise. Despite
the large number of parties involved, and the complexity of the application, the
protocol we present minimizes information disclosure and satisﬁes the access
control requirements of table 1. Furthermore, our protocol is equipped with a
set of abuse detection and evidence gathering mechanisms that allow oversight
authorities to solve instances of fraud and ensure accountability. In addition to
protecting patients’ privacy, our protocol provides a mechanism to prevent the
intrusive monitoring of doctors’ prescription patterns. The ability of third party
players to determine the prescription patterns of a given doctor is often con-
sidered an undesirable aspect in healthcare, since it can be used by malicious
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pharmaceutical companies for example, (1) as a coercive tool against doctors
who do not prescribe their products, or (2) as an instrument to facilitate bribery
and kick-backs with doctors who do the opposite (cf., [3,2].) In our protocol,
doctors are only pseudonymously identiﬁed to allow the legitimate gathering of
statistical data about medicine consumption and its eﬀect on the population.
The real identity of the doctors is unveiled only in case of apparent abuse via a
judicial procedure.
The design we propose in this paper is highly modular and can be adapted
to other healthcare systems comparable to the Belgian one. For example, if we
consider a jurisdiction where the real identity of the doctor (as opposed to his
pseudonym) has to be indicated in plaintext in all transcripts generated during
the prescription lifecycle, then one can easily adapt our protocol to the new
setting by replacing the DrNym attribute in the authentication step of phase I,
with the DrID attribute already embedded in the doctor’s credential. The rest
of the protocol can be easily modiﬁed accordingly.
Further improvements can be made to our protocol. For example one could
strengthen access control to health records stored on remote databases by enforc-
ing privacy policies deﬁned by the patients. Another worthy avenue for future
work would be to simplify the prescription workﬂow and reduce interactions (to
the extent acceptable by the healthcare procedures and practices in place).
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Abstract. Many standard elliptic curves (e.g. NIST, SECG,
ANSI X9.62, WTLS, . . .) over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp have p a prime of
Mersenne-like form—this yields faster ﬁeld arithmetic. Point compres-
sion cuts the storage requirement for points (public keys) in half and is
hence desirable. Point decompression in turn involves a square root com-
putation. Given the special Mersenne-like form of a prime, in this paper
we examine the problem of eﬃciently computing square roots in the base
ﬁeld. Although the motivation comes from standard curves, our analysis
is for fast square roots in any arbitrary Mersenne-like prime ﬁeld satisfy-
ing p ≡ 3 (mod 4). Using well-known methods from number theory, we
present a general strategy for fast square root computation in these base
ﬁelds. Signiﬁcant speedup in the exponentiation is achieved compared to
general methods for exponentiation. Both software and hardware imple-
mentation results are given, with a focus on standard elliptic curves.
Keywords: elliptic curve cryptography, square roots modulo p, expo-
nentiation, addition chains.
1 Introduction
Point compression is a frequently used operation in elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC). Public keys (or any point on the curve) consisting of an x and
y-coordinate can be compressed to only the x coordinate and some sign or com-
pression bit, requiring only half the space. Given an x-coordinate, point decom-
pression calculates the y-coordinate by using the curve equation; in the case
of elliptic curves over a prime ﬁeld Fp, a square root must be computed. ECC
is an attractive choice for small devices due to the reduced size of keys and
signatures. There are many existing standards for ECC, for example [1,2,3,4].
Standard curves [5,4,3,6] have been constructed for use with elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems, and such curves are often used in industry standards. For example,
the curve P-192 [5] is used in the new Bluetooth Simple Pairing Protocol [7].
Popular software packages often also include these standard curves, for example
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 134–149, 2008.
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OpenSSL [8]. As there are many advantages for protocols making use of ECC to
use point compression and decompression, and such operations are often done
online, the speed is important.
This work is motivated by point decompression for those standard curves
over Fp which satisfy p ≡ 3 (mod 4) of Mersenne-like form. Hence much of the
analysis focuses on square roots in the speciﬁc ﬁelds listed in these standards,
although a more general analysis of Mersenne-like primes is provided as well. We
present a fast method for calculating square roots by exponentiation in these
ﬁelds, which is signiﬁcantly faster than general exponentiation algorithms. The
method is based on well-known equations from number theory that are often
used in other areas of cryptography.
We begin in Sec. 2 with an overview of elliptic curves and square roots in
prime ﬁelds. Addition chains are covered in Sec. 3 and some notation is in-
troduced. An overview of fast exponentiation methods is provided as well. We
present our strategy for computing square roots in Mersenne-like prime ﬁelds in
Sec. 4, which yields signiﬁcant speedup when compared to classic exponentiation
methods. Software and hardware implementation results are provided in Sec. 5.
We conclude in Sec. 6.
2 Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields
Over Fp for some prime p > 3, an elliptic curve E(Fp) is deﬁned by the equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b. (1)
An abelian group is formed using all of the points on the curve, and hence
elliptic curve cryptosystems can be implemented. For example, Diﬃe-Hellman
key agreement [9]: given a generator point G of large prime order r, Alice gen-
erates a random a ∈ [1, r) and sends the point aG to Bob. Bob generates a
random b ∈ [1, r) and sends the point bG to Alice. The shared secret is then
a(bG) = b(aG), and commonly the result is then mapped (a projection) to the
x-coordinate to arrive at a shared key.
For the sake of storage eﬃciency, Miller [10] noted that both the x and y-
coordinate of a point need not be transmitted; given an x-coordinate, there are
either two or zero solutions for y in (1) computed using a square root opera-
tion. The negative of a point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp) is the reﬂection on the x-axis;
that is, −P = (x,−y). Denoting Px as the x-coordinate of the point P , clearly
Px = (−P )x and (aP )x = a(−P )x. If it is necessary for the point to be uniquely
determined, a simple compression or sign bit can be used to identify which solu-
tion for y to use. As point decompression is often done online, the computational
eﬃciency of this square root operation is important.
Clearly the main advantage is that storing x requires half the space of (x, y).
There are also some security advantages. Public keys should be validated be-
fore use to prevent small subgroup attacks and false curve attacks. Validation
involves verifying that a point does indeed lie on the curve and have large order.
Unlike the multiplicative group of integers modulo p which always yield trivial
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subgroups, elliptic curve groups can be of prime order, and indeed most standard
curves over prime ﬁelds are. Given an x-coordinate for point decompression, if a
valid square root for the righthand side of (1) is found, (x, y) is guaranteed to be
on E(Fp), preventing false curve attacks. If the order r of E is prime, then (x, y)
is also guaranteed to be of order r, preventing small subgroup attacks. Such
validation can, of course, be obtained given an uncompressed point by verifying
that (1) holds, but when using point decompression, public key validation can
be obtained naturally.
2.1 Square Roots Modulo p
Computing a y-coordinate from an x-coordinate using (1) involves computing a
square root modulo p. To state the problem formally, denoting QRp as the set
of all quadratic residues modulo p, solve
α2 = β (mod p), where β ∈ QRp (2)
for α. The simplest case is p ≡ 3 (mod 4). Euler’s Criterion ensures that
β(p−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod p), so
α2 ≡ ββ(p−1)/2 ≡ β(p+1)/2 (mod p) and
α ≡ ±β(p+1)/4 (mod p) (3)
We focus on this case and disregard the remaining case of p ≡ 1 (mod 4). For
standard curves, p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is most often the case. For example, OpenSSL
supports 27 standard curves over Fp and 24 of them satisfy p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
2.2 Mersenne-Like Prime Fields
By deﬁnition, the concept of Mersenne-like primes is by no means precise. A
Mersenne number is of the form 2d − 1 = ∑d−1i=0 2i and a Mersenne-like prime
generally contains a few more terms and/or a small constant. For a more general
analysis, we will often refer to a Mersenne-like prime having the form of (4) where
a ≥ 1, b > a + 1, c ≥ b, . . .
p =
a∑
i=0
2i +
c∑
i=b
2i + · · · ≡ 3 (mod 4). (4)
Although the binary representation of any arbitrary p can be described by
such a form (a series of ones followed by a series of zeros followed by . . .), we
can identify Mersenne-like primes as those having a small number of summation
terms, where “small” is left to interpretation. We will also consider slightly less
general Mersenne-like primes having the form of (5).
p = 2d − 2j − 1 ≡ 3 (mod 4) where 1 < j < d− 1 (5)
Mersenne-like form is desirable as it makes ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic, such as modu-
lar reduction, more eﬃcient; instead of expensive divisions, modular reduction can
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be performed using a small number of shifts, additions, and/or small multiplica-
tions. Table 1 contains some of the Mersenne-like prime ﬁelds for standard elliptic
curves from various standards including NIST [5], SECG [4], ANSI X9.62 [3], and
WTLS[6]. Clearly all of these primes can be described by using (5) and/or (4) as
well. There are overlaps in these standards, and some of the standard curves use
the same p but diﬀerent curve coeﬃcients. OpenSSL includes all of these standard
curves by default.
Table 1. Mersenne-like prime ﬁelds from various standards
Curve name p
wtls8 2112 − 537 (6)
secp128r1/r2 2128 − 297 − 1 (7)
secp160r1 2160 − 231 − 1 (8)
secp160k1/r2 / wtls7 2160 − 232 − 214 − 212 − 29 − 28 − 27 − 23 − 22 − 1 (9)
wtls9 2160 − 229233 (10)
secp192r1 / NIST P-192 / X9.62 p192v1/v2/v3 2192 − 264 − 1 (11)
secp192k1 2192 − 232 − 212 − 28 − 27 − 26 − 23 − 1 (12)
X9.62 p239v1/v2/v3 2239 − 2143 − 295 + 247 − 1 (13)
secp256r1 / NIST P-256 / X9.62 p256v1 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1 (14)
secp256k1 2160 − 232 − 29 − 28 − 27 − 26 − 24 − 1 (15)
secp384r1 / NIST P-384 2384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1 (16)
secp521r1 / NIST P-521 2521 − 1 (17)
3 Addition Chains and Exponentiation
Clearly for computing square roots modulo p ≡ 3 (mod 4), a ﬁxed exponent,
variable base exponentiation (3) is used. A survey of some common methods for
general fast exponentiation can be found in [11]. Fast exponentiation is normally
carried out using an addition chain ([12] is the de facto reference on the topic;
also see [13]). Addition sequences are also of interest for exponentiation. We use
the deﬁnition and notation from [14].
Definition 1. An addition chain for an integer al is a sequence γ of l pairs
((j(1), k(1)), . . . , (j(l), k(l))) of integers with 0 ≤ k(i) ≤ j(i) < i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
and the semantics S(γ) = {a0, . . . , al} is the set of integers such that a0 = 1 and
ai = aj(i) + ak(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. An addition chain can be viewed as a directed
graph consisting of nodes S(γ) and edges from aj(i) and ak(i) to ai.
Definition 2. An addition sequence for a set of integersW is an addition chain
γ such that W ⊂ S(γ).
The binary expansion of an integer clearly yields an addition chain (we will refer
to this as the binary addition chain), although the length l is not necessarily
optimal; an optimal addition chain is one for which l is minimal.
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Example 1. The smallest positive integer for which the binary addition chain is
not optimal is 15. The binary addition chain is of length 6:
γ = ((0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 2), (3, 0), (4, 4), (5, 0))
S(γ) = {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 15}
1    2  3  6  7  14  15
and a15 = ((a2a)2a)2a, 3 squarings and 3 multiplications. But the optimal ad-
dition chain is of length 5:
γ = ((0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 2))
S(γ) = {1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 15}
1   2  3 
 	 
6  12  15
and a15 = ((a2a)2)2a2a, 3 squarings and 2 multiplications (using the previously
computed value a2a in the last step).
3.1 Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation
The square-and-multiply (binary) method for fast exponentiation is shown in
Algorithm 1. The number of multiplications needed is one less than the Hamming
weight of the exponent e denoted ω(e) and the number of squarings one less than
the binary length  = log2 e+1 of e; we denote this cost as (ω(e)−1)M+(−1)S,
where M and S denote ﬁeld multiplications and ﬁeld squarings, respectively.
Algorithm 1 scans the bits of e in a left-to-right fashion; bit i of e is denoted
as ei. The bits of e can also be scanned from right-to-left, but one additional
accumulator is needed. This simple method is in fact the only fast exponentiation
method included in some popular cryptography standards ([2] for example).
Algorithm 1. Square-and-multiply exponentiation (binary method)
Input: Modulus p, exponent e of length , β ∈ Fp
Output: βe mod p
η ← 1
for i ← − 1 to 0 do
η ← η2 mod p // 1 squaring
if ei = 1 then η ← ηβ mod p // 1 multiplication
end
return η
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Algorithm 2. Sliding window exponentiation
Input: Modulus p, exponent e of length , β ∈ Fp, window size w
Output: βe mod p
Precompute βi mod p for all odd i < 2w .
η ← 1, i ← − 1
while i ≥ 0 do
if ei = 0 then t ← 1, u ← 0
else Find the largest t ≤ w such that u ← (ei, . . . , ei−t+1) is odd.
η ← η2t mod p // t squarings
if u > 0 then η ← ηβu mod p // 1 multiplication from precomputed
values
i ← i− t
end
return η
Table 2. OpenSSL sliding window widths
Bit-length  of e Window size w
 > 671 6
671 ≥  > 239 5
239 ≥  > 79 4
79 ≥  > 23 3
23 ≥  2
3.2 Sliding Window Exponentiation
Instead of scanning the bits of e one at a time, it is possible to scan w-bits at
a time, or scan e in w-bit windows. This can signiﬁcantly reduce the number
of multiplications needed when coupled with some precomputation (oﬄine for
ﬁxed base exponentiation, online for variable base exponentiation). The sliding
window method takes this approach, with placement of the width w window
such that value in the window is odd (zeros are “skipped”). Up to w squarings
are then applied in each iteration, and then one multiplication is used to put
the window in place. The strategy for precomputation and choice of window
width w vary, depending on the intended application. Algorithm 2 outlines the
general case, where all of the possible values of an odd width w windows are
precomputed. An alternate strategy is to use a larger window width and only
precompute needed values; some good heuristics are given in [15]. Note that
Algorithm 1 is the speciﬁc case of Algorithm 2 with w = 1.
In general, the appropriate window width choice is clearly related to the binary
length of the exponent, which can vary depending on the cryptosystem. For
example, using RSA [16] it can be common to choose a small value for the
public key (e.g. 0x10001, short and low-weight)—this makes verifying digital
signatures faster. It would then be better to not use any sliding window at all
when verifying signatures.
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Many wide-spread publicly available cryptographic software libraries imple-
ment something similar to Algorithm 2 for exponentiation, including OpenSSL.
The diﬀerent window width sizes that OpenSSL chooses for diﬀerent exponent
lengths are listed in Table 2. The amount of precomputation is 2w−1 − 1.
3.3 Analysis, Square Root Costs
In practical implementations, the general disadvantage of using more eﬃcient
addition chains is that a large number of intermediate values may have to be
stored. However, clearly for ﬁxed exponent, variable base exponentiation, any
computation of an eﬃcient yet practical addition chain can be done oﬄine.
Unfortunately, ﬁnding an optimal addition chain is NP-hard (see [15] for a
discussion). In practice, eﬃcient but not necessarily optimal addition chains are
used. The length l of an optimal addition chain is bounded by
log e + logω(e)− 2.13 ≤ l ≤ log e+ ω(e)− 1. (18)
Note that the upper bound is the binary method.
Now that the theoretical bounds have been established, the ﬁxed cost for
square root computation for the ﬁelds in Table 1 using the binary method are
listed in Table 3, where e = (p + 1)/4 is the exponent. Note that the binary
method for P-521 (or any true Mersenne prime) is already optimal, and hence
we omit any further analysis.
Remark 1. For the basic comparison of methods in this paper, we have chosen
to compare versus the square-and-multiply method. The reasoning behind this
choice is that it is the basic, standard method of performing an exponentiation—
and as previously mentioned, the only method actually listed in some stan-
dards [2,3]. We note that in some cases for Mersenne-like primes it would be
possible to improve performance by using a signed representation, trading a se-
ries of ﬁeld multiplications for a single ﬁeld inversion (which would only need
to be computed and stored online once per exponentiation). Due to the high
inversion to multiplication ratio (I/M) in Fp, this approach would outperform
the binary method in some cases, but not the sliding window method when us-
ing higher window widths as I/M is so high; the particularly eﬃcient ﬁnite ﬁeld
arithmetic presented in [17] lists I/M=80 for NIST curves over Fp.
3.4 Repunit Exponentiation
A number of the form 2n− 1 =∑n−1i=0 2i, all ones (weight n) in the expansion, is
in general known as a repunit [18,14]. An optimal chain for a repunit is simple to
ﬁnd—the following equation is well-known and has indeed been used in cryptog-
raphy before. Using the notation from [14], denoting wj = 2j − 1 it follows [13]
that
wa+b =
∑
0≤i<(a+b)
2i =
⎛
⎝ ∑
0≤i<a
2i
⎞
⎠ 2b + ∑
0≤i<b
2i = wa2b + wb (19)
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Table 3. Square root costs, binary method
p∗ e ω(e) Cost Bound on M+ S
(4)
c−2X
i=b−2
2i + · · · ω(p) − (a + 1) (log2 e)M + (ω(e)− 1)S —
(5)
d−3X
i=j−2
2i d − j (d − j − 1)M+ (d − 3)S —
(6)
109X
i=8
2i +
6X
i=3
2i + 2 107 106M+ 109S 113
(7)
125X
i=95
2i 31 30M+ 125S 127
(8)
157X
i=29
2i 129 128M+ 157S 162
(9)
157X
i=31
2i +
29X
i=13
2i + 211 +
9X
i=8
2i +
4X
i=2
2i + 1 151 150M+ 157S 162
(10)
157X
i=16
2i + 213 + 25 + 22 145 144M+ 157S 162
(11)
189X
i=62
2i 128 127M+ 189S 194
(12)
189X
i=31
2
i
+
29X
i=11
2
i
+
9X
i=7
2
i
+
3X
i=1
2
i
184 183M+ 189S 194
(13)
236X
i=142
2i +
140X
i=93
2i + 245 144 143M+ 236S 241
(14)
253X
i=222
2i + 2190 + 294 34 33M+ 253S 256
(15)
253X
i=31
2
i
+
29X
i=8
2
i
+
3X
i=2
2
i
247 246M+ 253S 259
(16)
381X
i=127
2i +
125X
i=94
2i + 230 288 287M+ 381S 387
(17) 2519 1 0M+ 519S 519
∗ See Table 1 for the full form.
and an addition chain for wa+b can be constructed using b squarings and two
smaller addition chains for wa and wb. The problem is now simpliﬁed to ﬁnding
an addition chain for n, and indeed in most practical applications a brute force
search for an optimal addition chain for n can easily be carried out.
Example 2. Consider the previous binary method addition chain for 15; an ad-
dition chain for w15 = 215 − 1 is given by
w1
·2      w2 ·2  w3 ·2
3
 w6
·2  w7 ·2
7
 w14
·2  w15
where ·2b are the b intermediate squarings; a215−1 is computed using 6 multipli-
cations and 14 squarings. The optimal chain of length 5 could be used to reduce
the number of multiplications to 5.
Algorithm 3 is a straightforward implementation of (19) which uses the binary
addition chain for n; this choice is often not optimal with regards to the num-
ber of ﬁeld multiplications, but has a larger scope of applications. As written,
Algorithm 3 is executed at a cost of
n+log2 n+ω(n)−2, or in ﬁeld operations (n−1)S+(log2 n+ω(n)−1)M (20)
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Algorithm 3. Repunit exponentiation
Input: Field element β ∈ Fp, modulus p, exponent n.
Output: β2
n−1 mod p.
Let bj be the MSB of n.
η ← β , k ← 1
for i ← j − 1 to 0 do
μ ← η2k mod p // k squarings
η ← μη mod p , k ← 2k // 1 multiplication
if bi = 1 then η ← η2β mod p , k ← k + 1 // binary method, bi are the
bits of n
end
return η
Instead of using the binary chain for n, it is easy to substitute a shorter chain.
Some eﬃcient implementations of cryptographic operations make use of (19).
For example, Itoh and Tsujii [19] used the idea for inversion in binary ﬁelds.
4 Fast Point Decompression for Standard Curves
For the square root computation needed for point decompression, we take a
similar approach to sliding window exponentiation as in Algorithm 2 coupled
with precomputation of repunits using Algorithm 3. As Table 3 illustrates, we
can conceptually view e as consisting of k repunit windows of the form 2ni − 1
(that is,“splitting” e on zeros). Let the distinct ni appearing in e make up the
set W . Let 2ns − 1 be the window in the most signiﬁcant bits of e and 2nb − 1
the largest window. To describe the strategy, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let p ≡ 3 (mod 4) be a prime and β ∈ Fp be a quadratic residue
modulo p. Let γ of length l be the shortest addition sequence for W. The cost of
computing the square root of β in Fp is at most log2 e−ns+nb squarings and
k − 1 + l multiplications in Fp.
Proof. As β ∈ QRp, βe modulo p clearly yields the square root. For this ex-
ponentiation, we use Algorithm 2 as a base. In the precomputation phase, we
use γ combined with one execution of Algorithm 3 to compute all the values of
β2
ni−1 mod p. The length of γ is l so this costs l multiplications and nb − 1
squarings. We start the accumulator with a value of β2
ns−1 mod p. From the
bit position to the right of 2ns − 1, we proceed to the least signiﬁcant bit of
e, performing squarings and using multiplications to put the remaining k − 1
windows into place. The number of squarings is thus log2 e − ns + 1 and the
number of multiplications is k − 1. This yields a maximum of log2 e − ns + nb
squarings and k − 1 + l multiplications in Fp. 	unionsq
The strategy therefore is to ﬁnd the shortest addition sequence γ for W , easily
done through exhaustive search for seemingly all practical purposes (l is small).
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Algorithm 4. Fast square roots, sliding window exponentiation with repunit
precomputation
Input: Modulus p ≡ 3 (mod 4), β ∈ QRp, addition sequence γ
Output: Square root of β in Fp
// Using notation from Thm. 1
Using one execution of Algorithm 3 combined with γ, precompute β2
ni−1 mod p
for all ni ∈ W.
η ← β2ns−1 mod p, i ← log2 e − ns
while i ≥ 0 do
if ei = 0 then t ← 1
else Find the largest t such that (ei, . . . , ei−t+1) is a repunit window. // no
length restriction on t
η ← η2t mod p // t squarings
if ei 	= 0 then η ← ηβ2t−1 mod p // 1 multiplication from precomputed
values
i ← i− t
end
return η
The binary chain in Algorithm 3 is then replaced with γ (this is easily done, see
(19)) and only one execution is used to precompute all of the elements β2
ni−1
mod p, and the ﬁnal exponentiation is done similarly as in Algorithm 2. This is
illustrated in Algorithm 4.
4.1 Analysis and Application
Clearly for an arbitrary p, this strategy is not particularly eﬃcient and in the
worst case roughly regresses to the square-and-multiply method as the number
of windows k approaches the weight ω(e). However, Given p of Mersenne-like
form—in particular (4), (5) and Table 1—we can identify where this method
will be generally advantageous:
– If k is very small (as it frequently is with Mersenne-like p), the number
of multiplications needed to put these windows into place is signiﬁcantly
reduced.
– If ns = nb (the largest window appears in the most signiﬁcant bits of e),
signiﬁcantly fewer squarings are needed.
We now provide a few examples to illustrate how Algorithm 4 can be used
eﬃciently.
Example 3. Consider (5): k = 1 and γ is the shortest addition sequence for
W = ns = d − j found easily through exhaustive search. We calculate β2d−j−1
mod p using Algorithm 3 at a cost of (d − j − 1)S + lM, where l is at most
log2(d− j)+ ω(d− j)− 1 when using the binary chain (20). We then put this
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window into place at a cost of k − 1 = 0 multiplications and j − 2 squarings.
This is the form of P-192; the cost of computing β2
128−1 mod p is 7M+ 127S.
w1
·2  w2 ·2
2
 w4
·24  w8 ·2
8
 w16
·216 w32 ·2
32
 w64
·264 w128
An additional 62S is then needed once this value is obtained. As the only
window length is a power of 2 (W = {128}), the binary chain is clearly optimal
and in fact far less logic is needed in Algorithm 3 (the inner if condition can be
omitted) and Algorithm 4.
Example 4. Consider P-384, with k = 3 windows and W = {1, 32, 255}. To
calculate γ, we do exhaustive search for the shortest addition sequence γ for W .
The binary addition chain for 255 is of length 14 (but does not contain 32), an
optimal addition chain for 255 is of length 10, but the shortest addition sequence
for W is of length 11 (the value β232−1 mod p can be computed intermediately
at the cost of only one additional multiplication when compared to an optimal
addition chain).
w1
·2  w2 ·2
2
 w4
·24 
 	
w8
·28  w16
·216
 	 
w32
·232 w64
·216 w80
·24  w84
·2  w85
·285
 	
w170
·285 w255
The precomputation cost is thus 254S + 11M; k − 1 = 2M is needed to put
the smaller windows into place and an additional 127S.
4.2 Analysis, New Square Root Costs
Table 4 provides the cost of square root computation for the applicable ﬁelds from
Table 3 when using Algorithm 4. The “Savings” column is the saving achieved
when compared to the square-and-multiply (binary) method (Algorithm 1). In
savings calculation, the reasonable [17] estimate of S = 0.85M is used. Given
the bounds of (18), in all cases for the standard curves the costs are optimal or
near-optimal.
Remark 2. Although the savings listed in Table 4 seem extremely signiﬁcant, we
note that point decompression is not normally the time consuming operation in
elliptic curve cryptography—scalar multiplication is. Therefore if the benchmark
is on an entire cryptographic operation (for example, point decompression and
then signature veriﬁcation) the speedup obtained in practice from the use of such
fast point decompression will not be as signiﬁcant. However, this is all dependent
on the intended application.
5 Implementation
Implementations of point decompression were done to investigate the feasibility
of reaching the theoretical speedups listed in Table 4. Both software and hard-
ware implementations are provided for comparison. The results are presented
below.
Fast Point Decompression for Standard Elliptic Curves 145
Table 4. Square root costs, Algorithm 4
p W S(γ) Cost Savings (%)
(6) {1, 4, 102} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 17, 34, 68, 102} 10M+ 109S 48.3
(7) {31} {1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 15, 30, 31} 7M+ 125S 15.0
(8) {129} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 129} 8M+ 157S 45.9
(9) {1, 2, 3, 17, 127} {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 17, 31, 62, 124, 127} 15M+ 157S 48.2
(10) {1, 142} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 17, 34, 35, 70, 71, 142} 13M+ 157S 47.2
(11) {128} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128} 7M+ 189S 41.7
(12) {3, 19, 159} {1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, 19, 35, 70, 140, 159} 13M+ 189S 49.0
(13) {1, 48, 95} {1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 18, 19, 38, 47, 48, 95} 12M+ 236S 38.1
(14) {1, 32} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} 7M+ 253S 10.5
(15) {2, 22, 223} {1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 22, 44, 88, 110, 220, 223} 13M+ 253S 51.8
(16) {1, 32, 255} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 80, 84, 85, 170, 255} 13M+ 381S 44.9
5.1 Software
OpenSSL was used as a basis for the software implementation. OpenSSL per-
forms point decompression via the function ec GFp simple set compressed
coordinates, which calculates the righthand side of (1) and in turn calls the
function BN mod sqrt to compute the square root, which in this case calls the
function BN mod exp which uses a sliding window (Algorithm 2). For curve opera-
tions such as point addition, OpenSSL deﬁnes speciﬁc ﬁeld addition and squaring
functions, allowing for fast reduction for the NIST primes listed in Table 1. In
the case of a non-NIST prime, the fallback method is Montgomery multiplica-
tion [20]. However, the BN mod sqrt function is not provided by the elliptic curve
portion of OpenSSL and thus it always uses Montgomery multiplication (no fast
reduction).
For this implementation, we provide the wrapper function ec GFp field sqrt
inside the ECC portion of OpenSSL. This allows fast reduction to be used when
available, and Montgomery multiplication otherwise. Three timings are given:
one using the unmodiﬁed OpenSSL, one using the binary method (Algorithm 1),
and one using the new method in Algorithm 4. The resulting timings for the
binary method are sometimes better than those of the sliding window method
and can be explained by the fact that BN mod exp is located outside of the ECC
portion of OpenSSL and hence does not have access to fast reduction.
The implementation was done on an AMD Athlon Thunderbird 1.0GHz 32-
bit processor with 1GB of RAM running Debian Linux. The compiler used was
GCC v4.1.2 using compiling switches -march=athlon-tbird -O3 -pipe -ﬀorce-addr
-fomit-frame-pointer and OpenSSL v0.9.8g. The results are given in Table 5.
The “Savings” column indicates the achieved savings of Algorithm 4 over the
unmodiﬁed OpenSSL and Algorithm 1, respectively.
These practical results are inline with the theoretical speedups listed in
Table 4, with any variation due to diﬀerent squaring to multiplication ratios
and some limited extra logic needed to implement Algorithm 4. These are actual
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Table 5. Software timings, OpenSSL point decompression (μs)
p OpenSSL (Alg. 2) Binary (Alg. 1) Alg. 4 Savings (%)
(6) 159.9 214.3 123.1 23.0 42.6
(7) 159.3 152.6 129.8 18.5 14.9
(8) 278.1 365.3 224.4 19.3 38.6
(9) 300.7 393.9 234.4 22.0 40.5
(10) 288.8 385.2 231.3 19.9 40.0
(11) 358.6 299.6 190.8 46.8 36.3
(12) 386.7 547.0 305.4 21.0 44.2
(13) 507.9 616.6 412.8 18.7 33.1
(14) 516.6 310.8 280.5 45.7 9.7
(15) 597.5 804.3 431.4 27.8 46.4
(16) 1574.7 1386.3 789.9 49.8 43.0
timings of the OpenSSL point decompression function (unmodiﬁed and modi-
ﬁed), so these are the results that will be seen in practice.
5.2 Hardware
Field speciﬁc processors were implemented in an Altera Stratix II EP2S180C3
FPGA [21] in order to study feasibility of the fast square root method in hard-
ware. The primes included in this study are (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (16),
as deﬁned in Table 1. The processors are straightforward implementations of
commonly-known algorithms and, hence, we omit a detailed description. How-
ever, a short presentation is given in the following.
Processors compute ﬁeld multiplications with integer multiplications whose re-
sults are then reduced modulo p by using fast reduction methods. Integer multi-
pliers were implemented using DSP blocks embedded into Stratix II FPGAs. Each
DSP block can implement one up to 36x36-bit multiplication [21]. Reduction cir-
cuitries were implemented with reconﬁgurable logic and primes can be switched by
reconﬁguring the FPGA. Two diﬀerent fast reduction methods were used. If the
number of 2i terms was small, we used the method developed for Mersenne-like
primes in [22] which computes reductions with shifts and additions. Such equa-
tions are given for all NIST primes in [1] ((11) and (16)), [23] includes formulae
for (7), and equations for (8) were derived by hand. Another type of primes that
we considered have a relatively large number of terms with small powers, i.e. the
primes have the form 2d − c where c is relatively small. The primes deﬁned by
(9) and (10) have such forms. For them we used the method presented by Cran-
dall [24] which computes reductions with additions and multiplications by c. The
processors include memory for storing ﬁeld elements and it was implemented us-
ing embeddedmemory blocks, calledM4Kmemory blocks [21]. Table 6 summaries
design decisions and methods that were used for diﬀerent primes. Latencies for
multiplication and squaring are also provided, as well as their ratio.
When the processors were described in VHDL and synthesized with Altera
Quartus II 6.0 SP1 design software, resource requirements and maximum clock
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Table 6. Summary of implementation methods
p Multiplier size Reduction method Memory size (elements) M S S/M
(7) 64x64-bit Mersenne-like [23] 256x128-bit (256) 9 8 0.89
(8) 80x80-bit Mersenne-like 256x160-bit (256) 9 8 0.89
(9) 80x80-bit Crandall 256x160-bit (256) 9 8 0.89
(10) 80x80-bit Crandall 256x160-bit (256) 10 9 0.90
(11) 96x96-bit NIST [1] 256x192-bit (256) 9 8 0.89
(16) 96x96-bit NIST [1] 256x192-bit (128) 29 23 0.79
Table 7. Implementation results on Altera Stratix II EP2S180C3 FPGA
p ALUTs Regs. ALMs M4Ks DSPs Max. clock
(7) 2,539 951 1,428 8 4 80.18 MHz
(8) 2,250 1,174 1,289 9 9 83.04 MHz
(9) 4,141 1,213 2,206 9 9 45.29 MHz
(10) 3,206 1,356 1,733 9 9 66.56 MHz
(11) 2,855 1,397 1,609 11 9 73.82 MHz
(16) 8,001 2,982 4,551 11 9 39.55 MHz
Table 8. Hardware timings, square root computation
Binary (Alg. 1) Alg. 4
p Latency Time (μs) Latency Time (μs) Speedup Savings (%)
(7) 1,426 17.78 1,205 15.03 8.63 15.4
(8) 2,408 29.00 1,328 15.99 14.03 44.9
(9) 2,913 64.32 1,562 34.49 6.80 46.4
(10) 3,154 47.39 1,713 25.74 8.98 45.7
(11) 2,971 40.25 1,771 23.99 7.95 40.4
(16) 17,755 448.93 9,535 241.09 3.28 46.3
frequencies were as shown in Table 7. Costs of square root computations with Al-
gorithm 1 (binary) and Algorithm 4 (the new method) are presented in Table 8.
The “Speedup” column shows the speedup factors over the software timings
from Table 5. The savings are clearly close to the ones presented in Table 4 in
hardware as well.
As can be seen from Tables 7 and 8, the Mersenne-like primes give better
results because reductions are faster and they require less area. Especially, (11)
results in a very eﬃcient implementation although the ﬁeld size is relatively large.
Crandall reduction is slower and requires more area, as expected. Nonetheless,
Algorithm 4 gives major enhancements compared to Algorithm 1 for all imple-
mented primes and the results are inline with the theoretical calculations given
in Table 4. FPGAs also provide major speedups ranging from 3.28 to 14.03 times
over software-based implementations.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has explored the problem of computing fast point decompressions
for curves deﬁned over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp with p ≡ 3 (mod 4) of Mersenne-
like form. A signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient method has been presented, based on a
known equation from number theory which yields an estimated theoretical speed
savings of up to 51.8% at a cost of little to no storage. In addition to a general
analysis of Mersenne-like p, an extensive analysis of the prime ﬁelds for standard
curves was given, so these results have a large scope of practical application as
well. Both software and hardware implementation results have been provided,
which not only are inline with the theoretical savings, but also show that there
is signiﬁcant speedup in hardware over software.
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Abstract. The security of a system is often compromised by exposure
of secret keys even if its underlying cryptographic tools are perfectly se-
cure, assuming that their secret keys will be never exposed to adversaries.
A key-insulated signature scheme is a useful cryptographic primitive for
reducing the damage caused by such leakage. In this paper, we propose
an eﬃcient strong key-insulated signature (KIS) scheme and prove its
security. This scheme is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient than conventional
strong KIS schemes especially in terms of signature size, and it is prov-
ably secure under the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption in the random
oracle model. It is constructed by extending the Abe-Okamoto signature
scheme [1]; we give a formal proof of adaptive key-exposure security
as it is not addressed in [1]. A typical application of our scheme is to
an authentication system in which one (or a small number of) sender
communicates with many receivers since multiple copies of the sender’s
signature are transmitted to individual receivers in such a system. We
discuss a bidirectional broadcasting service as an example.
Keywords: strong key-insulated signature, key leakage, DL assump-
tion, random oracle model, adaptive security.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Digital signature is now an important technology, but signing key leakage has
become a critical problem. If a signing key is leaked to an adversary, she can easily
impersonate the signer. Recently, several signature schemes have been proposed
as countermeasures against key leakage, and the key-insulated signature (KIS)
scheme [4] is a useful cryptographic primitive for reducing the damage caused
by such leakage.
A typical application of the KIS scheme is a large-scale multi-receiver authen-
tication system in which a signer communicates with a huge number of receivers.
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 150–165, 2008.
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In such a system, to renew his veriﬁcation key, the signer has to send his new
veriﬁcation key to all receivers in an authentic manner. Therefore, we must deal
with the key exposure problem without renewing a veriﬁcation key. We noticed
that a KIS scheme is an appropriate tool for this requirement. A bidirectional
broadcasting service [11] is one such application.
The eﬃciency of an authentication system for a bidirectional broadcasting
service heavily depends on the signature size since multiple copies (proportional
to the total number of receivers) are individually transmitted to receivers. For
example, when using a trivial KIS with simple double signing [4] in the Schnorr
signature scheme [13], the number of signatures over the whole network becomes
1120 · n bits, where n is the total number of users.
Strong key-insulated security [4], rather than standard key-insulated security,
is needed to deal with various ways of key exposure. The diﬀerence between
strong KIS scheme and standard KIS scheme is discussed in Section 1.2.
Our main motivation is to design an eﬃcient strong KIS scheme with a sig-
niﬁcantly shorter signature size.
1.2 Related Work
In [3], Dodis, Katz, Xu, and Yung advocated the notion of key-insulated security.
Their goal was to minimize the damage caused by secret-key exposures, and
they proposed key-insulated signature (KIS) schemes. A KIS scheme enables the
signing key to be updated without updating the veriﬁcation key. Key updating
establishes a lifetime for a signing key, and this means that damage due to a
leaked signing key cannot occur beyond its lifetime. A KIS scheme has not only
forward security, such that no one can generate signing keys before key leakage,
but also backward security, such that no one can generate signing keys after key
leakage. KIS schemes have been actively studied as a countermeasure against
key leakage [5,8,14,15].
A KIS scheme is secure if the master key is stored in a secure device, but
it is not secure if the master key is leaked to an adversary. Therefore, a signer
must securely manage the master key when using a KIS scheme. In [4], Dodis,
Katz, Xu, and Yung proposed a construction method for a strong key-insulated
signature scheme. A standard KIS scheme is secure against only signing key leak-
age, whereas a strong KIS scheme is secure against either signing key leakage or
master key leakage. Therefore, a strong KIS scheme is more secure than a KIS
scheme. The strong KIS scheme in [4] is provably secure under the assumption of
the infeasibility of a discrete logarithm problem (DLP). An upper bound is set
on the number of signing key leakages in this scheme, however, and the size of the
veriﬁcation key is very large. In [4], the authors also gave a method for construct-
ing a strong KIS scheme based on the Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme [6].
This scheme is more eﬃcient than the former scheme, but it is provably secure
under the RSA assumption. (This scheme is described in Appendix B.)
Malkin, Obana, and Yung gave a generic conversion of a proxy signature
scheme [10], in which a signer can delegate his signing right to a third party, to
a KIS scheme, which is provably secure in the standard model [9]. However, the
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KIS scheme obtained from this conversion is not a strong KIS scheme. In [4],
Dodis, Katz, Xu, and Yung showed that a KIS scheme can be converted into a
strong KIS scheme. Their method of constructing a strong KIS scheme, however,
uses double signing. That is, the scheme requires two signatures: a signature with
a master key and a signature with the signer’s secret key. Therefore, the scheme
is not eﬃcient. (This scheme is described in Appendix A.) In other words, it
is diﬃcult to construct an eﬃcient and strong KIS scheme, even if there is an
eﬃcient proxy signature scheme.
There are other approaches for reducing the damage caused by signing key leak-
age. Bellare and Miner proposed a forward-secure signature scheme [2]. This
scheme has forward security but not backward security. Itkis and Reyzin proposed
an intrusion-resilient signature scheme [7] in which both the master and signing
keys are updated. This scheme has forward security even if both master and sign-
ing keys are leaked. In contrast, a KIS scheme is not secure if both keys are leaked.
1.3 Our Contributions
We propose an eﬃcient strong KIS scheme and prove its security. Our scheme
is more eﬃcient than conventional strong KIS schemes, especially in terms of
signature size, and is provably secure under the DL assumption in the random
oracle model.
The signature size in our scheme is about two ﬁfths that in previous schemes.
More precisely, the signature sizes of the schemes described in Appendices A and
B and our scheme are 1120, 1184, and 480 bits, respectively.
As pointed out in [9], a KIS scheme can be generically constructed from any
proxy signature scheme, and therefore, to design an eﬃcient KIS scheme, we start
with the Abe-Okamoto proxy signature scheme [1] as the basic primitive. However,
the conversion from the Abe-Okamoto scheme into the KIS scheme is not straight-
forward since the security deﬁnition of [1] does not consider an adaptive adversary
who can get signing keys at any time and in any order. Therefore, we have to ad-
dress such adaptive security with a formal security proof from scratch, and extend
it to strong key-insulated security without increasing the signature size.
As an example application for our scheme, we discuss a bidirectional broad-
casting service. By applying our scheme to a bidirectional content distribution
system proposed in [11], we can reduce the damage caused by master key leak-
age, while enabling eﬃcient signing and veriﬁcation. Moreover, the network cost
for transmitting signed messages can be reduced. Currently, there are more than
35,000,000 users of Japanese broadcasting services. The total amount of sig-
nature data would be 39.2 (= 1120 × 35,000,000) Gbits if all users used the
scheme in Appendix A. In contrast, our scheme would only require 16.8 (= 480
× 35,000,000) Gbits of signature data for all users, a reduction of 22.4 Gbits.
2 Deﬁnitions
We address the model of the KIS scheme and its security deﬁnition.
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2.1 Model
Deﬁnition 1. The KIS scheme consists of ﬁve polynomial time algorithms (Gen,
Upd∗, Upd, Sign, Vrfy) as follows:
– Gen: key generation algorithm
This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security parameter
1k and the total number of time periods N . It returns a master key SK∗, a
veriﬁcation key PK, and an initial signing key SK0.
– Upd∗: partial key generation algorithm
This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input indices i and j for time
periods and a master key SK∗. It returns a partial key SK ′i,j .
– Upd: key update algorithm
This is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input indices i, j, a signing
key SKi, and a partial key SK ′i,j. It returns a signing key SKj for time
period j.
– Sign: signing algorithm
This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input an index j for a time
period, a message M , and a signing key SKj. It returns a pair 〈j, s〉 consisting
of j and a signature s.
– Vrfy: veriﬁcation algorithm
This is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a veriﬁcation key PK,
a message M , and a pair 〈j, s〉. It returns a bit b, where b = 1 means that
the signature is accepted.
A time period is used when verifying signatures, and the veriﬁcation key does
not have to be updated even if the signing key is updated.
2.2 Security
We next address the security deﬁnition of a strong KIS scheme. First, we deﬁne
the security of a KIS scheme; then we deﬁne the security of a strong KIS scheme.
Intuitively, a KIS scheme is secure against a signing key leakage, whereas a strong
KIS scheme is secure against either signing key or master key leakage.
Security Deﬁnition of Key-Insulated Signature Scheme. An attack on a
KIS scheme means that a signing key was leaked by a signer and used by a third
party. To model this attack formally, we give an adversary access to a key expo-
sure oracle ExpSK∗,SK0(·) and a signing oracle SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·). ExpSK∗,SK0(·)
takes as input a time period i and returns a signing key SKi. SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·)
takes as input a time period i and a message m, and it returns a signature σi,m.
The KIS scheme is considered secure if veriﬁcation of a signature that the ad-
versary forges for any message has negligible probability of success. We formally
deﬁne the security of a KIS scheme as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let Π = (Gen,Upd∗,Upd, Sign,Vrfy) be a KIS scheme. Let A be
an adversary. Deﬁne the success probability of signature forgery by A as follows:
SuccA,Π(k) := Pr
[
VrfyPK(m∗, i∗, σi∗,m∗) = 1
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(SK∗, PK, SK0) ← Gen(1k, N),
(m∗, i∗, σi∗,m∗) ← ASignSK∗,SK0 (·,·),ExpSK∗,SK0(·)(PK)
]
,
where A cannot submit the query (i∗,m∗) to SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·) and cannot submit
the query i∗ to ExpSK∗,SK0(·). A is allowed to submit a query to the key exposure
oracle up to t times, and if SuccA,Π(k) is negligible, Π is (t,N)-key-insulated. If
Π is (N − 1, N)-key-insulated, Π is perfectly key-insulated.
Security Deﬁnition of Strong Key-Insulated Signature Scheme. Re-
garding a strong KIS scheme, a key leakage attack means that either a signing
key or a master key was leaked by a signer and used by a third party. To model
this attack formally, we give an adversary the master key and access to a signing
oracle SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·). SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·) takes as input a time period i and a
message m, and it returns a signature σi,m. The strong KIS scheme is considered
secure if veriﬁcation of the signature that the adversary forges for any message
has negligible probability of success. We formally deﬁne the security of a strong
KIS scheme as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let Π = (Gen,Upd∗,Upd, Sign,Vrfy) be a KIS scheme which is
(t,N)-key-insulated. Let B be an adversary. Deﬁne the success probability of
signature forgery by B as follows:
SuccB,Π(k) := Pr
[
VrfyPK(m
∗, i∗, σi∗,m∗) = 1
(SK∗, PK, SK0) ← Gen(1k, N),
(m∗, i∗, σi∗,m∗) ← BSignSK∗,SK0 (·,·)(PK,SK∗)
]
,
where B cannot submit the query (i∗,m∗) to SignSK∗,SK0(·, ·). Then, if
SuccB,Π(k) is negligible, Π is strong (t,N)-key-insulated. If Π is strong (N −
1, N)-key-insulated, Π is perfectly strong key-insulated.
3 Our Construction
We propose an eﬃcient strong KIS scheme that is secure against leakage of either
signing keys or a master key.
3.1 Basic Concept
Our goal is to design an eﬃcient strong KIS scheme with a signiﬁcantly shorter
signature size.
We construct the KIS scheme by extending the Abe-Okamoto proxy signa-
ture scheme [1]. The Abe-Okamoto scheme is based on the Schnorr signature
scheme, and it is the most eﬃcient proxy signature scheme in terms of veriﬁca-
tion cost and communication cost. However, constructing an eﬃcient and strong
KIS scheme from the Abe-Okamoto scheme is not a trivial exercise.
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First, intending more security, we extend the Abe-Okamoto scheme to a KIS
scheme that provides adaptive security. Adaptive security is security against an
adversary who can get signing keys at any time and in any order, and it is not
taken into consideration in the security deﬁnition of [1]. Consequently, we must
address adaptive security with a formal security proof from scratch.
We then extend this scheme into one that provides strong key-insulated secu-
rity without increasing the signature size. Malkin, Obana, and Yung [9] devised
a generic method for converting any proxy signature scheme into a KIS scheme,
but the resulting KIS scheme does not have strong key-insulated security. In [4],
Dodis, Katz, Xu, and Yung showed that a KIS scheme can be converted into a
strong KIS scheme. Their construction method, however, employs double signing.
That is, the scheme needs two signatures: a signature with the master key and
a signature with the signer’s secret key. Therefore, the scheme is not eﬃcient.
(This construction is shown in Appendix A.) Thus, for the sake of eﬃciency, we
have to construct a scheme without the above conversions.
3.2 Proposed Strong Key-Insulated Signature Scheme
The algorithms for our strong KIS scheme are constructed as follows:
– Gen: key generation algorithm
Let Gq be a cyclic group of prime order q. Randomly select g ∈ Gq, where
g is a generator of Gq. Then, randomly select x and x′ ∈ Zq. The master
key x0 = x − x′ is stored in a secure device, and x′ is managed by a signer.
Calculate y0 = gx0 and y′ = gx
′
, and publish the veriﬁcation key PK =
〈q, g, y0, y′, G(·, ·), H(·, ·, ·, ·)〉. Here, G and H are hash functions, where G :
Gq × {0, 1}∗ → Zq, and H : Gq × Gq × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
– Upd∗: partial key generation algorithm
Randomly select r1 ∈ Zq from a secure device, and calculate v1 = gr1 . Then,
calculate c1 = G(v1, T ) using the inputted time period T , and obtain a
partial key x1 = c1r1 + x0 mod q using the inputted master key x0. x1, v1,
and T are transmitted to the signer.
– Upd: key-update algorithm
The signer calculates c1 = G(v1, T ) and veriﬁes whether gx1 = vc11 y0 is
correct by using the inputted v1, T , x1, and y0. If and only if the partial
key veriﬁcation is successful, the signer obtains the signing key SKT = x1 +
x′ mod q for a time period T by using x1 and the inputted x′.
– Sign: signing algorithm
The signer randomly selects rs ∈ Zq and calculates vs = grs . Then, the
signer calculates cs = H(v1, vs, T,m) and σs = csrs + SKT mod q by using
the inputted message m, T , the signing key SKT , and v1. Finally, the signer
transmits m, (σs, cs, v1), and T to a veriﬁer.
– Vrfy: veriﬁcation algorithm
Using the inputted y0, y′, m, (σs, cs, v1), and T , the veriﬁer calculates c1 =
G(v1, T ). If the following equation holds, it returns b = 1; otherwise, it
returns b = 0:
cs = H(v1, (gσs(vc11 y0y
′)−1)1/cs , T,m).
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Secure device Signer
(x0) (x
′, y0)
r1 ∈U Zq
v1 = g
r1
c1 = G(v1, T )
x1 = c1r1 + x0 mod q
x1,v1,T−→
c1 = G(v1, T )
gx1
?
= vc11 y0
SKT = x1 + x
′ mod q
Fig. 1. Partial key generation and key-update algorithms
Signer Veriﬁer
(SKT , v1, T ) (y0, y
′)
rs ∈U Zq
vs = g
rs
cs = H(v1, vs, T,m)
σs = csrs + SKT mod q
m,(σs,cs,v1),T−→
c1 = G(v1, T )
cs
?
= H(v1, (g
σs(vc11 y0y
′)−1)1/cs , T, m)
Fig. 2. Signing and veriﬁcation algorithms
Figure 1 illustrates Upd∗ and Upd, and Fig. 2 illustrates Sign and Vrfy.
Remark 1. In the partial key generation and key update algorithms, the signer
can verify whether the partial key transmitted from the secure device is valid.
This is the feature that conventional strong KIS schemes lack.
Remark 2. If the secure device storing the master key x0 is completely reliable,
partial key veriﬁcation is unnecessary during the signing key update. That is,
one of the veriﬁcation keys can be y := y0y′, instead of y0 and y′. This implies
that the veriﬁcation key size can be reduced by half.
4 Security Analysis
We prove the security of our scheme from scratch in accordance with the secu-
rity deﬁnition of a KIS scheme in [4]. As described in Section 3.1, we can not
straightforwardly apply the security proof in [1] to our scheme, since the security
deﬁnition of [1] does not consider an adaptive adversary, who can get signing
keys at any time and in any order.
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4.1 Overview of Security Proof
An adaptive adversary can get signing keys and signatures at any time and in
any order. Hence, the security proof assumes that she can access a signing oracle
and a key exposure oracle adaptively and all oracles have to answer her queries
correctly. More precisely, the oracles have to simulate key exposures and signing
perfectly. This simulation is not trivial.
In the following proof, we construct an adversary Bms which can forge the sig-
nature of the modiﬁed Schnorr signature scheme by using an adversary Ap which
can forge the signature of our scheme. Bms expects that Ap forges a signature
by using speciﬁc information that Bms embeds into a certain oracle answer. The
probability that Ap uses the embedded information is 1/poly. When Ap uses the
information for the forgery, simulation of all the oracles is perfect and Bms can
forge a signature of the modiﬁed Schnorr signature scheme from Ap’s output.
Furthermore, we consider two cases of key exposure: signing key leakage and
master key leakage.
The proof can be sketched as follows: First, we show that the modiﬁed Schnorr
signature scheme is EUF-ACMA secure if the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
is infeasible. We then show that our scheme is perfectly key-insulated if the mod-
iﬁed Schnorr signature scheme is EUF-ACMA secure. Finally, we show that our
scheme is perfectly strong key-insulated if it is perfectly key-insulated. This shows
that our scheme is perfectly strong key-insulated assuming the infeasibility of
the DLP.
4.2 Security Proof
Modiﬁed Schnorr Signature Scheme: The modiﬁed Schnorr signature scheme is
constructed as follows:
– Gen: key generation algorithm
Let Gq be a cyclic group of prime order q. Randomly select g ∈ Gq, where
g is a generator of Gq. Then, randomly select x ∈ Zq. Calculate y = gx,
and publish the veriﬁcation key PK = 〈q, g, y,G(·, ·)〉. Here, G is a hash
function, where G : Gq × {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
– Sign: signing algorithm
The signer selects r ∈ Zq randomly and calculates v = gr. Then, the signer
calculates c = G(v,m) and σ = cr + x mod q, by using the inputted message
m and its signing key x. Finally, the signer transmits m and (v, σ) to a veriﬁer.
– Vrfy: veriﬁcation algorithm
Using the inputted m, (v, σ), and y, the veriﬁer calculates c = G(v,m).
Then, if the following equation holds, it returns b = 1; otherwise, it returns
b = 0:
gσ = vcy.
Deﬁnition 4. Let Π = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) be a signature scheme. Let F be an
adversary, which can access a signing oracle Sign(·) that takes as input a message
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m and returns a signature σ. Deﬁne the success probability of signature forgery
by F as follows:
SuccF ,Π(k) := Pr
[
VrfyPK(m
∗, σ∗) = 1
PK ← Gen(1k),
(m∗, σ∗) ← FSign(·)(PK) ] ,
where F cannot submit the query m∗ to the signing oracle. If SuccF ,Π(k) is
negligible, Π is EUF-ACMA secure.
Lemma 1. The modiﬁed Schnorr signature scheme is EUF-ACMA secure, as-
suming the infeasibility of the DLP.
Proof. We assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A that can forge a modiﬁed Schnorr signature. Then, according to the forking
lemma [12], A outputs two valid tuples of message and signature, (m, v, c, σ) and
(m, v, c′, σ′), with non-negligible probability in polynomial time. Therefore, we
can get the two equations σ = cr + x and σ′ = c′r + x. Solving these equations
for r and x, we obtain
x =
c′σ − cσ′
c′ − c mod q.
This implies that the discrete logarithm x of y = gx can be obtained. That
contradicts the assumption of DLP infeasibility. Therefore, there does not exist
a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A that can forge a modiﬁed Schnorr
signature. unionsq
Lemma 2. The KIS scheme proposed in Section 3.2 is perfectly key-insulated,
assuming that the modiﬁed Schnorr signature scheme is EUF-ACMA secure.
Proof. We prove Lemma 2 according to the Deﬁnition 2.
We assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary Ap
that can forge a signature in our scheme. Then, we show that there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time adversary Bms that can forge a modiﬁed Schnorr
signature.
Let Gq be a cyclic group of prime order q. Randomly select g ∈ Gq, where g
is a generator of Gq. Then, randomly select a master key x0 ∈ Zq, and calculate
y0 = gx0. Next, we assume that q, g, and y0 are given to a simulator Bms. Bms
selects x′ ∈ Zq randomly and calculates y′ = y0gx′ . Then, Bms transmits q, g,
and y′ to Ap.
Ap can access key exposure oracles Exp(·). Exp(·) is a key exposure oracle
that takes as input a time period and returns a signing key. Ap is not allowed
to input the target time period into Exp(·), but she can access a signing oracle
Sign(·, ·), which takes as input a message m and a time period T and returns
a signature (σs, vs, v1). Ap also can access random oracles G(·, ·) and H(·, ·, ·, ·).
Ap is not, however, allowed to submit the target tuple of a message and a time
period to Sign(·, ·). On the other hand, Bms can access a signing oracle Sign′(·)
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that takes as input a message and returns a signature. Bms can also access a
random oracle G′(·, ·) but is not allowed to submit the target message to Sign′(·).
Next, we show that Bms can simulate Exp(·) and Sign(·, ·).
We show how Bms simulates Sign(·, ·) when Ap transmits a message m and a
time period T to Sign(·, ·). There are two cases: Ap requests the signing key for
a time period T from Exp(·) before Ap accesses Sign(·, ·), or Ap does not request
the signing key beforehand.
Case1 : Request the signing key beforehand
First, Ap requests the signing key. Ap transmits T to Exp(·). Exp(·) then
transmits T to Sign′(·) directly. Sign′(·) randomly selects r1 ∈ Zq and cal-
culates v1 = gr1 . Then, Sign′(·) transmits v1 and T to the random oracle
G′(·, ·), which returns c1 to Sign′(·). Sign′(·) obtains x1 = c1r1 + x0 by using
the master key x0 and sends (x1, v1) to Exp(·). Exp(·) adds (T, x1, v1) to the
list (List1), which indicates the input-output relation of the signing oracle
Sign′(·). Finally, Exp(·) calculates the signing key SKT = x1 + x′ by using
x′ and transmits (SKT , v1, x′) to Ap.
Next, Ap requests a signature. Ap transmits m and T to Sign(·, ·). Sign(·, ·)
calculates the signature (σs, vs, v1) by using SKT and v1, which have already
been obtained through the signing key request. Finally, Sign(·, ·) transmits
(σs, vs, v1) to Ap.
Case2 : Never request the signing key beforehand
If Ap requests a signature from Bms, Bms normally responds as follows:
Ap transmits m and T to Sign(·, ·), which accesses Exp(·) and obtains
SKT , v1, and x′. Sign(·, ·) calculates (σs, vs, v1) for (m,T ) by using (SKT , v1)
and transmits (σs, vs, v1) to Ap.
Ap is not, however, allowed to transmit the target (m∗, T ∗) to Sign(·, ·),
and Bms is not allowed to transmit the target T ∗ to Sign′(·). Therefore, Ap
can get no information about (m∗, T ∗) from those responses.
Here, Bms takes the following strategy. We assume that Ap requests the
hash value for the target T ∗ from the random oracle H(·, ·, ·, ·) when Ap forges
the signature. Sign(·, ·) calculates the tuple of (v1, vs, T ∗,m) and cs, and it
adds these to the list (List2), which indicates the input-output relation of
H(·, ·, ·, ·). Let qH be the number of queries to H(·, ·, ·, ·). Bms expects that
the jth query is the request for (m∗, T ∗). If this expectation is true, the
simulation of Bms is successful. To be more precise, Bms responds to the
signing request of Ap as follows:
Ap transmits m and T ∗ to Sign(·, ·), which randomly selects r1 ∈ Zq
and calculates v1 = gr1 . Then, Sign(·, ·) transmits (v1, T ∗) to the random
oracle G′(·, ·), which returns c1 to Sign(·, ·). Sign(·, ·) then randomly selects
cs, σs ∈ Zq and calculates
vs =
(
gσs
vc11 y
′
)1/cs
.
Sign(·, ·) adds the tuple of (v1, vs, T ∗,m) and cs to List2. Finally, Sign(·, ·)
transmits (σs, vs, v1) to Ap.
160 G. Ohtake, G. Hanaoka, and K. Ogawa
According to the forking lemma [12], Ap outputs two valid signatures (m∗,
(σs, cs, v1), T ∗) and (m∗, (σ′s, c
′
s, v1), T
∗) for the message m∗ and the time
period T ∗ with non-negligible probability in polynomial time. Therefore, Bms
can get the two equations σs = csrs + SKT ∗ and σ′s = c
′
srs + SKT ∗ . Solving
these equations for rs and SKT ∗ , we get
SKT ∗ =
c′sσs − csσ′s
c′s − cs
mod q.
Bms calculates x∗1 = SKT ∗ −x′ and outputs (x∗1, v1, T ∗) as the modiﬁed Schnorr
signature for T ∗.
Let Bms be the success probability of Bms forging (x∗1, v1, T ∗). Let Ap be the
success probability of Ap forging (m∗, (σs, cs, v1), T ∗) and (m∗, (σ′s, c′s, v1),
T ∗). Then, Bms is equal to Ap times the probability that the expectation of a
request to the random oracle H(·, ·, ·, ·) is true. That is,
Bms = Ap ·
1
qH
.
Let Q1, Q2, ..., QqH be the inputs to the random oracle H(·, ·, ·, ·). Let ρ1,
ρ2, ..., ρqH be the outputs from H(·, ·, ·, ·). We assume that Ap outputs the sig-
nature (m∗, (σs, cs, v1), T ∗) for Qj = (v1, vs, T ∗,m∗) with a probability greater
than or equal to 1/P (n). (Let P (n) be the polynomial in n, the length of the
veriﬁcation key). Then, according to the forking lemma [12], there exists the set
Ωj of random tape ω and the set Rj,ω of outputs (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρj−1) from the ran-
dom oracle, such that Ap outputs two valid signatures (m∗, (σs, cs, v1), T ∗) and
(m∗, (σ′s, c
′
s, v1), T
∗) for Qj = (v1, vs, T ∗,m∗) with a probability greater than or
equal to 1/4P (n). That is,
Ap ≥
1
4P (n)
.
Therefore,
Bms ≥
1
4qHP (n)
.
As a result, Bms can forge the modiﬁed Schnorr signature by using Ap with
non-negligible probability in polynomial time. unionsq
Lemma 3. The KIS scheme proposed in Section 3.2 is perfectly strong key-
insulated, assuming that the KIS scheme is perfectly key-insulated.
Proof. We prove Lemma 3 according to the Deﬁnition 3.
Let Gq be a cyclic group of prime order q. Randomly select g ∈ Gq, where
g is a generator of Gq. Then, randomly select x′ ∈ Zq, and calculate y′ = gx′ .
Next, we assume that q, g, and y′ are given to a simulator Bms. Bms randomly
selects a master key x0 ∈ Zq and calculates y0 = y′gx0 . Then, Bms transmits q,
g, y0, and x0 to Ap.
Ap can access a signing oracle Sign(·, ·), which takes as input a message m
and a time period T and returns a signature (σs, vs, v1). Ap also can access
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random oracles G(·, ·) and H(·, ·, ·, ·). Ap is not, however, allowed to submit the
target tuple of a message and a time period to Sign(·, ·). On the other hand, Bms
can access a signing oracle Sign′(·) that takes as input a message and returns
a signature. Bms can also access the random oracle G′(·, ·) but is not allowed
to submit the target message to Sign′(·). Next, we show that Bms can simulate
Sign(·, ·).
Ap transmits m and T to Sign(·, ·). Sign(·, ·) then transmits T to Sign′(·)
directly. Sign′(·) randomly selects r1 ∈ Zq and calculates v1 = gr1 . Then, Sign′(·)
transmits v1 and T to G′(·, ·), which returns c1 to Sign′(·). Sign′(·) obtains x1 =
c1r1+x′ and sends (x1, v1) to Sign(·, ·). Sign(·, ·) then calculates SKT = x1+x0 =
c1r1 + x′ + x0. Sign(·, ·) also randomly selects rs ∈ Zq and calculates vs = grs .
Sign(·, ·) transmits the tuple of (v1, vs, T,m) to H(·, ·, ·, ·), which returns cs to
Sign(·, ·). Finally, Sign(·, ·) obtains σs = csrs + SKT = csrs + x0 + c1r1 + x′ and
transmits (σs, vs, v1) to Ap.
We assume that Ap outputs a valid signature (m∗, (σ∗s , c∗s, v∗1), T ∗) for the
message m∗ and the time period T ∗ with non-negligible probability in polynomial
time. Then, Bms randomly selects r∗1 ∈ Zq and r∗s ∈ Zq and calculates v∗1 = gr
∗
1
and v∗s = g
r∗s . Bms transmits v∗1 and T ∗ to G′(·, ·), which returns c∗1 to Bms. Bms
also transmits v∗1 , v∗s , T ∗, and m∗ to H(·, ·, ·, ·), which returns c∗s to Bms. Finally,
Bms calculates x∗1 = σ∗s − (c∗sr∗s + x0), and outputs (x∗1, v∗1 , T ∗) as the modiﬁed
Schnorr signature for T ∗.
Let Bms be the success probability of Bms forging (x∗1, v∗1 , T ∗). Let Ap be the
success probability of Ap forging (m∗, (σ∗s , c∗s, v∗1), T ∗). Then,
Bms = Ap .
We assume that Ap outputs the signature (m∗, (σ∗s , c∗s, v∗1), T ∗) with a probability
greater than or equal to 1/P (n). (Let P (n) be a polynomial in n, the length of
the veriﬁcation key). That is,
Ap ≥
1
P (n)
.
Therefore,
Bms ≥
1
P (n)
.
As a result, Bms can forge the modiﬁed Schnorr signature by using Ap with
non-negligible probability in polynomial time. unionsq
From Lemma 1–3, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Our scheme is perfectly strong key-insulated, assuming the infea-
sibility of the DLP.
5 Performance
Table 1 lists results comparing the strong KIS scheme proposed in Section 3.2 and
the conventional strong KIS schemes: the certiﬁcate-based scheme using Schnorr
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Table 1. Comparison of our scheme and the conventional strong KIS schemes: a
certiﬁcate-based scheme using Schnorr signatures (CB scheme) and the scheme based
on Guillou-Quisquater signature [4] (GQ scheme). CB and our scheme are constructed
over elliptic curves.
CB scheme GQ scheme Our scheme
Veriﬁcation key size (bits) 320 1024 160
Signature size (bits) 1120 1184 480
Computational cost (signing) 720 1776 240
Computational cost (veriﬁcation) 1440 1776 720
Security assumption DL RSA DL
signatures (we call this the CB scheme, as shown in Appendix A), and the scheme
based on Guillou-Quisquater signature [4] (we call this the GQ scheme, as shown
in Appendix B), in terms of veriﬁcation key size, signature size, computational
cost for signing and veriﬁcation, and security assumption. The veriﬁcation key
does not include the system parameters: q, g,G(·, ·), H(·, ·, ·, ·). The computa-
tional cost means the number of multiplications for modulo exponentiation1.
We assume that the CB scheme and our scheme are constructed over elliptic
curves. The size of both elements of Gq and Zq are 160 bits. We also assume
that the size of element of Z∗n is 1024 bits and the output length of hash functions
is 160 bits.
The signature size in our scheme is about two ﬁfths that of the conventional
schemes. More precisely, the signature sizes of CB, GQ, and our scheme are 1120,
1184, and 480 bits, respectively. It is recommended that the signature size be as
short as possible, especially in the services where a signer communicates with
a huge number of receivers. Our scheme is also eﬃcient in terms of veriﬁcation
key size and computational cost for signing and veriﬁcation.
6 Application
A typical application of our scheme is to an authentication system in which one
(or a small number of) sender communicates with many receivers since in such
a system, multiple copies of the sender’s signature are transmitted to individual
receivers. In particular, we discuss a bidirectional broadcasting service.
In this type of service, such as for TV shopping or watching quiz programs,
users must transmit personal information, such as names, addresses, and phone
numbers, to a broadcaster through a network. The broadcaster distributes con-
tent and manages the users’ information. A user has a terminal (digital TV)
to receive content, and a tamper-resistant module (TRM), such as a smart
card, is inserted into the terminal. The broadcaster transmits personal informa-
tion requests to the users. Each terminal then transmits the requested personal
1 In this paper, we assume that the number of multiplications for ga is 1.5|a|, where
|a| means the bit length of a.
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information back to the broadcaster, which receives the information and stores
it in a database for several services.
When users employ such bidirectional services, broadcasters must be authen-
ticated using digital signatures in order to protect themselves against imperson-
ation. That is, when a broadcaster transmits a personal information request to
a user, it signs for the request with its signing key. The user’s terminal receives
the request and veriﬁes the signature with a veriﬁcation key stored in the TRM.
The request issuer is authenticated and conﬁrmed through this process, and the
user can feel safe in providing personal information to the broadcaster.
Ohtake, Hanaoka, and Ogawa proposed a bidirectional content distribution
system that enables secure provider authentication against key leakage [11]. This
system uses a KIS scheme for provider authentication, and the broadcaster pe-
riodically updates its signing key to reduce the damage caused by key leakage.
The authors, however, do not concretely specify any KIS scheme. Our scheme
could be applied to this system.
Since there are many users in a bidirectional broadcasting service, a great
amount of signed data is transmitted through the network, and the memory
size of each TRM for storing a veriﬁcation key is limited, our scheme would be
especially eﬀective for this system. The eﬀect of applying it would be as follows:
– Reduced damage due to master key leakage
The master key x0 and x′ are managed by two diﬀerent servers. Even if x0
is leaked, the signing key cannot be updated without x′.
– Eﬃcient signing and veriﬁcation
A veriﬁcation key is stored in each TRM. The length of the veriﬁcation key
in our scheme is 160 bits, which is shorter than in the conventional strong
KIS scheme and thus suitable for such a small-memory-capacity device.
Moreover, the network cost for transmitting signed messages is reduced.
As mentioned before, there are more than 35,000,000 users of Japanese
broadcasting services. The signature size of the certiﬁcate-based strong KIS
scheme is 1120 bits. If this scheme were applied to all users, the total amount
of signature data would be 39.2 (= 1120 × 35,000,000) Gbits. In contrast,
the signature size of our scheme is 480 bits. The total amount of its signa-
ture data would be only 16.8 (= 480 × 35,000,000) Gbits, a reduction of
22.4 Gbits.
– Application of sources and libraries for the Schnorr signature scheme
In developing a security system using our signature scheme, we can directly
use the existing sources and libraries for the Schnorr signature scheme. As a
result, the development cost for a security system can be reduced.
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A Certiﬁcate-Based Strong Key-Insulated Signature
Scheme
Here, we show the construction method for the certiﬁcate-based strong KIS
scheme using Schnorr signatures.
First, the master key x0 ∈ Zq is stored in a secure device, and x′ ∈ Zq is
managed by a signer. Then, publish the veriﬁcation keys y0 = gx0 and y′ = gx
′
.
Second, generate the signing key SKT and the veriﬁcation key PKT for a time
period T in the secure device, and send those keys to the signer with a certiﬁcate
Signx0(PKT ). Here, Signx(y) denotes a Schnorr signature for a message y and
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using a key x. To a message m, the signer adds a signature SignSKT (m) by using
SKT and a certiﬁcate Signx′(m) by using x′. Then, the signer sends these to
a veriﬁer with PKT and Signx0(PKT ). The veriﬁer veriﬁes Signx0(PKT ) and
Signx′(m) by using public keys y0 and y
′ and veriﬁes SignSKT (m) by using PKT .
B Strong Key-Insulated Signature Scheme Based on
Guillou-Quisquater Signature
We show the construction method for the strong KIS scheme based on the
Guillou-Quisquater signature.
First, randomly select primes p, q; then calculate and publish n = pq. Second,
randomly select e, where e is a relatively prime to (p − 1)(q − 1), then calculate
d = 1/e mod (p−1)(q−1). Publish e as a veriﬁcation key. Set d1 and d2, such that
d1+d2 = d mod (p−1)(q−1). The master key d1 is stored in a secure device, and
d2 is managed by a signer. Generate the partial key x1 = (1/f(T ))d1 in the secure
device by using d1 and a time period T . Here, f is a function f : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n.
x1 and T are transmitted to the signer. The signer calculates the signing key
SKT = x1·(1/f(T ))d2 for a time period T by using d2. Then, the signer randomly
selects k, and calculates r = ke mod n. For a message m, the signer calculates
l = h(m, r) and s = k · SK lT mod n using the signing key SKT and obtains the
signature (s, l). Here, h is a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}c, and c
is a constant value. The signer sends m, (s, l), and T to a veriﬁer. The veriﬁer
calculates u = se ·f(T )l mod n and l′ = h(m,u) using the veriﬁcation key e and
veriﬁes whether l = l′ is satisﬁed or not.
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Abstract. We propose a generic method to construct forward-secure signature
schemes from standard signature schemes. The proposed construction is more
computationally eﬃcient than previously proposed schemes. In particular, the key
updating operation in the proposed scheme is orders of magnitude more compu-
tationally eﬃcient than previous schemes, making it attractive for a variety of
applications, such as electronic checkbooks. Another advantage of our proposed
scheme is the ability to be easily extended to proxy signature schemes. We de-
fine two notions of forward-security in the proxy signature setup, namely, strong
forward-secure proxy signatures and weak forward-secure proxy signatures. We
then describe a construction of a scheme that satisfies the strong forward-secure
proxy signature property.
Keywords: Digital signatures, forward-security, proxy, eﬃciency.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
One of the biggest threats to the security of standard digital signatures is from the expo-
sure of the secret (signing) keys. If the secret key of an authorized user is exposed, an
adversary with access to the exposed key can forge signatures that are indistinguishable
from the signatures of the authorized user. Furthermore, all the signatures of the autho-
rized user become repudiable, even if they have been generated before the key exposure.
In order to minimize the damage caused by key exposure, the notion of forward-security
in digital signatures was put forth by Anderson in [2] and formalized by Bellare and
Miner in [3]. In forward-secure signature schemes (FSS), although an adversary with
access to exposed keys can generate valid signatures, the validity of signatures gener-
ated prior to the key exposure will remain intact. Consequently, forged signatures with
past dates are distinguishable from valid signatures.
A forward-secure signature scheme is a key evolving scheme [3]. In previously pro-
posed schemes [3,1,13,11,5,14,18], time is divided into disjoint intervals, say T periods
t1, t2, ..., tT ; each period ti has a secret key, while the public key remains the same. At
the end of each interval, a new secret key is generated and the secret key correspond-
ing to the previous interval is deleted [3]. Hence, FSS are time dependent; that is, FSS
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 166–181, 2008.
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must be correlated in some way to the time when the signature is generated. On the
other hand, a verifier of an FSS must also have a mechanism to verify that the signature
generated during interval ti is uniquely related to the secret key that is valid at ti. To
ensure forward-secrecy, however, it is required that old secret keys cannot be computed
by unauthorized users based on the knowledge of present or future keys.
As pointed out in [3], it is trivial to design FSS if we allow the size of the registered1
secret and/or public keys, or the size of the signatures to grow proportionally with the
number of intervals T . It is impractical, however, to assume users’ ability to register
an arbitrary number of keys from the Certificate Authority (CA) [3]. Except for [2], all
proposed schemes avoid such an impractical assumption [3,1,13,11,5,14,18].
In the existing literature, there are two major classes of approaches to design FSS.
The first approach is to design schemes based on specific number theoretic assump-
tions [3,1,13,11,5]. The second approach is to apply a generic construction to stan-
dard signature schemes [2,3,14,18]. Generic schemes have the advantage of provable-
security assuming secure standard signature schemes exist [7]. On the other hand, spe-
cific schemes can only be proven secure in the random-oracle model[7]. Another ad-
vantage of generic schemes is that they exhibit the added flexibility to be instantiated
from diﬀerent standard signature schemes. This gives generic schemes the room for
trading oﬀ computational and storage eﬃciencies by using base schemes with diﬀerent
performance characteristics, rather than being bound to the properties of a specific base
scheme [7].
An unsolved problem in previously proposed schemes [3,1,13,11,5,14,18] is the va-
lidity of signatures generated within the key exposure interval. Obviously, all signatures
generated before the key exposure but within the same interval will be repudiable, since
the same key is used throughout the entire interval. Therefore, the design of interval
lengths can be a nontrivial task. The longer the interval, the more the signatures gen-
erated with the same key, hence, violating the whole idea behind forward-security in
digital signatures. On the other hand, shorter intervals will result in a more frequent key
updates, even if no signature has been generated during the intervals.
In this paper, we propose a generic construction, that can be applied to any standard
signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)2, to compose an FSS
scheme. Our treatment of forward-security is diﬀerent; instead of corresponding keys
with time intervals, our keys are tied with signatures. That is, each key is used for one
and only one signature; after every signature generation, the key is updated independent
of time. In our scheme, the key update algorithm is orders of magnitude more compu-
tationally eﬃcient than previously proposed schemes. Furthermore, computational and
storage eﬃciencies are very competitive in all parts of the scheme, compared to other
generic schemes in [14,18] and achieves better performance overall (Tables 2 and 3).
Another advantage of our scheme is that its extension to proxy signatures is straight-
forward and intuitive. We define two levels of forward-security in proxy signatures, and
propose a generic construction of forward-secure proxy signature schemes that achieves
the stronger level of security. To the best of our knowledge, the construction of forward-
secure proxy signature schemes has not been addressed in the literature.
1 Registered keys are the ones authenticated by the Certificate Authority.
2 In fact, the construction can be extended to non-DLP based signature by slight modifications.
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1.2 Related Work
In [2], Anderson extended the idea of forward-security in session key exchange proto-
cols introduced in [10,8] to the context of digital signatures. Since then, many schemes
have been proposed to design FSS where the parameters sizes (registered private/public
keys and signatures) do not depend on the total number of intervals T . These proposals
can be divided into two categories: schemes based on specific number theoretic assump-
tions, and generic schemes constructed from a standard signature scheme as a building
block.
Number theoretic schemes. Bellare and Miner [3] formalized the problem introduced
by Anderson [2] and suggested the first solution. Their proposed scheme was based on
the hardness of factoring the Blum-Williams integers. Although their scheme does not
require the number of secret or public keys, nor the length of the signature to grow with
the number of intervals T , it does, however, have rather long keys. Other number the-
oretic schemes appeared later including [1,13,11,5]. Abdalla and Reyzin [1] improved
on the scheme of [3] by shortening the length of the keys. Kozlov and Reyzin [13]
proposed an FSS with fast key update. Their proposed scheme requires only one mod-
ular exponentiation to update the keys; hence, allowing for shorter intervals. Itkis and
Reyzin [11] proposed an FSS that requires only two modular exponentiations with short
exponents for signing and verifying. Boyen et al. [5] proposed a scheme where the up-
date can be performed on encrypted keys as a second layer of security.
Generic approach schemes. A diﬀerent approach to designing FSS is to use existing
standard digital signature schemes as building blocks. Anderson [2] proposed the first
scheme, where the signer is required to have a registered secret key for each interval,
thus having a secret key size linear in T . Bellare and Miner [3] introduced the binary
tree scheme to reduce the required number of registered secret keys to O(log T ). Their
improvement came with the cost of longer signatures and longer verification time (both
are increased by a factor O(log T )). As argued by Bellare and Miner [3], however, sig-
nature schemes with one of the parameters (registered secret/public keys, or signature
sizes) growing proportionally with T are considered impractical.
The first practical generic construction was proposed by Krawczyk [14]. In the ini-
tialization phase of [14], the signer, using a single pair of registered secret/public keys,
generates a total of T certificates, one for each period. The certificate chain of length
T need not be secret. However, it must be available for the signer to generate valid
signatures. If the certificate corresponding to time interval ti is lost, no signature can
be generated during that interval. The other generic scheme was the one proposed by
Malkin et al., usually referred to as the MMM scheme [18]. The MMM scheme makes
use of Merkle tree-type certification chains combined with ideas from the binary tree
scheme of [3]. In the MMM scheme, instead of generating T certificates in the initial-
ization phase, the scheme is divided into subtrees. At the end of each subtree, log ti
secrets are generated, where ti denotes the time period. Hence, reducing the secret
key storage from O(T ) to O(log T ).3 This reduction, however, is paid for in the key
3 In the worst case scenario, i = T .
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update algorithm as their update time is increased by a factor of log ti compared to [14].
Moreover, unlike the certificate chain [14], their keys must remain secret.
In a diﬀerent but related work, Ma and Tsudik [17] proposed the forward secure
sequential aggregate (fssagg) authentication schemes.
1.3 Our Results
Compared to previously proposed generic FSS [2,14,18] and the tree based scheme of
Bellare and Miner [3], our generic construction method exhibits desirable properties,
such as:
Time independence. All previously proposed schemes, including number theoretic
based schemes, assign keys to time intervals. Except for the MMM scheme [18], all
other schemes require the total number of intervals T to be predefined. Thus, the de-
sign of short intervals will exhaust the set of private keys rather quickly. On the other
hand, the design of longer intervals leads to signing more messages with the same key,
violating the principle of FSS.
Although, the MMM scheme [18] does not require the total number of time intervals
to be predefined, the eﬃciency of some of its operations4 is dependent upon the interval
when the signature is generated. That is, the scheme will become less eﬃcient with
time. Therefore, the choice of shorter intervals will drive the scheme to be less eﬃcient
relatively rapidly.
This problem is overcome in our scheme by demanding that key update is performed
immediately after every signature generation, rather than the end of the time interval.
Flexibility. In addition to the flexibility granted by the ability to use diﬀerent standard
schemes as building blocks, our scheme provides a flexibility of its own. It provides
options to trade-oﬀ between space and computational eﬃciencies. For example, some
parameters evaluated in the key generation stage can be stored in the system to make
key updating and signing more computationally eﬃcient. Moreover, some parameters
are unrestricted and can be generated in either one of two operations. For example, a
modular exponentiation operation can be performed either in the key update operation
or the signature generation operation, trading oﬀ computational eﬃciencies in the two
operations, depending on application.
Computational eﬃciency. As a direct consequence of the requirement that key update
is performed immediately after signature generation, the key update operation must be
performed eﬃciently. For that, we propose a key update algorithm that is orders of
magnitude more eﬃcient than the previous generic schemes [14,18], as can be found in
Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves excellent overall perfor-
mance. In [18], Malkin et al. provide a comparison of number theoretic approaches
[3,1,13,11] with their MMM scheme, showing how the MMM scheme outperforms
these number theoretic approach schemes. Since the MMM scheme is arguably the
most eﬃcient generic scheme [7,16], we quantify, in Tables 2 and 3, the performances
4 See Table 2.
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of our proposed scheme against other generic construction based schemes, including the
MMM scheme, showing how our proposed scheme outperforms those earlier schemes.
Applicability to proxy signature schemes. Our proposed scheme can be easily applied
to proxy signature schemes. In fact, as discussed in Section 4, the implementation of
forward-secure proxy signature schemes based on our proposed scheme is straightfor-
ward. The extension of generic construction to proxy signature schemes has not been
addressed in any of the previous proposals for FSS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some preliminaries
and basic concepts that will be used in the subsequent sections. We present our generic
construction in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the construction of forward-secure
proxy signature scheme. We conclude our paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume the existence of public key infrastructure,
where users have registered private and public key pair (x, y), where x represents the
private key and y represents the public key. Depending on context, the term signing key
is used interchangeably with the terms private or secret key. Similarly, the terms public
and verifying key are used synonymously.
2.1 Definitions
A DLP-based standard signature scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Standard Digital Signature Scheme). A standard digital signature
scheme SS= (P,K ,S,V), with P,K ,S, andV being polynomial-time algorithms with
the following functionalities.
1. P is a randomized parameter-generating algorithm that, on input 1k, where k is a
security parameter, outputs a description of a multiplicative group G, a generator
g, and a description of a one-way hash function. These parameters are assumed to
be publicly known.
2. K is a randomized key-generating algorithm that takes the output of P as input
and outputs a pair of keys (x, y), where x is a secret key and y is the corresponding
public key.
3. S is a possibly randomized signing algorithm that takes as input a message M ∈
{0, 1}∗, a secret key x, and possibly a set of parameters λ. Depending on application,
no set of parameters might be needed, in which case λ is taken to be the empty set.
The algorithm outputs a signature σ on the message M.
4. V is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input (M, y, σ), such that:
V(M, y, σ) =
{
1, i f σ = S(M, x, λ)
0, otherwise . (1)
Equation (1) demands that the verification algorithmV outputs 1 only if the signa-
tureσ on message M is generated using the secret key x corresponding to the public
key y. Otherwise put, the verification algorithmV outputs 1 only if the signature is
valid.
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2.2 Security Parameters
To be able to provide fair comparison for diﬀerent schemes we need to quantify the cost
of performing diﬀerent operations in each scheme. Time and space complexity is used
here to provide such a basis for comparison. For that, as in [18], we define two diﬀerent
security parameters.
l : a security parameter such that performing an exhaustive search over l-bit se-
quences is infeasible. This is the security parameter of conventional symmetric
cryptography. We assume the output of cryptographic hash function and the size of
secret keys in signature schemes are of size l.
k : a security parameter such that the k-bit composite integers are hard to factor
and such that the discrete logarithm problem modulo a k-bit prime is believed to be
hard. We assume that the size of public keys in signature schemes are of size k.
Distinguishing between the two parameters is important, because symmetric key
cryptography is much more eﬃcient than asymmetric. The factoring problem can be
solved in sub-exponential time exp(k 13 log 23 k), thus, asymptotically one might need
k ≈ O(l3) [18].
Although more eﬃcient multiplication algorithms exist, for simplicity we will as-
sume that multiplying two integers a and b is performed in O(size(a) size(b)) time and
modular exponentiation is performed in O(size(exponent) size(modulos)2) time [6].
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will ignore the cost of integer addition and integer
comparison.
3 Proposed Generic Construction of Forward Secure Signature
Schemes
3.1 The Proposed Scheme
In this section we describe our generic construction method to design FSS. The key
point for the forward-security of our scheme is allowing the signer to possess two pairs
of registered keys. Allowing the signer to possess two pairs of registered keys results in
a simple design of FSS that is computationally more eﬃcient than previously proposed
schemes. Instead of generating T certificates as in [14], or a secret for every tree leave
as in [18], our scheme is based on the generation of a forward-security chain R. The
forward-security chain is not required to generate signature, as opposed to [14], nor is it
required to be kept secret, as opposed to [18]. In fact, it need not be stored in the system
and signatures can still be generated and verified. Another advantage of our scheme and
the scheme of [14], over the MMM scheme, is that the chain R and the T certificates
are generated oﬀ-line in the key generation phase.
To describe our construction method, let SS=(P,K , S,V) be a standard digital sig-
nature scheme as in Definition 1. Based on SS, the constructed forward-secure signa-
ture scheme is FSS=(P,K ,FKG,FS,FV, KU), where P,K ,FGK , FS,FV, and
KU are polynomial-time algorithms. The algorithms P and K are exactly the same as
in the base scheme. We further require that the algorithm K is run twice so the signer
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will possess two pairs of registered private and public keys (x1, y1) and (x2, y2). The
forward-secure key generation algorithm FGK , the forward-secure signing algorithm
FS, the forward-secure verifying algorithm FV, and the forward-secure key update
algorithmKU are described in detail below.
Key Generation. On input of a security parameter l, the user generates a prime p and a
prime q that divides p−1, such that q ≥ 2l. The user picks an element g ∈ Z∗p of order
q, and selects a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q. The parameters p, q, g, and h are as-
sumed to be publicly known.5 With the above public parameters and the total number of
signatures for the forward-secure scheme T in hand, the signer generates the forward-
security chain R = (r(1), r(2), ..., r(T )), where each r(i) corresponds to ith signature. To
start, the signer generates a integer k(1) picked randomly from the multiplicative group
Z
∗
q. The value of r(1) is then computed from k(1) as:
r(1) = gk
(1)
mod p. (2)
Using the one-way hash function h, the signer continues to construct a chain of k(i)’s:
k(i) = h(k(i−1)), (3)
of length T . For each k(i) the corresponding r(i) is computed as in equation (2) and
the forward-security chain R is constructed as an ordered tuple of the r(i)’s. Figure 1
illustrates an implementation of the key generation phase.
The function h in equation (3) must be a one-way function so that evaluating k(i−1)
from k(i) can be assumed infeasible. Moreover, by the discrete logarithm assumption,
computing k(i) using the knowledge of r(i) is infeasible.
Algorithm FKG(T )
k(1) R←− Z∗q;
r(1) ← gk(1) mod p;
For i = 2, ..., T do
k(i) ← h(k(i−1));
r(i) ← gk(i) (mod p);
Delete k(i−1);
EndFor
R← (r(1), r(2), r(3), ..., r(T ));
Return R
After the forward-security chain R has been generated, the signer uses its first secret
key x1 to sign the chain (using any secure standard signature scheme.) The secret key
x1 is only needed to sign the chain R in the key generation phase and should not be
stored in the system to ensure forward-secrecy. Otherwise, an adversary breaking into
the system can forge a signature for any R. Note that the only parameter that the signer
5 This setup is the same as in the Schnorr signature scheme [23]. For diﬀerent standard signature
schemes, setup varies according to the used standard scheme.
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Fig. 1. The forward-security chain generation: Secret key for a given signature is a hash of the
secret key for the previous signature
is required to store after the completion of the key generating phase is the value of the
random number k(1) and the private key x2. The chain R is used to provide forward-
security and it is not required for signatures generation. Observe that the key generation
is performed only once during the lifetime of the FSS, and it is performed oﬀ-line.
Signature Generation. To sign the ith message, the signer uses its second secret key
x2 and the value of k(i) to run the signing algorithm FS. The signer calls the base sign-
ing algorithm with k(i) passed as a parameter.
s = S(M, x2, λ = k(i)), (4)
where S represents the signing algorithm corresponding to the standard signature
scheme used as a building block. The tuple σ = (i, s, r(i)) comprises the signature on
message M.
Algorithm FS(M, x2, i, k(i))
s← S(M, x2, λ = k(i));
Return σ = (i, s, r(i))
Note that, instead of generating a random k for every signature as in DLP-based sig-
natures, such as El-Gamal [9] or Schnorr [23], the value k(i) is passed as a parameter
in our scheme. Thus, our forward-secure signature generation is more computationally
eﬃcient than its base scheme. No previous generic FSS can be more eﬃcient then its
base scheme. Further improvement can be made, depending on the resources available
for the signer. If computational eﬃciency is more important than storage, the signer can
store R in the system. Storing R in the system will save the signer one modular expo-
nentiation by passing r(i) as a parameter; an operation that requires O(lk2) time to be
performed. This eﬃciency improvement, however, comes with a cost of O(Tk) bits in
storage.
Signature Verification. The verification algorithm FV is shown below. The verifier
uses the signer’s public key y2 to verify the validity of the signature, using the standard
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verification algorithm V. Then, the verifier runs the standard signature verification to
verify the validity of the forward-security chain R using the signer’s public key y1.
Algorithm FV(M, y2, σ,R, y1, σR)
If V(M, y2, σ) = 1
IfV(R, y1, σR) = 1 and r(i)σ = r(i)R
Return 1
Else
Return 0
EndIf
Else
Return 0
EndIf
Observe that, without the second check, which is to check the validity of the chain
R and if the value r(i) in the signature σ is equal to the authenticated r(i) in R, the ver-
ification algorithm is just the verification algorithm of the base scheme. That is, the
scheme can be used as a standard scheme and, if needed (e.g., in case of a dispute), R
can be used to ensure forward-security.
Key Update. After the (i-1)th signature has been generated, the signer updates the secret
key k(i−1) by applying the one-way hash function, to get k(i). As soon as the value of k(i)
has been computed, the value of k(i−1) must be deleted to ensure forward-security, as
can be seen in algorithmKU below.
AlgorithmKU(k(i−1))
k(i) ← h(k(i−1));
Delete k(i−1)
Return k(i)
The key update operation uses one application of the hash function, an operation that
requires O(l2) in time. No previous FSS [3,1,13,11,5,14,18] can achieve the same per-
formance, except for Anderson’s proposal [2] which has been argued to be impractical.
Even better, by storing the chain of k(i)’s in the system, the key update can be performed
in O(1) time with the expense of O(Tl) bits in storage, giving the system designer a
choice to trade-oﬀ storage and computational eﬃciencies. Note that if the chain of k(i)’s
is stored, k( j) must be deleted immediately after the generation of the jth signature to
ensure forward security.
Table 1 illustrates our construction of an FSS based on the Schnorr signature [23].
Theorem 1. If an adversary can break the forward-security of our scheme, she can
solve the discrete logarithm problem or invert a one-way function.
Proof. Compared to the underlying signature scheme, our scheme introduces the pre-
computation of the k(i)’s and the forward-security chain R. Given the security of the
underlying scheme, the adversary needs to know the k(i) corresponding to the ith sig-
nature to forge a valid signature. If k(i) has already been deleted from the system, the
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Table 1. Applying the proposed construction method to design an FSS based on the Schnorr
signature scheme [23]. The key generation FKG, signature generation FS, signature verification
FV, and the key updating KU algorithms are summarized.
Algorithm FKG(T ) Algorithm FS(M, x2, i, k(i))
k(1) R←− Z∗q r(i) ← gk(i) mod p;
r(1) ← gk(1) mod p; s← h(M, i, r(i))x2 + k(i) mod q;
For i = 2, ...,T do Return σ = (i, s, r(i))
k(i) ← h(k(i−1));
r(i) ← gk(i) (mod p);
Delete k(i−1)
EndFor
R← (r(1), r(2), r(3), ..., r(T ));
Return R
Algorithm FV(M, y2, σ,R, y1, σR) Algorithm KU(k(i−1))
If r(i) ≡ yh(M,i,r(i) )2 gs mod p k(i) ← h(k(i−1));
IfV(R, y1, σR) = 1 and r(i)σ = r(i)R Delete k(i−1)
Return 1 Return k(i)
Else
Return 0
EndIf
Else
Return 0
EndIf
adversary can compute k(i) either from r(i) by solving the DLP or from present k( j), j > i,
by inverting the one-way hash function. 
unionsq
3.2 Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze the performance of our scheme.
Key generation. The key generation requires the user to generate a total of T k(i)’s,
one for each signature. Each k(i) is obtained from k(i−1) by one application of the hash
function. Each application of the hash function is performed in O(l2) time. For each k(i),
the corresponding r(i) is computed using one modular exponentiation. Each computa-
tion of r(i) is performed in O(lk2) time. Therefore, the entire key generation operation is
performed in O(T (l2 + lk2)) time.
Signature generation. Our forward-secure signature generation is the signature gen-
eration of the standard scheme with k(i) passed as a parameter. If the Schnorr signature
scheme is used, the signature generation of our scheme is performed in O(lk2+2l2) time.
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Table 2. Comparing the asymptotic performances of the generic constructions of Krawczyk [14],
MMM [18], and our scheme, when the Schnorr signature scheme [23] is used as a building block
Krawczyk MMM Our Scheme
Key update time 2l2 + lk2 T k2l l2
Signature time 3l2 + lk2 3l2 + lk2 2l2 + lk2
Verifying time 2(2lk2 + l2) 2(2lk2 + l2) + (log l + log T )l2 2(2lk2 + l2)
Signature size log T + 2l + 4k (log l + log T + 2)l + 4k log T + l + k
Key gen time (5l2 + 2lk2)T k2l2 (l2 + lk2)T + lk2 + 3l2
Secret key size l k + l(log l + log T ) 2l
Public key size k l 2k
Signature verification. The verification of our scheme is the same as in the standard
scheme with the added verification of the forward-security chain R and the check that
r(i) in the signature is equal to r(i) in R. If Schnorr signature scheme is used, the verifi-
cation operation can be performed in O(4lk2 + 2l2). Observe, however, the verification
of more than one signature requires only a single verification of the forward-security
chain R.
Key update. After the generation of every signature, the key k(i−1) is updated to get
k(i) and the old key is deleted. The hashing operation can be performed in O(l2) time.
Although this key update operation outperforms all previous schemes, it can be made
even more eﬃcient. If the user can store the chain of k(i)’s generated during the key
generation phase, the key update can be performed in O(1) time.
Key sizes. Since the signer possesses two pairs of registered keys, the size of the se-
cret key is 2l bits, while the size of the public key is 2k bits.
Signature size. The only extra parameter in the signature of our scheme, compared
to the standard scheme, is the inclusion of the signature’s number i. Resulting in an
extra log i bits in the size of the signature. If Schnorr signature is used, the resulting
signature size will be O(l + k + log i) bits.
3.3 Applicability
The properties and performances of all parts of our scheme make it attractive for a
variety of applications. Our focus will be electronic checkbooks (e-checkbooks) which
was our primary motivation. Just like a regular checkbook, an e-checkbook usually
contains multiple checks. Each e-check is meant to be signed by the checkbook holder
and verified by the bank issuing the e-checkbook.
The signature number in our scheme is mapped to the check serial number in the
e-checkbook application. When a scheme with ineﬃcient key update algorithm is used
and the user’s e-checkbook is stolen, an unauthorized user with access to the
e-checkbook can forge a signature on the last signed e-check that is indistinguishable
from the authorized signature, making the last check signed by the authorized user repu-
diable. Therefore, a scheme with very eﬃcient key update algorithm, like our scheme,
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Table 3. Comparing the performances of the generic constructions of Krawczyk [14], MMM
[18], and our scheme, when the Schnorr signature scheme [23] is used as a building block and
for k = 1024, l = 160, and T = 1000. (∗) this operation is done only once for the lifetime of the
forward secure scheme and is performed oﬄine.
Krawczyk MMM Our Scheme
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute
Key update time 1.7 × 108 6800 1.7 × 1011 6800000 2.5 × 104
Signature time 1.7 × 108 1 1.7 × 108 1 1.7 × 108
Verifying time 6.7 × 108 1 6.7 × 108 1 6.7 × 108
Signature size 4.4 × 103 3.67 7.2 × 103 6 1.2 × 103
Key gen time 3.4 × 1011 2 2.7 × 1010 −6.3(∗) 1.7 × 1011
is of most importance to the application of e-checkbook. Furthermore, since signatures
are meant to be verified by the bank, the forward-security chain R can be stored in the
bank’s database; thus, no need to worry about the exchange of the chain R. Moreover,
the verification of the chain R needs to be performed only once.
3.4 Comparison to Other Schemes
In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme with the Krawczyk [14] and
Malkin et al. [18] when the Schnorr signature scheme is used for construction. Table 2
shows the asymptotic performances of the three schemes in the worst case scenario
(when ti = T for the schemes in [14,18], and i = T in our scheme). If k ≈ O(l3), as
suggested in [18], the three schemes are asymptotically comparable, except for the key
update operation where the performances are O(l7), O(Tl7), and O(l2) for the Krawczyk,
MMM, and our scheme respectively. Thus, supporting our claim that our key update
algorithm is orders of magnitude more eﬃcient.
Table 3 compares the performances when k = 1024, l = 160, and T = 1000. The
values of k and l are the typical values in Schnorr signature scheme. The columns cor-
responding to the Krawczyk and the MMM schemes are split into two halves. The first
half shows the performance of the corresponding scheme where the second half shows
the normalized performances when our scheme is used as a reference point. Positive
values represent the relative advantage of our scheme, while negative values represent
the advantage of their schemes over ours. Since storage is cheap in today’s technology,
the non-secret storage of the T certificates in the Krawczyk scheme and the chain R in
our scheme are ignored.
In the next section, we show how to construct forwrad-secure proxy signature
schemes.
4 Forward-Secure Proxy Signature Scheme
4.1 Background
In the previous section, we showed how to construct an FSS with the requirement that
the signer possesses two pairs of registered keys. In this section, we show how the same
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idea can be extended to construct a forward-secure proxy signature scheme (FSPS) from
any secure proxy signature scheme, without the requirement that the signer possesses
two pairs of registered keys. This requirement is avoided because, in the proxy signature
setup, there are two legitimate users, namely, the proxy designator and the proxy signer,
and each one of them is assumed to possess a pair of registered private and public keys,
(xa, ya) and (xb, yb), respectively. For historical reasons the proxy designator and signer
are called Alice and Bob respectively. In proxy signature schemes, Alice delegates her
signing capability to Bob. The idea of digital proxy signatures was first introduced by
Mambo et.al. [20]. Many of the proposed proxy signature schemes appeared in the
literature are based on the following concept: Alice has a pair of keys (xa, ya), where xa
and ya represent the secret and public keys, respectively. To delegate her signing power
to the Bob, Alice generates a warrant describing Bob’s authorities to sign messages on
her behalf. The warrant is then signed by Alice (using a standard signature scheme)
and sent to Bob. After checking the validity of the signature, Bob combines Alice’s
signature with his secret key xb to generate a proxy signing key xp. Bob uses the proxy
signing key xp to sign messages on behalf of Alice using a standard signature scheme.
To validate a proxy signature, the verifier computes the public key yp corresponding to
the proxy secret key xp (usually a function of Alice’s and Bob’s public keys; that is,
yp = f (ya, yb)) and use the corresponding standard signature verification algorithm to
verify the signature.
Many proxy signature schemes have appeared in the literature [21,22,12,15,4]. As
noted by Wang [24], little eﬀort has been made towards the design of FSPS. In most
of the existing proxy signature schemes, Bob generates a proxy key xp, and the same
key will be used for proxy signing throughout the signature delegation period, without
any modifications. Hence, exposure of the proxy key xp will enable a forger to generate
proxy signatures that are indistinguishable from the legitimate signatures. We propose,
to the best of our knowledge, the first design of an FSPS.
4.2 Definitions
It is important to distinguish between two keys, namely, Bob’s secret key xb and the key
generated by Bob to generate signatures on Alice’s behalf xp. Bob’s key xb is the one
distributed by the CA and does not change. The other key xp is generated by Bob and
can be updated whenever Bob wishes.
Before describing the construction, we define two diﬀerent notions of forward-
security for proxy signatures; weak forward-secure proxy signature (WFSPS) schemes
and strong forward-secure proxy signature (SFSPS) schemes.
Definition 2 (Weak Forward Secure Proxy Signatures). A proxy signature scheme is
said to be weak forward-secure if it is resilient to the exposure of the proxy key xp.
Definition 3 (Strong Forward Secure Proxy Signatures). A proxy signature scheme
is said to be strong forward-secure if it is resilient to the exposure of the proxy key xp
and the private key of the proxy signer xb.
The lack of appropriate definitions for forward security in proxy signatures led Malkin
et al. to conclude that proxy signatures are by design forward secure [19]. Given our
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Table 4. A forward-secure proxy signature scheme constructed by applying the proposed con-
struction method to the proxy signature scheme in [12]. Assuming the forward-security chain
has been generated successfully, the proxy key generation PKG, proxy signature generation PS,
proxy signature verification PV, and the proxy key updating PKU algorithms are summarized.
The subscript a indicates parameters generated by the proxy designator and w represents the war-
rant describing the authority given to the proxy, as in the original scheme in [12]. xb represents the
registered secret key of the proxy signer, while xp represents the key generated to sign messages.
Algorithm PKG(w, σa, k(i), i, xb) Algorithm PS(M, xp, k(i))
r(i) ← gk(i) mod p sp ← h(M)x(i)p + k(i) mod q;
x
(i)
p ← h(i, r(i))xb + h(w, ra)xa + ka mod q Return σM = (i, sp, r(i),w, ra);
Return x
(i)
p
Algorithm PV(ya, yb,M, σM,R, σR) Algorithm PKU(k(i−1))
y(i)p ← yh(i,r(i))b yh(w,ra )a r−1a mod p; k(i) ← h(k(i−1));
If r(i) ≡ (y(i)p )h(M)gsp mod p Delete k(i−1)
IfV(R, ya, σR) = 1 and r(i)σ = r(i)R Return k(i)
Return 1
Else
Return 0
EndIf
Else
Return 0
EndIf
definitions above, under the condition that Bob generates a new xp for every signature,
proxy signatures are only weak forward-secure.
4.3 Our Proposed Strong Forward-Secure Proxy Signature Scheme
The idea here is the same idea for constructing regular FSS. For lack of space, we omit
describing the details of the construction and outline the basic concept. The major dif-
ference between the standard proxy signature scheme and the forward-secure version is
in the proxy and key initialization stage, which we describe below.
Proxy and key Initialization. The proxy key generation is an interactive protocol. To
start the protocol, Alice decides the number of signatures T for the forward-secure
proxy scheme. Upon receiving T , Bob runs the same algorithm FKG used in the
construction of non-proxy forward-secure signature schemes to generate the forward-
security chain R of length T . The forward-security chain R is then sent to Alice who
signs R with her private key xa and publishes the signed R.
For the ith message M to be signed, the pair (k(i), r(i)) is used by Bob to generate
forward-secure proxy signatures with the private key xp. The fact that R is signed by
Alice ensures forward-security, even if Bob’s system has been broken into.
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Table 4 illustrates our construction of a forward-secure proxy signature scheme based
on the provable secure scheme of Kim et al. [12]. The constructed scheme in Table 4
assumes that the proxy and key initialization has been performed successfully and the
forward-security chain R is available for verifiers.
The security analysis of the forward-secure proxy scheme is similar to the non-proxy
one. Assuming the standard proxy scheme is secure6, provided that the forward-security
chain R has been generated successfully, the forward-security is granted by the hardness
of the discrete logarithm problem and the existence of one-way functions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the two major design approaches of forward secure signature
schemes, i.e. number-theoretic and generic construction based approaches. The generic
construction schemes can be based on any underlying signature scheme, hence, oﬀer-
ing more flexibility in terms of meeting a wide spectrum application requirements. We
proposed a generic construction method to obtain a forward-secure signature scheme
that is very eﬃcient in parameter size and computation times. A quantitative compar-
ison with related schemes showed that the proposed scheme is more computationally
eﬃcient in terms of signature verification, signature size, and key updating time.
Further, we identified that in the literature there was no explicit design of forward
secure proxy signatures. Therefore, we first defined two notions of forward security
in the context of proxy signatures, i.e. weak forward-secure and strong forward-secure
proxy signatures. We then showed how the proposed generic construction method can
be easily extended to any proxy signature scheme to obtain strong forward secure proxy
signatures.
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Abstract. Many cryptosystems suﬀer from fault attacks when imple-
mented in physical devices such as smart cards. Fault attacks on secret
key elements have successfully targeted many protocols relying on the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), the Integer Fac-
torization Problem (IFP) or the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
More recently, faults attacks have also been designed against the public
key elements of ECDLP and IFP-based schemes.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst fault attacks on the public key el-
ements of DSA and ElGamal, two DLP-based signature schemes. Our
attacks fully recover a 160-bit DSA secret key and a 1024-bit ElGamal
secret key with ∼ 4 ·107 and ∼ 3 ·106 faulty signatures respectively. Such
ﬁgures might suggest that DLP-based schemes are less prone to fault
attacks than ECDLP- and IFP-based schemes. However, the integrity of
public keys should always be checked in order to thwart such attacks
since improvements may reduce the required amount of faulty signatures
in the near future.
Keywords: Smart cards, side channel, fault injection, faults attacks,
ElGamal, DSA.
1 Introduction
From a classical point of view, cryptanalysis is an abstract mathematical notion.
However in practice, algorithms have to be implemented on real physical devices
that are exposed to side-channel attacks like timing attacks [12,14,27,28,30],
power attacks [11,20,22,26], electromagnetic attacks [1,16,25] as well as fault
attacks [3,9,17].
After the discovery of fault attacks (1970’s) [21], various mechanisms for fault
production and propagation have been discovered and researched. Some of the
most popular fault injection techniques include variations in supply voltage,
clock frequency, temperature or the use of white light, X-ray or ion beams [3].
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It is not suﬃcient to just induce a fault in the cryptographic device during a
calculation involving a secret. Depending on the algorithm, it is also crucial to
generate the right fault at the right time and on the right place within the chip.
The generated fault must be exploitable, meaning that the attacker has to be
able to extract some information about the secret from the erroneous result of
the algorithm. The ﬁrst attack [9] that used a fault to derive secret information
from a cryptosystem targeted a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) based RSA
implementation. After that, DES [5], RSA and ElGamal [2], LUC and Demytko
[19], ECC [6], AES [7], and DSA [24] have also been compromised by fault
attacks.
All these attacks targeted secret keys and computations involving secret keys.
Recently, several papers have considered fault attacks on public key elements,
demonstrating the necessity to protect public keys against fault attacks at least
for ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) [4] and IFP (Integer
Factorization Problem) based algorithms [10,23,29]. Curiously and to the best
of our knowledge, no fault attack on public key elements has been proposed so
far for any DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem)-based schemes.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst fault attacks on the public key elements of
two DLP-based algorithms, namely the ElGamal and DSA signature schemes. We
also estimate the complexity of our attacks (the number of faults required) both
by a theoretical analysis and software simulations. Although it turns out that our
attacks require a large number of faults, they highlight the necessity to check the
integrity of both public and private keys elements for DLP-based schemes.
Fault Attack Model: In our model, an attacker tries to corrupt not the private
but the public keys by faults. Whereas some attacks [2,24] require that only
a single bit is ﬂipped or a particular byte is set to zero, our model only assumes
that the attacker is able to enforce random register faults. While such single or
particular bit ﬂips are rather hard to achieve in practice, changing a word or
many words in an undetermined way is the most simple fault to induce. It can
simply be obtained by inducing a fault on address decoders for example, when
parameters stored in EEPROM or Flash are transferred to RAM. This results
in a random transient change in the public key.
Outline of the Paper: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes previous fault attacks on ECDLP and IFP schemes with a corruption of
public keys. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our new attacks on DSA and ElGamal
signature scheme and describe their complexity by a theoretical analysis and
software simulations. Section 5 contains some open discussions to improve the
attacks, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Previous attacks on public key elements of cryptographic schemes were per-
formed on ECDLP [4,13] or IFP [29,23,10] cryptosystems.
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2.1 Previous Attacks on ECDLP
Here, the attacker tries to shift the computation from a given secure elliptic
curve E (in Weierstrass parameterization) to an insecure curve E∗. Consider a
smart card that has to compute dP , for d a scalar and P a point on the curve
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6.
If a fault is induced on P , it is changed into a point P ∗ on a curve
E∗ : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6∗.
The attack exploits the fact that the parameter a6 is not used in the usual
point addition formula on Weierstrass elliptic curves. As a consequence, the
whole computation is performed on the curve E∗, and dP ∗ is obtained. If now E∗
is an insecure curve (typically because ord(E∗) has a small factor), the discrete
logarithm problem can be solved on it, which gives information about d. Faults
occurring during the computation of dP are also exploitable [4]. The attack here
assumes that only a few error bits are inserted in order to be successful. This
hypothesis has been relaxed in [13] where a random and unknown fault either
in the base point P , in the base ﬁeld Fp or F2q underlying the curve, or in the
curve’s parameters is turned into breaking the scheme.
2.2 Previous Attacks on IFP
Seifert’s RSA Attack [29]: The attacker tries to corrupt RSA public key N
into N∗ during RSA signature veriﬁcation by faults, where N∗ is prime. Then
he can simply compute the private exponent d∗, as e−1 mod (N∗− 1), assuming
that e is relatively prime to (N∗ − 1). In the oﬀ-line part, he can choose bits
of N to modify the creation of N∗. In the on-line part, he repeatedly queries
the device with a specially constructed message-signature pair and causes data
faults until this particular N∗ is used as the modulus in the signature veriﬁcation
algorithm.
Seifert proved that there exists an algorithm that will be successful with prob-
ability at least O(1/k) in getting fraudulent programs S∗ authenticated and
therefore executed on a machine relying on RSA-authentication of programs.
The running time of the algorithm is logO(1)(N), where N and e are a k-bit
RSA public keys.
Generalization of Seifert’s RSA Attack [23]: Muir generalized Seifert’s
attack to moduli N∗ not necessarily primes but still easy to factorize.
He simpliﬁed the analysis of Seifert’s attack. He also showed an experimental
result for the oﬀ-line stage of RSA-Attack. His analysis and computational trials
show that if an adversary is able to cause random faults in only 4 bits of a
1024-bit RSA modulus stored in a device, then there is more than 50% chance
that the modiﬁed modulus N∗ has good property to attack. For Seifert’s original
attack, it required 8 bits.
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Brier et al.’s RSA Attack [10]: The attacker tries to corrupt RSA public
key N into N∗ similar to Seifert’s attack, but here he tries to attack signature
generation process, s = md mod N . Moreover, at the end of the attack the
attacker has the secret key d.
The basic idea is based on the fact that, for small moduli - for example, from
15 to 20 digits -, discrete logarithms are eﬃciently computed by square root
methods such as baby-step giant-step or Pollard’s rho. In particular if pa|N∗
and r is a small number dividing the multiplicative order of m modulo pa, then
from s∗ = md mod N∗, d mod r can be recovered. Gathering some fault couples
(mi, si) corresponding to unknown moduli Ni∗ = N , the attacker retrieves the
private exponent d oﬀ-line by progressively determining d mod rj for some small
prime powers rj . Once the product R =
∏
k rj exceeds the modulus N (and so
unknown ϕ(N)), d is recovered with the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Even when the adversary does not have any information on Ni∗, he can recover
a 1024-bit secret d with about 60000 faults, and he needs only 28 faults once he
knows the faulty Ni∗ values.
3 A New Fault Attack on DSA
3.1 The Digital Signature Algorithm
The system parameters for DSA [18] are {p, q, h, g}, where p is prime (at least
512 bits), q is a 160-bit prime dividing (p−1), h is a hash function and g ∈ Z∗p has
order q. The private key is an integer x ∈ Z∗q and the public key is y = gx mod p.
Signature: To sign a message m, the signer picks a random k < q and computes:
u ← (gk mod p) mod q and v ← h(m) + xu
k
mod q.
The signature of m is the pair (u, v).
Veriﬁcation: To check (u, v) the veriﬁer ascertains that:
u = (gwh(m)ywu mod p) mod q, where w = v−1 mod q.
3.2 A New Attack by a Fault Induction on p and q
Let us suppose that an attacker succeeded in invoking transient faults before
starting signature generation and changing the values of p, q into p∗, q∗, respec-
tively. Assuming the generated k satisﬁes gcd (k, q∗) = 1, he gets:
u∗ ← (gk mod p∗) mod q∗ and v∗ ← h(m) + xu∗
k
mod q∗.
Consider any integer t dividing p∗ and q∗, such that ϕ(t) divides q∗ and g is
not a root of zero modulo t. Then, we have
(u∗)v
∗ ≡ gh(m)+xu∗ mod t. (1)
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Consequently,
(u∗)v
∗
gh(m)
≡ (gu∗)x mod t. (2)
Denote DL(α, β, t) the discrete logarithm of β mod t with respect to α. For any
rj dividing the multiplicative order of (gu
∗
) modulo t we have
x ≡ DL(α, β, t) mod rj , (3)
where β = (u
∗)v
∗
gh(m)
mod t and α = gu
∗
mod t can be computed from the faulty
signature.
Assuming the attacker knows the value of the faulty (p∗, q∗) induced, this sug-
gests that an algorithm can recover the secret key x, by successively recovering
x modulo rj with various faulty signatures until the lowest common multiple of
those rj is large enough to recover x using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Toy Example. Take p = 124540019, q = 17389, g = 10083255. Let the private key
be x = 12496, so y = gx mod p. The message to be signed veriﬁes h(m) = 5246,
and k = 9557 is chosen. The signature is the pair (u = 34, v = 13049). Now
suppose that the attacker succeeded in making faults and changing the value of
p into p∗ and q into q∗ before generating the signature. Then, we ﬁnd x with the
values shown in Table 1 .
Table 1. Toy example of the attack on DSA
p∗ q∗ k u∗ v∗ t α β rj x mod rj lcm({rj})
124539997 17030 41 13384 9140 131 33 28 65 16 65
124539973 17110 6171 12501 422 59 47 7 58 26 3770
124539983 16536 9961 11694 1214 53 20 36 26 16 3770
124539989 17296 491 6434 202 47 24 18 23 7 86710
3.3 Analysis of the Attack
We now provide an estimation of the number of faults needed to recover the
whole secret x. Our analysis will be completed in four steps. We ﬁrst estimate
the probability Pt that for a given t, the condition
Ct := (t | q∗) ∧ (ϕ(t) | q∗) ∧ (t | p∗) ∧ (gcd(k, q∗) = 1) (4)
is satisﬁed. Then, we approximate by 1 the probability Pr|t that when this con-
dition is satisﬁed for t, the secret x is recovered modulo r, where r is a prime
power dividing φ(t). From these two probabilities we derive a global estimate
for the probabilities P [rj ] to recover x modulo rj for various rj , and we ﬁnally
estimate the number of faults required from these probabilities. Each step in the
analysis induces an error by some small factor in the estimations, so our ﬁnal
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estimations only give an upper bound on the number of faults required, precise
up to a small factor.
We ﬁrst estimate Pt = Pr[Ct] where the probability is on random independent
choices of k, p∗ and q∗. Let write lt for lcm(t, ϕ(t)) and decompose q∗ as q∗ =
q∗1 lt + q
∗
2 . Then
Pt = Pr[q∗2 = 0]Pr[t | p∗] Pr[(gcd(k, q∗1) = 1) ∧ (gcd(k, lt) = 1)].
Clearly, Pr[q∗2 = 0] =
1
lt
and Pr[t | p∗] = 1t . Neglecting correlations between the
conditions on the gcds, we have
Pr[(gcd(k, q∗1) = 1) ∧ (gcd(k, lt) = 1)] ≈ Pr[gcd(k, q∗1) = 1] Pr[gcd(k, lt) = 1].
As Pr[gcd(k, lt) = 1] =
ϕ(lt)
lt
and Pr[gcd(k, q∗1) = 1] ≈ limQ→∞
∑Q
q=0
ϕ(q)
q =
6
π2 ≈ 0.6 we ﬁnally get
Pt ≈ 0.6ϕ(lt)
tl2t
= 0.6
ϕ(lcm(t, ϕ(t)))
t(lcm(t, ϕ(t))2
. (5)
The conditions on the gcds are actually dependent with a positive correlation:
clearly if gcd(k, q∗1) = 1 then for example k is more likely to be a prime and then
gcd(k, lt) = 1 will be satisﬁed also. However, as
Pr[(gcd(k, q∗1) = 1) ∧ (gcd(k, lt) = 1)]
Pr[gcd(k, q∗1) = 1] Pr[gcd(k, lt) = 1]
≤ Pr[gcd(k, q
∗
1) = 1]
Pr[gcd(k, q∗1) = 1] Pr[gcd(k, lt) = 1]
=
lt
ϕ(lt)
,
for most t values the actual probability is only a small factor larger than our
approximation.
Now suppose a fault is performed such that Condition (4) is satisﬁed. For
each r dividing ϕ(t), we evaluate the probability Pr|t that the attacker recovers
x mod r from Equation (2), i.e. by computing a discrete logarithm modulo t.
As p∗ is uniformly random, the remainder of u∗ = gk mod p∗ modulo ϕ(t)
is nearly uniformly distributed in Zϕ(t). We deduce that α is nearly uniformly
distributed in the subgroup of Z∗t generated by g. Write rg,t =
∏I
i=1 p
ei
i and
rα,t for the multiplicative orders of g and α modulo t, where pi are distinct
primes. Then, for any divisor r =
∏I
i=1 p
e′i
i of rg,t, the probability that rα,t = r
is ϕ(r)rg,t =
∏
p−eii
∏
e′i =0(pi − 1)p
e′i−1
i , and the probability that r divides rα,t is
Pr|t =
∏
e′i =0 p
−(ei−e′i+1)
i (p
ei−e′i+1
i − 1).
In particular if r is a power of a prime, i.e. r = pe
′
r
r , then 12 ≤ Pr|t =
p
−(er−e′r+1)
r (p
er−e′r+1
r − 1) ≤ 1. We approximate this probability by 1 for all
r, which is a good approximation for all but very small r. The approximation
means the following: we suppose that once a fault that satisﬁes Condition (4)
for some t is induced, the attacker recovers x modulo r for any r dividing ϕ(t).
For any set of integers T , write PT for the probability that all t ∈ T verify
Condition (4), and no other integer. We now evaluate P [r], the probability to
recover the secret modulo a prime power r if the attack is performed once.
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According to our previous arguments, we have
P [r] ≈
∑
T={ti}
s.t. ∃t∈T s.t. r|ϕ(t)
PT .
We ﬁnally approximate
P [r] ≈
∑
T={ti}
s.t. tr∈T
PT = Ptr where tr = arg max
t s.t. r|ϕ(t)
Pt. (6)
This approximation underestimates the actual probability because all the sets
in the original sum that do not contain tr are neglected. However, according to
the estimation (5), Pt tend to decrease very fast with t, so for the sets T that
do not contain tr the probability PT is much smaller than Ptr , and the actual
probability P [r] is only a small factor larger than our estimation.
We now estimate the number of bits of the secret key that can be recovered
for a given amount of faults. In order to recover x by means of the Chinese
Remainders Theorem, an adversary should know a list of values x mod rj such
that lcm({rj}) > x. On the other hand, if N faults are performed, it is likely
that x will be recovered modulo rj for all rj such that P [rj ] > N−1, so the
quantity of information that can be recovered with N faults is
log2(lcm({rj |P [rj ] ≥ N−1})). (7)
This conclude our analysis.
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Fig. 1. Approximation (6) for all r power of prime smaller than 5000
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In Figure 1, we display the probabilities P [rj ] evaluated from Equations (5)
and (6) for every rj power of prime up to 5000. Using this computation, we
further estimate for any Ns = 10s with 4 ≤ s ≤ 10, the number of bits of the
secret key that can be recovered. The results are presented in Figure 2. The
last row in the table corresponds to 160-bits security and predicts that about
2.14 · 108 million faults are needed to recover the secret. The table and the
ﬁgure additionally show that, at least for this range of parameters, the attack
complexity is between cubic and biquadratic in the size of the secret.
3.4 Experimental Results
In order to check the soundness of our theoretical analysis, we simulated the
attack in software (with parameters p a 1024-bit prime, q a 160-bit prime and g
about the size of p). The results are shown in Table 2, where each column gives
the amount of faulty couples (p∗, q∗) used to retrieve m bits of the private key x.
As can be seen, the required amount of faults in our simulations is 3 to 10 times
smaller than the 2.14 · 108 theoretical bound with a mean of 4.16 · 107 faults.
Ns = 10
s |x| ≈ log2(lcm({rj}))
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Regression line : 
log2 ( N ) = 3.51 * log2 ( |x| ) + 1.95
Fig. 2. Following the theoretical analysis of our attack on DSA, the number of faults
needed N is between cubic and biquadratic with respect to the secret size |x|
Table 2. Seven experimental software results for our attack on DSA. In each column,
we display the number of faults needed to recover m bits of the secret for each of the
experiments.
Exp. n◦ m = 32 m = 64 m = 96 m = 128 m = 160
1 463986 5676441 8549083 26476140 38621903
2 811215 8898520 14945495 22174790 34861119
3 284706 3336328 5577267 11579152 20960118
4 798230 6438425 21496166 31049856 61711260
5 282811 8363054 14303797 26594960 39066576
6 721742 8762969 20601681 38398403 73933924
7 453623 3174393 10220088 17145832 22623221
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4 A New Fault Attack on ElGamal Signature Algorithm
4.1 ElGamal Signature Algorithm
In the ElGamal signature scheme [15], to generate a private and public key pair,
we ﬁrst choose a prime p, and two random numbers, g and x, such that both g and
x are less than p. The private key is x and the public key is (y = gx mod p, g, p).
Signature. To generate a signature on a message m, the signer ﬁrst picks a
random k such that k is relatively prime to (p − 1). He then computes
u ≡ gk mod p and v ≡ m − xu
k
mod (p − 1).
Veriﬁcation. The signature is the pair (u, v) and is veriﬁed by checking that
yuuv ≡ gm mod p.
4.2 A New Attack by Fault Injection on p∗
Suppose that there are faults before the signature generation and the modulus
p is changed into p∗. Then, if gcd(k, p∗ − 1) = 1, we have
u∗ ≡ gk mod p∗ and v∗ ≡ m − xu
∗
k
mod (p∗ − 1).
Let t divide p∗ and ϕ(t) divide (p∗ − 1). Then, we have
(u∗)v
∗ ≡ g(m−xu∗) mod t. (8)
Consequently, if g is not a root of 0 modulo t,
(u∗)v
∗
gm
≡ (g−u∗)x mod t. (9)
For any rj dividing the multiplicative order of (g−u
∗
) mod t, we have
x ≡ DL(α, β, t) mod rj , (10)
where β = (u
∗)v
∗
gm mod t and α = g
−u∗ mod t can be computed from the faulty
signature.
Assuming that the attacker knows the value of the faulty p∗ induced, equa-
tion (10) makes it possible to recover some information about x. By retrieving
x mod rj for suﬃciently many rj satisfying lcm({rj}) > x, the whole secret can
be recovered by use of Chinese Remainder Theorem.
4.3 Analysis and Experimental Results
The analysis of ElGamal case is similar to (and actually much easier than) DSA
case, so we omit its detail. In the table of Figure 3, we computed log2(lcm({rj}))
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Nf ≈ b
−1
s |x| ≈ log2(lcm({rj}))
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Secret size |x| = log2( x )
Regression Line:
log( Nf ) = 2.11 * log( |x| ) + 0.30
Fig. 3. Following the theoretical analysis of our attack on ElGamal, the number of
faults needed Nf is a bit more than quadratic with respect to the secret size |x|
Table 3. Six experimental software results with increasing factorization bound for our
attack on ElGamal. In each column, we display the number of faults needed to recover
m bits of the secret for each of the experiments.
Exp n◦ Bound on t m = 64 m = 128 m = 256 m = 512 m = 1024
1 104 5794 39790 104258 786038 3366136
2 2 · 104 4902 24054 126230 611494 2893428
3 5 · 104 4902 24054 126230 571170 2688882
4 5 · 104 8810 21742 102974 572170 2931512
5 5 · 104 7420 23290 142810 696046 3011938
6 10 · 104 3078 43274 135194 636864 2808468
for all rj that have probability larger than bs = 10−s for 4 ≤ s ≤ 10. The last row
in the table corresponds to 1024-bits security and predict that about three million
faults are needed to recover the secret. The table and the ﬁgure additionally show
that, at least for this range of parameters, the attack complexity is a bit more
than quadratic in the size of the secret.
Table 3 exhibits the amount of faulty primes generated in order to recover
m bits of the private key x in various simulations. In these experiments, each
faulty p∗ was factorized up to a bound that is indicated in the ﬁrst column of
the table (our predictions considered a bound of 5 · 104). As can be seen, the
practical results match pretty well the theoretical expectations. Moreover, the
table shows that considering more factors of p∗ slightly decreases the numbers
of faulty primes required to ﬁnd the key.
5 Open Discussion and Future Directions
We have shown both theoretically and by software simulation that fault attacks
on public key elements are successful against the DLP-based DSA and ElGa-
mal signature schemes. Our attacks are however not yet practical because they
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require that the attacker guesses the faulty values he induced, and because the
quantities of faulty signatures needed are too large for practical applications.
5.1 Finding the Faulty Value on the Public Key Elements
BlindMethod [10]. Aswehave seen above, ifCondition (4) is veriﬁed for (p∗, q∗),
we recover x modulo r from the discrete logarithm of β in basis α. However, if the
adversary does not know the faulty values, he cannot check whether Condition (4)
holds. What he can do, is storing all computed values and distinguish the correct
one by a statistical method. We point out that the discrete logarithm of β with
respect to α may not exist. In this case, the attacker knows that Condition (4) is
not veriﬁed and simply discards the fault.When the conditiondoes not hold but the
logarithm exists, we assume that all values are as likely for x mod r. Consequently,
a bias-based attack may be built for DSA. We remark however, that due to the
small probability for Condition (4) to occur, the bias will be much smaller. The
same remark holds for our attack against ElGamal.
Collision Method [10]. This method requires a diﬀerent model of faults,
namely a Dictionary of possible faulty values. For our attack on DSA, this
dictionary D would of course be two-dimensional. In [10], the authors use the
notion of marker of an element of the dictionary, which would be deﬁned as
couples (t, r) for DSA, where (t | q∗) ∧ (ϕ(t) | q∗) ∧ (t | p∗) and r is a not too
small factor of ϕ(t). For every fault (p∗, q∗) ∈ D and every marker (t, r), the
attacker keeps the discrete logarithm DL(α, β, t, r). As soon as two identical
values are found, this common value is believed to be the true value, that is
x mod r. In order to avoid false positives,
√
r should be much larger than | D |
[10], so t must be much larger than | D |2.
We argue that this method cannot be applied in the context of our attack
on DSA, simply because most likely, no element of the dictionary will have
an appropriate marker. Indeed, the probability that a random element satisﬁes
(t | q∗)∧ (ϕ(t) | q∗)∧ (t | p∗) is 1t· lcm(t,ϕ(t)) so the probability that an element of
the dictionary has a marker (t, r) for some t >| D | is smaller than
∞∑
t=|D|2
1
t · lcm(t, ϕ(t)) ≤
∞∑
t=|D|2
1
t2
≈ 1| D |2 .
The same conclusion holds for ElGamal.
Optimal Method [10]. This method uses the whole information available
from faults, in the sense that it keeps all possible values for the sequence of
faults ((p∗1, q
∗
1), (p
∗
2, q
∗
2), (p
∗
3, q
∗
3), . . .) that are coherent with the faulty signatures
((u1, v1), (u2, v2), (u3, v3), . . .). Coherency conditions include for example that
gcd(g, p∗, q∗) divides u∗. Moreover it is “optimal” in the sense that it associates
a selectivity parameter related to a “maximum-likelihood selection” to each pos-
sible sequence of faults.
In theory, this method can be applied to our attacks on DSA and ElGamal.
However, handling the lists of fault values will most likely become intractable in
practice.
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Further Methods. By relaxing the condition
√
r | D | we can allow some
false positives in the collision method (and discriminate between false and true
positives via coherency conditions). In our attack on DSA, we could also think
of having a dictionary for p∗ only. Furthermore, we could use a fault model in
which an induced error occurs only on a few bytes instead of on the whole value.
This is reasonable because a byte or a word is a basic unit for communication
and computation in modern embedded devices such as smart cards. Therefore
we can reduce the possible candidates for faulty values.
5.2 Reducing the Required Number of Faulty Signatures
As lcm({ri}) should be larger than the size of the secret key, the required number
of faulty signatures dramatically increases with the secret key size. To partially
solve this problem, we can think of a hybrid method recovering part of the
secret key with our attack and the remaining bits with an exhaustive search. In
this case, we should ﬁnd the optimal number of bits by considering the trade-oﬀ
between the required number of faulty signatures and the amount of computation
for the exhaustive search.
6 Conclusion
For the ﬁrst time in the literature, we have shown that fault attacks on two DLP-
based schemes, DSA and ElGamal signature schemes, are possible by inducing
faults on the public key. Both attacks were carefully analyzed in order to derive
their probabilities of success. In each case, the analysis was validated by software
simulation. The amount of faulty signatures needed to recover a 160-bit DSA
secret key is about ∼ 4 · 107, and ∼ 3 · 106 for a 1024-bit ElGamal.
In order to render the attack more practical, some improvements are required
to reduce the number of faulty signatures and to ease the ﬁnding of the faults
induced. But fault attacks against DLP-based schemes are meant to improve
over time, we therefore recommend checking the integrity of public parameters
whatever the underlying number theoretic problem, that is in the case of DLP-
based scheme as much as in the case of ECDLP- or IFP-based schemes.
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Abstract. BankID is a PKI-substitute widely deployed by Norwegian
banks to provide digital signatures and identiﬁcation on the internet. We
have performed a reverse-engineering of part of the BankID system and
analysed the security protocols and the implementation of certain cryp-
tographic primitives. We have found cryptographic weaknesses that may
indicate security problems, protocol ﬂaws facilitating man-in-the-middle
attacks, and implementation errors facilitating strong insider attacks. We
also note that the system suﬀers from severe privacy problems.
1 Introduction
A public key infrastructure (PKI) is often deﬁned as an infrastructure that
provides users with public key encryption services, digital signatures etc. De-
ployment of a mass-market PKI is seen by many as a key enabler for eﬃcient
and secure online public services.
More narrowly, a public key infrastructure can be deﬁned as an authenticated
channel for transport of public encryption or veriﬁcation keys. The main obsta-
cle to eﬃcient implementation of this authenticated channel is the challenging
certiﬁcate revocation problem: how to prevent a public key from being used if
the corresponding secret key is compromised. For mass-market PKIs using smart
cards, the certiﬁcate must be revoked if the smart card is lost. One must expect
a large number of certiﬁcate revocations.
One of the common solutions for key revocation, the certiﬁcate revocation list
(CRL), becomes impractical when many certiﬁcates are revoked. Online certiﬁ-
cate status checks or other online certiﬁcate lookup solutions are of course online
and may also suﬀer from privacy problems.
Another signiﬁcant obstacle to solutions based on smart cards is software and
hardware support, exacerbated by the many possible combinations of hardware,
operation systems and other user software.
BankID is a system designed to provide digital signature services on the inter-
net with a simpler technical solution than most traditional PKI systems, greatly
simplifying the revocation problem as well as most software and hardware re-
lated problems. It has been developed by Norwegian banks and is used as a login
mechanism for many internet banks, ensuring mass-market deployment.
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 196–206, 2008.
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For digital signatures to have any legal force, it is a basic requirement that the
user should have sole control of his signing key (see for instance Article 2 of [1]).
The main simplifying idea in the BankID system is to ignore this requirement.
The system stores the users’ signing keys in a central infrastructure that makes
signatures on the users’ behalf when requested to do so. This means that the
BankID system – in principle – can do anything with the users’ signing keys,
quite unlike a traditional PKI where the trusted certiﬁcate authority can only
issue forged certiﬁcates.
To get the BankID infrastructure to make signatures, the user must authen-
ticate himself. There are minor variations that depend on the user’s bank, but
essentially two-factor authentication is used. The user has a password and a
token that outputs a one-time pin.
To identify himself on a merchant’s web site, the user runs an identiﬁcation
protocol with the merchant, involving signing and verifying challenges. The user
asks the bank infrastructure not only to do signature generation, but also sig-
nature veriﬁcation.
The actual execution of the protocol is done by a digitally signed Java applet
running in the user’s web browser as part of the web site’s login page. The
user enters his credentials into the Java applet. When the identiﬁcation protocol
completes, the merchant considers the user identiﬁed for the session.
Clearly, any approach based on entering credentials into applets will be highly
susceptible to phishing attacks, no matter how such a solution is implemented.
We note that one of the counter-measures proposed by the banks [9] is to verify
the signature on the Java applet.
There has been little independent public analysis of the BankID system. Hole
et al. [7] identiﬁed several security and privacy problems, and did a risk analysis.
Espelid et al. [4,5] described a strong phishing attack against BankID, defeating
the banks’ proposed counter-measures.
In this paper, we do a deeper analysis of parts of the BankID system based
on a reverse-engineering of the Java applet. We describe a new man-in-the-
middle attack against the identiﬁcation part of the system. We describe ﬂaws in
the cryptographic subsystem that allow devastating insider attacks against all
aspects of the system. We elaborate on the privacy problems in the system, and
brieﬂy discuss how some privacy problems can be eliminated.
This paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 sketches reasonable security goals
and attack models for BankID. Sect. 3 contains our analysis and ﬁndings. Finally,
in Sect. 4 we discuss some implications of our ﬁndings.
2 Security Goals and Attack Models
A system’s security goals describe undesirable system behaviour that should not
occur, even in the presence of an attacker. In order to analyse a system, we also
need to select an attack model that describes the attacker’s capabilities.
For a digital signature infrastructure to be useful, it must provide a reasonably
strong guarantee that every valid signature was intentionally produced by the
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user. A signature forgery is deﬁned as the creation of a valid signature without
the user’s consent.
Likewise, every time a user is accepted as identiﬁed by some honest web site, a
digital identiﬁcation infrastructure must provide a reasonably strong guarantee
that for any such session, the communicating partner must be the user’s terminal.
An impersonation attack succeeds when an honest web site accepts the user as
identiﬁed in a session, but the user’s terminal is not the communicating partner
for that session.
The natural security goal of any digital signature and identiﬁcation infrastruc-
ture must therefore be to prevent signature forgeries and impersonation attacks.
One very strong attack model is where we allow the attacker to compromise
the user’s terminal. Unless the system provides the user with at least a secure
input device and a secure display, separate from the user’s terminal, it is im-
possible to provide any meaningful security1 in such an attack model. We shall
therefore not allow the attacker to compromise the user’s terminal.
So-called phishing attacks exploits the fact that most users are unable to
correctly decide if a web page [6] is authentic or fake. While one can hardly expect
a system to protect a user from signing some arbitrary document without looking
at it, we can expect the system to prevent impersonation attacks, regardless of
how the user (mis)behaves.
In other words, a model where the attacker can fool the user into identifying
himself on a web site of the attacker’s choice is reasonable. For digital signatures,
we shall let the attacker fool the user into signing any document of his choice.
We shall not consider a signature to be a forgery if the user could have had the
document displayed on his terminal before giving his consent to the signature
production.
For a system where the user’s signing key is stored with a trusted third party,
we also need to consider insider attacks, where employees of the trusted third
party may attempt to abuse their access to the system.
It is hard to imagine a maintainable system for which there does not exist a
coalition of insiders whose combined privileges can provide access to the user’s
signing key. This is highly problematic, since in principle, there is no technical
obstacle preventing signature forgeries. But for our present purpose an attack
model where no security is possible is not interesting.
We shall work with a weaker attack model, where we assume that any tamper-
resistant hardware, such as hardware security modules (HSMs), function as in-
tended, that is, the attacker cannot compromise them.
To summarize our attack model:
– The attacker can have the user run the identiﬁcation protocol with any web
site of his choice.
– The attacker can have the user sign any document of his choice.
– The attacker can compromise any part of the system except for the user’s ter-
minal or any part of the system speciﬁcally designed to be tamper-resistant.
1 A smart card prevents theft of the user’s private key, but not misuse.
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Resistance against these attacks should not be the only design goal for an
infrastructure for digital signatures and identiﬁcation, privacy should also be an
important design goal. The infrastructure operator should learn as little as pos-
sible about his users based on their use of the infrastructure. When signing keys
are stored with the infrastructure operator, no practical solutions are possible
where the operator does not learn when a signing key is used. The natural pri-
vacy goal must therefore be that the operator should not learn anything about
the use of the system, except when the users’ signing keys are used.
3 The Analysis
Our original goal was to determine exactly what kind of private information was
sent from the BankID Java applet to the bank infrastructure. Since no public
documentation is available for the BankID system, we decided to extract protocol
information from the Java applet itself.
We did this by using a Java decompiler that transforms Java bytecode into
Java source code. It then turned out that the Java source code had been obfus-
cated by giving most symbols meaningless names. Such obfuscation is basically
a substitution cipher, where punctuation, strings and library calls are untouched
and constitute plain text. Reading the source code without knowing the substi-
tution is time consuming, but still fairly easy with appropriate tools.
3.1 Design Outline
When a user wants to use BankID to identify himself to some merchant, he
directs his browser to the merchant’s web site. The merchant’s web site includes
a Java applet signed by the banks. The documentation for the BankID system
expects the user ﬁrst to verify the digital signature on the Java applet [9]. If
the signature is correct, the user enters his credentials (exactly what these are
varies, but include a passphrase and one or more one-time pin) into the Java
applet. The Java applet then runs an identiﬁcation protocol with the merchant
and the infrastructure. If the identiﬁcation protocol concludes successfully, the
Java applet redirects the user’s browser to an URL supplied by the merchant.
The communication between the Java applet and the merchant is optionally
protected by SSL2, while the communication with the bank infrastructure is
always protected using SSL. In both cases, the usual web PKI is used to authen-
ticate the merchant and infrastructure public SSL keys.
The Java applet runs a mutual identiﬁcation protocol with the merchant web
site. The exact details of this protocol are unknown, but we know that the user
and merchant both issue challenges, and that both sign something.
The Java applet does not have the user’s signing key, but runs a protocol with
the infrastructure to have it make the required signature. To further simplify the
system, the Java applet does not verify the merchant’s signature, but instead
asks the infrastructure to do so.
2 After we reported our ﬁndings in Sect. 3.3 to the banks, SSL was made mandatory.
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The protocol used between the Java applet and the infrastructure is a crypto-
graphic protocol. An RSA encryption key is embedded in the Java applet. Every
time the applet wants to send a message to the infrastructure, it encrypts a ran-
domly chosen symmetric key using the RSA encryption key, then encrypts the
message using the symmetric key. Both ciphertexts are sent to the infrastructure
through an SSL tunnel. The reply from the infrastructure is encrypted using the
Java applet’s symmetric key, sent through the established SSL tunnel.
This motivates the following conjecture, which has been conﬁrmed by the
banks. An SSL gateway sits on the edge of the bank network and the SSL tunnel
stops. The SSL gateway forwards the applet’s two ciphertexts to a signature
HSM. The encrypted response is then sent to the SSL gateway and from there
through the SSL tunnel to the Java applet.
Further clues inside the Java applet motivates the sketch of the complete
system given in Fig. 1.
  	Merchant

Bank infrastructure
  	OTP HSM
  	User    	SSL Gateway    	Signature HSM

		



Fig. 1. The principal actors in the BankID security protocol and their communica-
tion lines. (⇔ denotes SSL tunnel, ↔ denotes no SSL tunnel,  denotes unknown
protocol.)
For public key encryption, RSA with PKCS#1 1.5 padding is used. Curiously,
none of the easy countermeasures to standard attacks on PCKS#1 1.5 listed in
[8] seem to be implemented.
For symmetric encryption, 3DES is used in CBC mode with an all-zeros ini-
tialization vector (IV). Since the same key is always used for two messages, we
note that using an all-zeros IV may leak information, but this seems to be of
minor signiﬁcance. More interesting is that fact that there is no integrity pro-
tection, a very curious omission.
We note that we do not have enough information to decide if the above ﬂaws
lead to exploitable security weaknesses. But the lack of integrity protection will
with high probability allow attacks on the PKCS#1 1.5 padding that can be
used to compromise user passwords, and perhaps also steal a user’s credentials.
3.2 Observations on Earlier Phishing Attacks
Verifying the signature on the Java applet, as instructed by the bank’s recom-
mended procedure for use of BankID [9], is intended to protect against phishing
attacks. Given that the typical browser dialog is somewhat hard to understand
(see Fig. 2), this protection is rather weak. It is also unclear to us, given the com-
plexity of modern web browsers, if a conscientious and educated user following
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Fig. 2. Verifying the signature on a Java applet: Java cannot verify the authenticity
of the certiﬁcate, but the certiﬁcate is valid
the bank’s recommended procedure can expect BankID to provide security. But
for the sake of argument, we shall assume so.
Unfortunately, Espelid et al. [4,5] showed that this procedure was insuﬃcient.
They noticed that the mutual identiﬁcation protocol between merchant and user
is run essentially inside an SSL tunnel, but without any binding between the
identiﬁcation protocol and the SSL tunnel.
The basic idea is to have the Java applet appear in the phishing web page, let
the user enter his credentials into the applet (which he has been told to trust),
and then hijack the established session. This is an impersonation attack.
The Java applet gets the address of the merchant’s web page from its para-
meters. The phishing web page can therefore control this address and direct the
applet to the phishing web site. The phisher starts a session with the merchant’s
web page, and simply forwards protocol messages to and from the user’s Java
applet to the merchant. Finally, the merchant considers the user to be identiﬁed,
and the phisher hijacks the session.
Espelid et al. developed [4,5] proof-of-concept software for a phishing attack,
notiﬁed the banks and demonstrated the attack for the Financial Supervisory
Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet).
By comparing the vulnerable version of the Java applet with the corrected
version, we see that a counter-measure against such man-in-the-middle attacks is
present in both versions, but the code has been disabled in the vulnerable version.
This means that the protocol was originally designed so that the merchant and
the applet would agree on the merchant web site’s host name and IP address,
but for some reason, this code had been disabled.
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It is somewhat interesting that when the code to verify the merchant host
name and IP address was turned back on (approximately eight months after the
banks were ﬁrst notiﬁed), the protocol messages were left unchanged, except for
the applet version number. But the version number was never cryptographically
protected. Further, the old Java applet was never revoked. It was therefore easy
to modify [5] the original phishing attack to use the old Java applet and then
change the version number in the message ﬂow to make the merchant and the
infrastructure believe they were talking to the new Java applet.
A new Java applet was released, this time with a modiﬁed protocol that
cryptographically protects the version number. This patches this speciﬁc hole.
3.3 A New Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The Java applet can run the identiﬁcation protocol with the merchant either
inside an SSL tunnel or in the clear. A more careful study of the Java applet
reveals the following fact. The cryptographic protocol ensures agreement on the
merchant site’s host name and IP address. There is no mechanism to ensure that
the applet and merchant site agree on whether SSL is used.
This fact suggests the following new attack, where the attacker controls the
network between the user and the merchant. He presents the user with a phishing
web page containing the Java applet. The applet gets the correct parameters, ex-
cept that the merchant URL is changed from https://... to http://.... The
applet proceeds to contact the merchant using the unencrypted http protocol.
The attacker intercepts these requests and redirects them to the real merchant
server inside an SSL tunnel. The replies can easily be forwarded to the applet.
After the merchant considers the user identiﬁed, the phisher hijacks the session.
Unlike Espelid et al. [4], we did not develop a complete attack. We tested
the applet in a simulated attack, demonstrating that the attack would work.
The banks have issued a new applet that requires SSL communication with the
merchant. This patches this speciﬁc hole.
3.4 An Insider Attack
It is well-known that high-quality pseudo-random numbers are vital for crypto-
graphic protocols. Many protocols break if an attacker can predict the pseudo-
random numbers used to generate protocol messages. In particular, the protocol
between the Java applet and the signature HSM breaks completely, since an
attacker that can predict the applet’s pseudo-random numbers can also predict
the key used to encrypt the messages. Anyone who knows the encryption key
and has access to the internal bank network, between the SSL gateway and the
HSM, can alter message contents at will. It is also easy to recognize when you
have the correct key, simply by comparing the resulting RSA ciphertext with
the transmitted ciphertext.
The Java applet uses the Java SecureRandom class to generate pseudo-random
numbers. Unfortunately, when run on older Java versions, the Java applet does
not use the built-in seed generation, but instead generates the seed on its own.
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Fig. 3. Time measurement
P
δi plotted against the number of measurements c. Four
outlayers have been removed out of 11 000 samples.
(Espelid et al. [4] noted that this seeding was suspicious, but did follow up on
the observation.)
The seed is generated by ﬁrst selecting a number c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9} and
computing
ct + cm +
c−1∑
i=0
δi mod 264,
where t is the current system time in milliseconds, m is the amount of free
memory in the Java virtual machine, and δi is a series of time measurements.
We ran the algorithm 11 000 times on a computer that was in ordinary use
(web browsing, editing, etc.). We measured the sum of the time measurements∑
δi. The results are shown in Fig. 3.
We must estimate the total entropy in the seed. It is quite clear that the
variance in the time measurements is very small, a close look at the numbers
suggests at most ﬁve bits of entropy, depending on c. The amount of free mem-
ory in the Java virtual machine seems to be a constant depending only on the
implementation. Again, this will introduce at most a few bits of entropy.
The current system time is more diﬃcult to analyse. The current system time
is sent as part of a client hello message in the SSL protocol [3], and can hardly
be classiﬁed sensitive information. A determined attacker will certainly be able
to determine the system time within a second. Since milliseconds are used in
the seeding process, this introduces at most 10 bits of entropy. Additionally,
the attacker must determine the start time of the Java applet. This depends on
whether or not user interaction is involved, but will most likely be on the order
of minutes, introducing perhaps another 9-10 bits of entropy.
A more casual attacker can still make a useful estimate of the Java applet
start time. Some users keep their system clocks synchronized with time servers
(some operatings systems make it easy to turn such synchronization on). One
would conjecture that only very few users let their system clocks run more than
a couple of hours wrong. An absolute worst-case scenario for an attacker is an
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uncertainty of a few hours, leading to approximately 25-26 bits of entropy. A
more realistic scenario would allow for an uncertainty of a minute or two, which
is on the scale of the uncertainty resulting from user interaction.
The end result is that the system time contributes somewhere between 10 and
26 bits of entropy, depending on how determined the attacker is and whether
user interaction is involved.
Finally, we need to consider c. It is sampled using the java.util.Random
class, which is initialized with the current system time in milliseconds. We have
already counted this entropy.
To summarize, a worst-case scenario for an attacker leads to a total of say 35
bits of entropy in the system. A more realistic scenario suggests approximately
25 bits of entropy, while one can assume no more than 15 bits of entropy against
a determined attacker, perhaps less.
This is clearly not enough. For 15-20 bits of entropy, an adversary could most
likely determine the random seed in real time. For 25 bits of entropy, a deter-
mined adversary might be able to determine the random seed without causing
noticable delay. For 35 bits of entropy, an attacker that can predict an approx-
imate access time might through precomputation mount a real time attack.
Alternatively, an attacker could passively monitor the protocol run and extract
the user’s password, a serious security failure.
3.5 Privacy Problems
First of all, BankID uses Norwegian personal identity numbers as user identiﬁers.
These numbers are similar to US social security numbers. This means that any
merchant who uses BankID must identify his users by their personal identity
numbers. This makes merchant databases easily linkable, which is problematic
from a privacy point of view. Ideally, an identiﬁcation system should allow the
user to select any number of pseudonyms with separate digital identities.
Furthermore, our study of the protocol between the Java applet and the bank
infrastructure shows that it violates our privacy requirements, as deﬁned in
Sect. 2. The infrastructure learns not only that the signing key is used, but
also the name of the merchant.
The protocol for digitally signing documents sends a hash of the message to
be signed to the infrastructure. Given a hash of a message, it will be easy to
decide if the message is on a list of candidate messages. For instance, the bank
may be able to recognize if the user signs a competitor’s standard contract. This
also violates our privacy requirements.
These observations are of course trivial. It therefore is seems quite clear that
the BankID protocols have not been designed with privacy in mind. We shall
brieﬂy explain how the protocols could be changed so that private information
does not leak.
The signing protocol should obviously use blind signatures.
In the identiﬁcation protocol, the user should not sign the names and chal-
lenges directly, but rather sign a hash of that data. Under reasonable assumptions
on the hash function, this should hide all information from the infrastructure.
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Verifying the merchant’s signature is somewhat more diﬃcult. Obviously, ver-
iﬁcation cannot be delegated to the infrastructure. This means that the applet
must somehow obtain the merchant’s certiﬁcate and check that it has not been
revoked.
Obtaining the merchant’s certiﬁcate is easy, we get it from the merchant him-
self. There are several possibilities for checking its revocation status. If a special
certiﬁcate revocation list for merchant certiﬁcates is maintained, the number of
revoked certiﬁcates may be very small, and downloading the entire CRL may be
feasible. The user cannot run an online status checking protocol directly against
the infrastructure, but it may be possible to run it via the merchant. As a third
possibility, the infrastructure may issue certiﬁcates with a very short lifetime,
eliminating the need for revocation lists.
4 Concluding Remarks
Any system that is to provide legally binding digital signatures and access control
to sensitive private information, such as bank accounts and medical records, must
be held to the highest standards.
The basic design of BankID is defective, given that the BankID infrastructure
has control over the user’s signing key. Furthermore, the technical solution chosen
is highly susceptible to phishing attacks.
The implementation of the BankID Java applet is seriously ﬂawed. The ran-
dom number generator ﬂaw is an astonishingly elementary mistake. While we
cannot say positively that the curious lack of integrity and counter-measures to
PKCS#1 1.5 attacks lead to attacks, we contend that the design is fragile and
highly inappropriate for a system of this kind.
Having an identiﬁcation protocol running both with and without an SSL
tunnel without any cryptographic link between the two is again an elementary
mistake. We note that automatic protocol veriﬁcation tools, such as Scyther [2],
will easily ﬁnd our man-in-the-middle attack.
The privacy problems we point out are quite elementary and are easily avoided
using standard cryptographic constructions. It is clear that privacy was not a
requirement during the system design.
We remark that the cryptographic problems faced by the BankID Java applet
are fairly standard. The threats faced by the infrastructure, such as insider at-
tacks, are signiﬁcantly more challenging. We have very little information about
this part of the system, but what we know indicate that powerful insider attacks
are possible.
Based on this evidence, it is clear that the current version of the BankID
system should see only very limited use, in order to mitigate phishing attacks
and privacy problems. No system developed by the banks should be allowed into
wide-spread use without rigorous public evaluation by independent experts.
As a ﬁnal note, we mention that our analysis was essentially carried out based
on publicly available information without any assistance from the banks. The
banks have been informed of our results, they have corrected one of the ﬂaws
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we have pointed out, and are working to analyse and (perhaps) correct the
remaining defects at the time of writing.
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Abstract. We present an architecture for a ﬂexible and open mobile
electronic identity tool, which can work as a replacement for numerous
ID cards and licenses. In addition, it can be used in various payment
and user authentication scenarios. The tool is mobile phone based and
uses a security element (e.g., a SIM card) for storing sensitive identity
information. We follow the design for privacy principles, such as minimi-
sation of data collection and informed consent of the user. The tool can
be implemented using currently available handset technology.
1 Introduction
In the modern community, the identity of every person is composed of numer-
ous personal characteristics (biological, social), roles, licenses, and business re-
lations. In the electronic world, the same can be seen in the multitude of user
accounts in diﬀerent services. The problem of abundant registrations and, ul-
timately, remembering numerous passwords, has been addressed by federated
identity management solutions [1,2,3,4]. However, their applicability is mostly
limited to various on-line scenarios, whereby a service provider can trust a third
party (identity provider) to securely authenticate the user.
Identity management schemes have also been developed for mobile users. An
extensive study of mobile identity management schemes has been conducted by
FIDIS [5]. As an example, a tool called iManager [6] enables the user to manage
her partial identities on a personal digital assistant (PDA), and provides an
interface for selecting the suitable identity for every use case. iManager, as most
other tools, is designed for on-line business scenarios.
Identity-related information and credentials can be stored on mobile devices
in diﬀerent ways. The unprotected memory of a hand-held device is suitable
as a data storage for non-critical applications. For example, mobile browsers
can store passwords and data for ﬁlling forms on the Internet. For more secure
key provisioning and program loading, trusted platform modules [7] or secure
mobile environments [8,9] can be used [10]. Yet another option is to securely
store identity-related information on the subscriber identity module (SIM) card
or another smart card attached to or embedded in the hand-held device [11].
S.F. Mjølsnes, S. Mauw, and S.K. Katsikas (Eds.): EuroPKI 2008, LNCS 5057, pp. 207–222, 2008.
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In addition to security, issues of usability and trust are of major importance
in mobile identity systems. Since hand-held devices such as mobile phones are
constantly connected to wireless networks, they are seen by many as potentially
insecure gadgets that can reveal sensitive information about one’s identity to
unauthorised parties. The application looks even more dangerous if it includes a
payment component. Therefore, the implementations must ensure that the user
has full control over data sent by the application, and can prevent disclosure
of any information by the device. Moreover, the systems that need informa-
tion about users must receive only a necessary minimum of it, and remove the
information as soon as it is not needed [12].
Privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g. [13,14]) enable building identity man-
agement systems whereby a person can make ﬂexible proofs about the values of
identity attributes. For instance, one can prove that one is over 22 and below
65 years old without surrendering any more information. Furthermore, anony-
mous credential systems (e.g., [15]) make such proofs anonymous and unlinkable.
However, such solutions tend to be an overkill for most everyday situations in
the face-to-face realm. Moreover, computationally they are still rather heavy
for hand-held devices [16]. In addition, the issues of their standardisation and
acceptance for oﬃcially recognised documents are yet unclear. In contrast, solu-
tions based on X.509 public-key certiﬁcates have been utilised in many national
electronic identity schemes.
In order to become widely accepted, a mobile identity management system
must be perceived by both users and service providers as a secure, trustworthy,
usable and ubiquitous tool. It has to work in the person-to-person proximity
scenarios as well as in the on-line world. In other words, it has to become a
public tool [17], open to be joined and freely used by any participating party.
Our contribution. We present an identity management scheme designed for
implementation on mobile phones. In addition, we discuss related infrastructure,
implementation and security issues. Identity information and keys are stored on
the SIM card. The scheme supports multiple partial identities of the person
and can be used for identity veriﬁcation, biometric authentication, and user
authentication in various online and proximity scenarios, in oﬃcial, business
and personal contexts. We use currently available handset technology and open
standards as building blocks for our open mobile identity tool.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe
the architecture of our mobile identity tool and give details of the protocols.
Next, in Sect. 3 we overview the infrastructure that has to be established for
introducing the tool in everyday life, and make a note of a few implementation
issues. In Sect. 4 we discuss issues related to security and usability. Section 5
reviews related work and Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Mobile Identity Tool
In this section, we describe the architecture and protocols for our mobile identity
tool. In the description, we use the terminology given in Appendix A. Readers
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acquainted with the Pﬁtzmann-Hansen terminology [18] will ﬁnd most of the
terms familiar.
A ﬂexible identity tool should allow quick selection of a suitable identity proﬁle
in the everyday life. Furthermore, it should allow adding and deleting proﬁles,
updating proﬁle information and revoking compromised proﬁles. For improved
ﬂexibility, self-created proﬁles can also be supported. In addition, usability is of
paramount importance if the tool is designed for broad public. Restrictions of
hand-held devices, such as small screen sizes and reduced keyboards, highlight
the importance of simplicity and usability even more.
2.1 Architecture
Our identity tool is comprised of two parts: a tamper-resistant security element
(e.g. a SIM card) and an identity proxy used for managing the security element.
The identity proxy can be implemented on the mobile phone most easily in Java
2 Mobile Edition (J2ME), as suitable application programming interfaces (APIs)
[19,20] are available. In addition to transferring data between the SIM card and
identity veriﬁer terminals, features of the proxy include providing a user interface
and checking identity veriﬁers’ credentials.
Often the same biometric (e.g., photo) or a pseudonym of the person can be
used in diﬀerent proﬁles. Therefore, we deﬁne ﬁrst a pseudonym pool. Entries of
the pool contain the following information:
1. Pseudonym type. A type describes the contents of a pseudonym. The seman-
tic meaning of pseudonym types could be, e.g., “User’s photo” or “Customer
ID of ShopChain Ltd.” Pseudonym types follow a naming convention; for ex-
ample, the system of object identiﬁers (OIDs) deﬁned in the ITU-T ASN.1
standard is a natural choice for naming.
2. Pseudonym content. The content can be, for example, a biometric template,
a number sequence, or a string.
3. Pseudonym identiﬁer. The identiﬁers, which will be used as subject names
in certiﬁcates issued to a person, contain cryptographic hash values of corre-
sponding pseudonym contents. For instance, in case of biometric templates
this produces biometric identiﬁers.
4. Date of creation. The ﬁeld is used for ensuring that pseudonyms are not
outdated. A proﬁle issuer may, for instance, refuse issuing a proﬁle connected
with a 10-year old photo.
Diﬀerent proﬁle issuers may have diﬀerent demands on pseudonym validity
terms, for example, on photo freshness. Therefore, we do not deﬁne the validity
period for pseudonyms, but only specify their creation date. This may easily
lead to a case when there are multiple patterns of the same biometric feature
in the pseudonym pool, with diﬀerent creation dates. However, we do not view
this as a problem, because proﬁle issuers may also have diﬀerent requirements
on pattern acquiring procedures, for instance, on photo lighting or set of ﬁngers
used in ﬁngerprint patterns.
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We deﬁne an identity proﬁle, corresponding to a partial identity, as the fol-
lowing information set:
1. Pseudonym identiﬁer, which works as a reference to the pseudonym pool.
2. Proﬁle type. Diﬀerent proﬁles must have diﬀerent types. However, the same
type of proﬁle in identity tools of diﬀerent persons must have the same name.
OIDs can be used for proﬁle type naming.
3. Private key, generated on-card. The key has a visibility indicator, either open
or PIN-protected. The PIN code must be submitted by the user before an
operation with a PIN-protected private key can be performed.
4. Certiﬁcate chain, containing the user’s public key certiﬁcate (PKC). The
certiﬁcate is issued by the identity vendor to the person’s pseudonym and
signed with the identity issuer’s private key. The “Not before” and “Not
after” ﬁelds of the certiﬁcate deﬁne the proﬁle validity period. The certiﬁ-
cate chain includes a trusted root certiﬁcate. For self-created proﬁles, root
certiﬁcate is the same as the user’s PKC.
5. Attribute certiﬁcates (AC) [21] associate attributes with the public key of
the person. Values of attributes in the certiﬁcates are masked. Attribute
certiﬁcates are signed by the identity issuer.
6. Attribute masks. The identity veriﬁer can read an attribute value only if it
has received the attribute mask (in addition to the attribute certiﬁcate).
7. Attribute visibility indicators. Each attribute can be marked as either open
or PIN-protected. The PIN code must be submitted by the user for a PIN-
protected attribute, before the corresponding mask can be retrieved.
8. Attribute values. In addition to the plaintext values of masked attributes,
also non-authenticated values can be stored here. For self-created proﬁles
(e.g., a business card proﬁle) attribute certiﬁcates are not necessary, and
attribute values can be stored as such.
9. Secret keys for symmetric encryption. Secret keys may also have visibility
indicators, open or PIN-protected.
Attribute certiﬁcates contain masked values of identity attribute values. An
attribute A is stored in the attribute certiﬁcate in the following form: H(A,M),
where H(·) is a cryptographic hash function, and M is the corresponding at-
tribute mask. Having received the attribute certiﬁcate, the mask, and the value
of the attribute, the identity veriﬁer can check the attribute authenticity.
A more advanced proﬁle could contain also a speciﬁc program for manipu-
lating attributes and their values. In this case, proﬁles must be loaded into the
identity tool as separate smart card applets. In our scheme, we skip this type of
proﬁles, as their design and implementation are diﬃcult due to security problems
inherent to applet loading procedures.
The mobile identity tool is issued to the person on a SIM card by her mobile
network operator (MNO). The identity applet has already been loaded to the
SIM card by the MNO and contains no identity proﬁles, except maybe a proﬁle
issued by the MNO. It contains, however, a private key and a corresponding
PKC named proﬁle-loading certiﬁcate, issued by the MNO. The subject name in
the certiﬁcate is the same as the card number. The certiﬁcate is used later for
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authenticating the card before loading any identity proﬁles to it. The user also
installs the identity proxy application on the phone.
We highlight the fact that any identity issuer can load a proﬁle. Furthermore,
there are no checks on whether the identity issuer has been certiﬁed for issuing
identities. Therefore, even the person herself can create a new proﬁle on the card
(e.g., a business card proﬁle). “Oﬃcial” proﬁle vendors diﬀer from others only
by the fact that their public keys belong to an oﬃcially recognised public key
infrastructure. The newly generated public-private key pair of the user becomes
therefore part of the same infrastructure. If an oﬃcially recognised proof of
identity is needed, a proﬁle issued by an oﬃcial identity vendor is invoked.
2.2 Loading an Identity Proﬁle
In order to load a proﬁle into the identity tool, a protocol comprised of three
phases is followed. First, the SIM card and the identity proxy, acting together,
create a certiﬁcate signing request (CSR). Second, the identity vendor constructs
the proﬁle. Finally, the new proﬁle is loaded on the card. The protocol is outlined
in Fig. 1, using notation given in Table 1. We concentrate on essential data sent
between the parties, skipping descriptive information about proﬁles and keys
(such as proﬁle names and visibility indicators).
Table 1. Protocol Notation
KU Public key TX Timestamp generated by X
KR Pr ivate key NX Nonce generated by X
KS Secret key P Pseudonym
KX Key of subject X P j Pseudonym used in proﬁle Ij
CCK Certiﬁcate chain for a public key
certiﬁcate issued to key K
Aji Attribute of type (code) i from
proﬁle Ij
KSi Secret key of type i M
j
i Attribute mask for A
j
i
PLC
CRI
Proﬁle-loading certiﬁcate
CertiﬁcationRequestInfo block
V ji Non-authenticated attribute of
type (code) i from proﬁle Ij
CSR Certiﬁcate Signing Request M Set of attribute masks
Ij
Kj
Identity proﬁle of type j
Key belonging to proﬁle Ij
V Set of non-authenticated
attributes
ACj
RCj
Attribute certiﬁcate belonging to
proﬁle Ij
Root certiﬁcate of chain CCKUj
{·}K
〈m〉K
Encryption under the key K
Message m and its signature
under key K
Creating a CSR. The process is started by the identity proxy which generates
a fresh timestamp TIP and submits it to the proﬁle manager (an applet) on the
SIM card. A new key pair {KU , KR} is generated on card. The public key KU
and the timestamp TIP are concatenated, signed using the SIM card speciﬁc
proﬁle-loading private key KRSC and sent to the identity proxy. If there is a
suitable pseudonym P in the pseudonym pool that can be re-used, the identity
proxy retrieves it from the card. Otherwise, it either asks the user to enter a new
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Identity issuer (II) Identity proxy (IP) SIM card (SC)
1 Generate a timestamp TIP
TIP 
Generate a key pair {KU , KR}
 〈KU,TIP〉KRSC , PLC, [P ]
Construct CertiﬁcationRequestInfo block
CRI 
 〈CRI〉KR
Construct Certiﬁcate Signing Request
 CSR, [P ], PLC
2 User authentication (optional)
Construct CCKU , AC. Generate
KSi1 . . .KSin (optional)
j, CCKU , AC, P , M , V ,
[{KSi1}KU . . . {KSin}KU ]

3 j, CCKU , AC, P , M , V ,
[{KSi1}KU . . . {KSin}KU ]

Decrypt secret keys,
store CCKU , AC, P , M , V ,
KS1 . . .KSn as proﬁle j
Fig. 1. Loading a new proﬁle. Numbers in bold indicate start of the protocol phases.
pseudonym, or leaves the creation of it to the identity vendor. The pseudonym is
placed in the subject name ﬁeld of the CSR. The signature of the newly created
public key is written in the challenge password attribute of the CSR. The identity
proxy constructs the CertiﬁcationRequestInfo block of the CSR and acquires a
signature for it from the card (the newly created private key KR is used for
signing). Finally, the CSR is submitted to the identity vendor, together with the
proﬁle-loading certiﬁcate.
Constructing an identity proﬁle. Having received the CSR, the identity issuer
veriﬁes its signature and also the signature 〈KU, TIP〉KRSC of the submitted pub-
lic key. Then it veriﬁes the proﬁle-loading certiﬁcate. Whenever needed, a normal
user authentication procedure with regard to the presented pseudonym is per-
formed. Namely, the user has to prove her connection to that pseudonym by
either performing a biometric authentication or presenting a PKC issued to that
pseudonym and proving the possession of the corresponding private key. Alter-
natively, the identity vendor can provide a new pseudonym or accept the one
suggested by the user. The identity vendor ﬁnally creates a new public key cer-
tiﬁcate and submits it within its corresponding certiﬁcate chain to the identity
proxy along with proﬁle-speciﬁc identity attributes and/or attribute certiﬁcates.
In addition, the identity vendor can supply a number of secret keys encrypted
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using the user’s public key. If a new pseudonym is created, its description is
attached to it.
Loading the proﬁle. The identity proxy loads the new proﬁle on the card. The
card stores the certiﬁcates and identity attribute information without performing
any checks on them. If a new pseudonym is supplied, it is stored in the identity
pool. Also secret keys are decrypted and stored in the proﬁle.
2.3 Identity Proofs and Digital Signatures
A proﬁle manager (an applet on the SIM card) handles identity veriﬁers’ requests
arriving at it via the identity proxy and chooses suitable proﬁles for creating
answers to them.
In an identity proof request, an identity veriﬁer indicates the type of proﬁle
(j) to be used and a list of codes for authenticated attributes (i1 . . . in) and
non-authenticated attributes (k1 . . . km) to be returned. A timestamp TIV and
the identity veriﬁer’s certiﬁcate chain CCIV are attached to the request. As an
optimisation, the root certiﬁcate can be omitted from the chain, as it is avail-
able on the SIM card. The request is signed using the identity veriﬁer’s private
key KRIV. The identity proxy veriﬁes the public-key certiﬁcate by retrieving
the corresponding root certiﬁcate from the SIM card and performing a normal
certiﬁcate validation procedure of the certiﬁcate chain. Next, it checks the re-
quest freshness, and asks for a conﬁrmation from the user, showing the list of
requested information. The user can either comply with the request or reject
it. If PIN-protected attributes are requested, PIN veriﬁcation is performed. The
identity proof, provided by the SIM card, includes relevant attribute certiﬁcates,
values and masks. To prove the possession of the proﬁle-related private key, the
card signs the combination of two timestamps: the one provided by the identity
veriﬁer and the one generated by the identity proxy.
In proximity scenarios, biometric authentication of the user can be easily
performed. If a biometric identiﬁer is used as the user pseudonym, corresponding
biometric pattern becomes available to the identity veriﬁer, and can be used in
normal biometric authentication. For example, if facial biometrics are used, the
person’s photo can be shown on screen to the identity veriﬁer representative,
who can thereon compare it with the person’s face.
Another type of operation supported by the identity tool is creating a digital
signature of a supplied message. This operation is useful for payments and other
services that require authenticated user agreement with service terms. To re-
quest a digital signature for message G, the identity veriﬁer (or service provider)
submits it to the identity proxy, along with the request for identity-related in-
formation. The identity proxy shows the message on the screen. Having read the
message, the user enters her PIN code if she agrees to sign it. Finally, message
G is appended with a new timestamp and submitted to the SIM card for the
calculation of a signature.
Diﬀerent PIN codes may be used for identity proofs and for digital signatures,
to make sure that the user is fully aware of the fact she is signing a message, and
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Identity veriﬁer (IV) Identity proxy (IP) SIM card (SC)
〈j, i1 . . . in, k1 . . . km, [G],
CCKUIV , TIV〉KRIV

j 
 RCj
Verify request, acquire user’s consent
Generate timestamp TIP
j, i1 . . . in, k1 . . . km, [G], TIV, TIP 
Ask and verify PIN code, if needed

CCKUj , AC
j , P j ,M ji1 . . .M
j
in
,
V jk1 . . . V
j
km
, 〈[G], TIV, TIP〉KRj

CCKUj , AC
j , P j ,M ji1 . . .M
j
in
,
V jk1 . . . V
j
km
, 〈[G], TIV, TIP〉KRj
Fig. 2. Protocol used for acquiring identity proofs and digital signatures
not just providing information on her identity. For digital signatures, a longer
(e.g., 6-digit) PIN code could be used, whereas for identity proofs a standard
4-digit PIN code is suﬃcient. The protocol used for acquiring identity proofs
and digital signatures is outlined in Fig. 2.
Note that requests with regard to several identity proﬁles can be easily com-
bined in one transaction, with only a small modiﬁcation of the protocol. Namely,
the identity veriﬁer sends a number of request tuples, all of which will be shown
on screen. The identity proxy acquires user’s consent and fetches several identity
proofs from the SIM card. All proofs can be sent to the identity veriﬁer in one
bundle.
The issue of trust must be noted here. Normally, identity veriﬁers’ certiﬁcates
are validated against the trusted root certiﬁcate of the identity proﬁle mentioned
in the request. If proofs from several identity proﬁles are requested, the iden-
tity veriﬁer may have to present several certiﬁcates, each chaining up to the
corresponding root certiﬁcate in the identity proﬁle.
2.4 Challenge Responses and One-Time Passwords
A service provider may also request encryption of a challenge with a secret key
included in a proﬁle. Using this functionality, the mobile phone can work as
an authentication token for Internet banking services. Namely, it can emulate
hardware tokens for two-factor authentication used in many network services and
access control systems. Moreover, using proximity communication (e.g., NFC)
electronic keys and other access tokens can be easily implemented.
Normally, the challenge is supplied to the identity proxy by the service provider.
For example, an electronic lock can submit a challenge to the identity proxy using
NFC. However, it is also possible that the identity proxy uses the current time as
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Service provider (SP) Identity proxy (IP) SIM card (SC)
〈j, i, NSP, CCKUIV , TSP〉KRSP 
j 
 RCj
Verify request
j, i,NSP 
Ask and verify PIN code, if needed
 {NSP}KSj
i
 {NSP}KSj
i
Fig. 3. Challenge-response protocol
a challenge. The mobile phone can therefore be used as a secure authentication
token, which shows a new one-time password every minute or half a minute. The
protocol for one-time password generation is illustrated in Fig. 4. Note that the
identity proxy does not necessarily need a connection to the service provider:
the user can choose the proﬁle j and specify the secret key type i himself, and
submit the one-time password using a separate channel (e.g., enter it in a web
browser on a computer). For acceptable usability, the one-time password in this
case must be trimmed to only a few digits.)
Service provider (SP) Identity proxy (IP) SIM card (SC)
j, i 
Generate timestamp TIP
j, i, TIP 
Ask and verify PIN code, if needed
 {TIP}KSj
i
 {TIP}KSj
i
Fig. 4. One-time password generation
3 Infrastructure and Implementation Issues
Connection between the identity provider or veriﬁer and the identity proxy can
be established with either a proximity communication technology (e.g., NFC) or
using a usual GPRS or WLAN connection. Note that NFC facilitates also peer-
to-peer scenarios: for example, to exchange business cards participants can select
their business card proﬁles and touch each other’s phones.
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At places where terminals with NFC are installed, the system can be used for
fast customer identity checks, in loyalty applications and mobile payments. A ter-
minal can also be used for loading proﬁles, if a proﬁle issuer’s private key is avail-
able at it, or if a certiﬁcate signing request can be processed quickly over a network.
An integral part of the certiﬁcate validation is checking whether the certiﬁ-
cate has been revoked. For this, certiﬁcate revocation lists (CRL) or protocols like
OCSP are used. Because for most proximity use cases we do not assume that the
hand-held device is connected to a network, CRL-based revocation checks are by
far the best option. We assume that the device can get connected to a network
(e.g., through GPRS or WLAN) from time to time, so that the identity proxy
can update the CRLs. For on-line use cases, and for identity veriﬁers’ terminals,
OCSP-based checks can be used.
Arguably, usability is one of the most important requirements for a mobile iden-
tity tool. If one has to go through the user interface jungle of a modern mobile
phone for mere identiﬁcation, such system would barely reach a wide audience.
NFC phones that support Contactless Communications API [20] enable applica-
tions to get launched when a certain tag or reader is touched by the phone. This
means that in order to provide information about herself the user has to touchwith
her phone the NFC reader attached to the veriﬁer’s terminal, check the request
shown on the phone screen, and enter the PIN code, if needed.
The identity proxy can be implemented most easily in J2ME, as the API for
application protocol data unit (APDU) messages exchange with the SIM card,
Security and Trust Services (SATSA) [19], is available in many newer phone mod-
els, e.g., those based on Nokia Series 60 platform since 3rd Edition.
No operations with private keys are performed in the identity proxy. Signatures
for identity proofs are generated on the SIM card; newer smart cards with cryp-
tographic coprocessors are capable of computing 1024-bit RSA signatures in less
than 200ms. Operations with public keys are normally faster than operationswith
private keys. Nevertheless, as mobile phones do not normally have optimised cryp-
tographic coprocessors, signature veriﬁcation can take about 800ms [22].We note,
however, that in identity veriﬁcation scenarios the user normally needs a few sec-
onds to study the veriﬁer’s request, and most cryptographic operations (except
signature calculation) can be performed during this time.
Identity proﬁles are securely stored on the SIM card. EEPROM or Flash mem-
ory can be used for storing proﬁle data; currently available high density SIM cards
which provide tens to hundreds of megabytes of non-volatile Flash memory [23]
have plethora of space for proﬁles. At the same time, requirements on random-
access memory (RAM) for the card-side application are moderate: most opera-
tions can be performed within APDU buﬀer only.
4 Discussion
In this section we give an evaluation of our scheme, discuss its beneﬁts and draw-
backs, and provide an overview of security-related issues.
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Identity proﬁles are securely stored on a tamper-resistant SIM card. Most cur-
rently used SIM cards have passed Common Criteria EAL4+ certiﬁcation, thus
providing security equivalent to bank cards. The level of protection provided by
smart cards is suﬃcient for identity documents: many countries issue smart card
based e-IDs. SIM cards has already been used in national mobile PKI infrastruc-
tures in several European countries (e.g., Finland, Slovenia and Turkey). In addi-
tion, the usability of the SIM card is somewhat better than that of built-in security
elements in mobile phones. Indeed, the user can easily move her identities to an-
other device simply by moving the SIM card.
Standardisation of the mobile phone as a payment card terminal is an issue
that has to be investigated if the system is used for mobile payments. In par-
ticular, Europay-Mastercard-Visa (EMV) or similar standards might require the
standardisation of mobile phone keypads for entering payment-related PINs. This
issue can depend on a country where the system is deployed. For example, in Fin-
land at least one bank group accepts national e-ID cards for the authentication of
its customers. Among other uses, such authentication is accepted for conﬁrming
3D Secure credit card payments, where the PIN is entered on a usual computer
keyboard. In other countries more strict standards may be in force.
If the mobile phone is stolen or lost, the user has to inform her MNO, who will
block the SIM card and place the proﬁle-issuing certiﬁcate on the CRL. The oper-
ator can also automatically contact all known identity vendors and inform them
about the blocked certiﬁcate, so that they can black-list identities associated with
this certiﬁcate. Alternatively, the user can contact identity vendors directly and
place her identity proﬁles on corresponding black lists.
The security of communication between the SIM card and the identity proxy is
provided in the followingway. To connect to an applet in the SIM card, the identity
proxy must be digitally signed using the operator domain or a trusted third party
domain certiﬁcate. In the SIM card there is an access control entry with a hash of
this certiﬁcate. The implementation of SATSA on the mobile phone compares this
hash with that of the certiﬁcate used for signing the J2ME applet. This security
mechanism is in place to ensure that the J2ME applet has not been tamperedwith.
Therefore, in order to steal and misuse identity proﬁles stored on the SIM card, an
attacker has to develop a suitable malware, ﬁnd a way to sign it by the operator or
TTP, and install it on the user’s mobile phone. Another option would be to ﬁnd
a serious vulnerability in the implementation of SATSA and exploit it.
An authentication token implemented using a mobile phone has certain bene-
ﬁts over usual security tokens. In particular, it is easier to provide time synchroni-
sation with the service provider, because both the identity proxy and the service
provider’s authentication server can easily synchronise their clocks with theMNO.
In many subscriptions this feature is enabled by default. Using mobile phones re-
moves the need for separate hardware tokens, reducing expenditures on devices
and logistical costs.
It is interesting to compare the security of our system with that of biometric
passports. Earlier versions of passports were vulnerable to several attacks (see an
overview in, e.g., [24]), including remote skimming of passport data due to only
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one-way authentication. In newer passports, a challenge-response mechanism was
introduced for passport reader authentication. However, as the passport chip does
not have a reliable source of time, it cannot reliably check whether the certiﬁcate
presented by the reader is valid. This makes it possible for malicious terminals to
use old expired certiﬁcates for compromised keys in some cases. In our system, the
terminal certiﬁcate is checked by the identity proxy, which has a reliable source of
time. In addition, the user can always see what information is being sent, and to
whom, which increases usability, trust and security.
Electronic tickets with stored value, modiﬁed or rewritten by the terminal in
every transaction cannot be implemented within our system. However, such
schemes can be much easier implemented using NFC phones in the passive mode,
as wireless smart card emulators. Also privacy issues can be reasonably taken into
account [25]. At the same time, our system can be used for tickets valid for a cer-
tain period of time. Moreover, the validation of a ticket can be easily combined
with the veriﬁcation of the person’s eligibility for a concession (e.g., belonging to
a certain social group).
Clearly, the same architecture can be used on any other portable device (e.g.,
PDA), provided that it has a smart card slot, and an API for implementing pro-
grams that exchange APDUs with the smart card. Furthermore, the device must
enable communication with terminals installed at identity veriﬁers’ premises.
From the security viewpoint, it is important to ensure that malware running on
the device cannot access the smart card.
5 Related Work
Due to the personal nature of the mobile phone, it is seen as a suitable medium for
storing personal information and credentials for access to various services. Indeed,
researchers have been active in developing diﬀerent ways for secure key provision-
ing and for storing identity information on the mobile phone.
Because the standard GSM authentication infrastructure is widely deployed, it
is tempting to reuse it in new services. The 3GPP project has developed a frame-
work called Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [26], which enables boot-
strapping credentials from the cellular authentication key and reusing them for
authorising access to other services. The system is easy to deploy, it is based on
open standards, and it can be used in both on-line and proximity scenarios [27].
At the same time, the architecture is not open in the sense that service providers
must sign agreements with the MNO in order to deploy GAA.
If the service provider has an agreement with the MNO, a system proposed in
[28] can also be used. The work shows how a security agent comprised of two com-
ponents, namely a J2MEapplet and a SIM card applet, can be deployed on themo-
bile phone over-the-air. The system is universal and can be used by the MNO for
deployment of arbitrary applications. This is an overkill for identity management,
because if a service provider wishes to only install new credentials on the user’s
mobile phone, the operator must be contacted and a complicated two-phase se-
curity agent deployment procedure run. At the same time, the system can prove
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extremely useful for the installation of mobile identity management applications
(e.g., the one presented in this paper).
The only fully open mobile credentials management system that we are aware
of at the present time and that uses a secure environment for key provisioning
and information storage is OnBoard Credentials platform [10]. In addition to the
installation of credentials, the system can be used for provisioning conﬁdential cre-
dential programs to a device. Sensitive information is stored within the M-Shield
secure environment [9], which is a proprietary solution. In addition, at the time of
writing, M-Shield has not passed a CommonCriteria certiﬁcation, which might be
a problem for deploying bank-issued credentials. For most of applications, how-
ever, the platform is very useful and ﬂexible. At the moment, credentials cannot
be easily moved from a phone to phone, but there are no apparent obstacles for
adding this feature in the future.
The idea of storing identity information and a keyring in the SIM was proposed
in [11]. The architecture is similar to the one presented in this paper, however, the
authors provided only a vague speciﬁcation of protocols used in their system.
6 Conclusions
This paper described an architecture and protocols for a mobile phone based iden-
tity management system. The system is open in the sense that any identity or
service provider can load and request veriﬁcation of identity proﬁles (including
pseudonyms and keys). The identity tool can also be used for payment applica-
tions and customer authentication in online banking and other similar services. In
proximity scenarios, the tool supports biometric authentication of the users. The
architecture is based on currently available handset technology.
We have set strict security requirements for our electronic ID, namely, min-
imisation of data collection (the veriﬁer gets the minimum necessary amount of
personal details), user consent (all actions regarding personal details have to be
approved by the user), authenticity and integrity (all parties are strongly authen-
ticated and data integrity is guaranteed), and easiness of revocation (in case of
compromised credentials, it is easy to revoke those credentials).
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A Terminology
We recall here some of the Pﬁtzmann-Hansen terminology [18] and extend it with
a few other notions regarding a person’s identity.
Biometric. A biometric pattern of a person. Examples of biometric are ﬁnger-
prints, iris scan, DNA; the least intrusive (in modern society) biometrics are
voice and photo image.
Biometric identiﬁer. A cryptographic hash value of a biometric pattern. Pre-
image resistance (both ﬁrst and second) of the hash function is important in
our application.
Pseudonym. An identiﬁer of a person other than one of the person’s real names.
We usemainly biometric identiﬁers in our system, but also other types of iden-
tiﬁers are supported.
Attribute. A quality or characteristic of a person. Attributes are the building
blocks of a person’s identity.Examples are surname, blood group, or employer’s
name. An attribute has a code and a value.
Attribute code. An identiﬁer of an attribute. A system for naming the attribute
codes must be chosen; we use standard X.509 attribute codes [29].
Identity. A subset of attributes of a person which suﬃciently identiﬁes this per-
son within any set of people. Often it characterises only a particular aspect of
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the person, i.e., a role, position or status of the person in a given context. In
this case only the identiﬁability of the role, position or status is needed, and
the identiﬁability of the person is not required. In the text, “identity” refers
to partial identity (see below), unless indicated otherwise.
Complete identity. The union of all attributes of all identities of this person.
Partial identity. A subset of attributes of the complete identity. Individuals use
diﬀerent partial identities in diﬀerent situations.
Identity issuer or identity vendor. An organisation or company determining
and attesting the attributes of an identity. Identity issuers can only issue par-
tial identities (we assume that there are no complete identity issuers).
Identity proﬁle. A partial identity along with certiﬁcates of its integrity and
authenticity, and other partial identity related information, such as keys and
certiﬁcates.
Identity veriﬁer. A party to which a person reveals values of certain attributes
from a partial identity or a number of partial identities, and proves their au-
thenticity and integrity.
Identity management means managing various partial identities of a person,
i.e., administration of identity attributes including the development and choice
of the partial identity and pseudonym to be (re-)used in a speciﬁc context or
role. Naturally, there are three parties in identity management: a person, an
identity issuer, and an identity veriﬁer.
Minimal identity. Minimal set of attributes and pseudonyms required by an
identity veriﬁer to identify a person or to correctly establish the person’s role,
position or status.
Data minimisation. This property means that in the release of personal data
only minimal identities are used; for released data, as much unlinkability as
possible is preserved.
Identity token. A storage device for one or more partial identities, used by a
person to reveal and prove her identity. Examples of identity tokens are usual
identity and loyalty cards.
Identity tool. An interactive device for storing and managing one or more par-
tial identities, used by a person to reveal and prove her identity. Interactivity
means that the selection of the used partial identity is possible.
Privacy-enhancing identity tool. An identity tool that can be used in iden-
tity management with data minimisation. A privacy-enhancing identity tool
(a) informs the person about the set of information requested by the identity
veriﬁer, and (b) allows the person to comply with the request or reject (or
modify) it.
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Abstract. How to distribute resource locators is a fundamental prob-
lem in PKI. Our PKI Resource Query Protocol (PRQP), recently pre-
sented at IETF, provides a standard method to query for PKI resources
locators. However the distribution of locators across PKIs is still an un-
solved problem. In this paper, we propose an extension to PRQP in
order to distribute PRQP messages over a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network.
In this work, we combine PRQP with Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs)
to eﬃciently distribute contents over a dynamic P2P overlay network.
In particular we present the PEACH protocol and a PEACH Enabled
System (PEACHES) which are speciﬁcally targeted toward solving the
PKI resources discovery problem. Our work enhances interoperability
between existing PKIs and allows for easy conﬁguration of applications,
thus augmenting usability of PKI technology.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Public key cryptography has become, in many environments, a fundamental
building block for authentication. Many applications already support the usage
of Public Key Certificates (PKCs)—e.g. browsers, mail user agents, web-based
applications, etc. PKCs can be requested and obtained from diﬀerent Certifi-
cation Authorities (CAs) which may live within a large infrastructure or may
be deployed as isolated entities. However, locating services and data repositories
related to a CA is still an open problem. The lack of a standard way to distribute
resource locators to applications heavily (and negatively) impacts interoperabil-
ity between PKIs and usability of applications.
In order to manage and extend trust among CAs and PKIs, diﬀerent trust
models have been studied and deployed.
Regardless of what the adopted trust model is, achieving interoperability be-
tween deployed infrastructure is very diﬃcult and the management of the au-
thentication infrastructure can be frustrating. One of the main reasons for these
interoperability issues is the diﬃculty in discovering resources related to a Cer-
tiﬁcation Authority.
An example of an interoperability nightmare is certiﬁcate validation. In order
to grant access to its service, an application needs to verify that a certiﬁcate is
still valid by, at the very least, retrieving the revocation information provided
by the issuing CA.
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This information is usually provided by the issuing CA by means of a Certifi-
cate Revocation List (CRL) or by an OCSP server. If no previous conﬁguration
exists at the application level, ﬁnding where the revocation information is avail-
able can be very diﬃcult. As discussed in our earlier work [1], current solutions
are not capable of solving the problem even in controlled environments like Vir-
tual Organizations and Computational Grids.
Motivated by how this lack of resource pointers impacts many usability as-
pects in PKIs, this paper extends the PKI Resource Query Protocol (PRQP) in
a peer-to-peer network in order to provide an eﬃcient Discovery service for PKI
resources—thus enhancing practical interoperability and usability of currently
deployed PKIs.
The core contribution of this work is PEACH, a scalable system for PKI
resources lookup.
2 Background
In order to provide a distributed and interoperable method to provide appli-
cations with pointers to PKI resources, we combine two existing technologies:
the PKI Resource Query Protocol (PRQP) and a distributed hash table routing
protocol, based on a modiﬁed version of Chord [2]. In this section, we provide
the reader with a description of the background knowledge needed to understand
our work.
2.1 The PKI Resource Query Protocol
PRQP is a simple query-response protocol designed to provide applications with
the ability to query an entity for locators of speciﬁc services associated with a
CA. In PKIs, the CA can grant other entities the authority to provide speciﬁc
information to clients. An example of this is OCSP, where the CA delegates
to the OCSP server the authority to provide information about the revocation
status of its certiﬁcates. Similarly, in PRQP the CA identiﬁes an entity to be
authoritative for PRQP answers. The identiﬁed entity is called the Resource
Query Authority (RQA). By querying the RQA, an application can discover the
location (URL) of a service or of a repository associated with a speciﬁc CA.
PRQP identiﬁes two diﬀerent trust model for the RQA. In the ﬁrst model,
the RQA is directly designated by the CA by having the CA issue a certiﬁcate
to the RQA with a speciﬁc value set in the extendedKeyUsage extension.
In the second model, the RQA acts as a PRQP Trusted Authority (PTA) for
a set of users—e.g., users in an enterprise environment. When operating as a
PTA, the RQA may provide responses about multiple CAs, without the need to
have been directly certiﬁed by them. To operate as such, PRQP requires that
a speciﬁc extension, i.e. prqpTrustedAuthority, should be present in RQA’s
certiﬁcate and its value should be set to TRUE.
A full description of the protocol and its details is provided in our RFC [3].
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2.2 Distributed Systems: The Peer-2-Peer Revolution
One open problem in PRQP is how to ﬁnd information about CAs without prior
knowledge of the associated RQA. To solve this problem, we now provide a
distributed discovery system for PKI resources.
However, designing, implementing and debugging a large distributed system
is a notoriously diﬃcult task. Consequently much of the current eﬀort has been
spent on easing the construction of such systems.
The simplest organizational model for distributed systems is the Client/Server
model. This model is well-known, powerful and reliable. In this conﬁguration, the
server is a data source while the client is a data consumer. Simple examples that
make use of this model are Web Services and FTP. The Client/Server model,
however, presents some limitations. For one thing, scalability is hard to achieve.
For another, the model presents a single point of failure. The model also leaves
unused resources at the network edges.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems try to address these limitations by leveraging
collaborations among all the participating parties (peers). Within this paradigm,
all nodes are both clients and server: any node can provide and consume data.
Several characteristics make P2P systems very interesting for data or services
distribution over the Internet. They can implement an eﬃcient use of resources
by equally distributing usage of bandwidth, storage and processing power at
every node. Most importantly, P2P systems are scalable. Napster, Gnutella and
Kazaa are popular examples of ﬁrst-generation P2P applications known to be
eﬃcient in data lookup and distribution. These systems use diﬀerent approaches
to provide a lookup service about the data provided by the participating peers.
Napster implements a centralized search service where a single server keeps track
of the location of the shared contents. On the opposite side is Gnutella; in this
type of network, search is implemented by recursively asking the neighbors for
ﬁles of interest. The search goes on till a Time To Live (TTL) limit is reached.
Other systems like Kazaa or Skype use a hybrid model where super-peers act
as local search hubs. Super-nodes are automatically chosen by the system based
on their capacities in terms of storage, bandwith and availability.
2.3 Distributed Hash Tables
The second generation of P2P overlay networks provide more advanced features:
they are self-organizing, load-balanced and fault tolerant. A major diﬀerence over
an unstructured P2P system is that these second-generation systems also guar-
antee that the number of hops needed to answer a query is predictable. These
systems are based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). DHTs are a distributed
version of a hash table data structure, which stores (key, value) pairs, where the
key is the identiﬁer of the resource while the value can be the ﬁle contents. DHTs
provide an eﬃcient way to look up data and objects in a P2P network. Each
node in the network is assigned a node-id and is responsible for only a subset
of (key, value) pairs. By using the DHT interface, these systems are capable of
ﬁnding a node responsible for a given key and eﬃciently routing the speciﬁc re-
quest (e.g., insert, lookup or delete) to this node. There are several DHT routing
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protocols, often referred to as P2P routing substrates or P2P overlay networks.
Chord [4, 5] implements a concept of a circular address space and provides sim-
ple operations—insert(key, value), lookup(key), update(key, value), join(n), and
leave()—to maintain and update the network routing tables. Pastry [6] imple-
ments a similar interface to Chord; however it considers network locality in order
to minimize hops that the messages travel. CAN [7] is based on a “d-dimensional”
Cartesian coordinate space on a d-torus. In CAN, each node owns a distinct one
in the space and each key hashes to a point in the space. Other examples of
DHTs include Tapestry [8], Kademlia [9], and P-Grid [10].
3 The PEACH Protocol
This section describes our PKI Easy Auto-discovery Collaborative Hash-table
(PEACH) protocol. Our protocol speciﬁes how to ﬁnd the location of a speciﬁc
RQA, how RQAs join the system, and how to update the system in case a node
leaves.
The PEACH protocol is derived from the Chord protocol. Although there are
many similarities with Chord, we designed PEACH in order to leverage unique
features of PRQP to provide support for a P2P overlay network speciﬁcally for
RQAs.
In particular, PEACH diﬀers from the Chord protocol in two main aspects.
First, we implement a completely new method to assign node identiﬁers to peers.
As a consequence, the lookup protocol directly provides the requesting entity
with the address of the authoritative RQA for a requested CA. Moreover, because
of this new idea, PEACH is simpler than Chord in that it does not require any
insert() or get() operations to locate the needed data—that is, to recover the
network addresses of RQAs.
The second change is related to the way nodes join the PEACH network.
In fact, the new join() operation allows only authenticated RQAs to join the
network.
3.1 Overview
Similarly to Chord, PEACH uses a standard hash function to assign node iden-
tiﬁers. Diﬀerently from Chord, we use a PKI-speciﬁc method instead of network
addresses to assign node identiﬁers.
In PEACH, the participating peers are RQAs. We assume that each RQA has
a (cryptographic) key pair that has already being certiﬁed by its CA. Speciﬁc
certiﬁcate contents—that is, the extendedKeyUsage ﬁeld—allow the RQA to
provide responses about resources related to that particular CA.
The basic idea is to leverage the direct link between a CA and its RA by
building the node identiﬁers by using the CA’s certiﬁcate ﬁngerprint1. Since the
CA’s ﬁngerprint is often used as part of a PRQP request, it is a perfect candidate
1 The fingerprint of a certiﬁcate is calculated by computing a cryptographic hash over
the DER- encoded certiﬁcate.
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ExtendedCertInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
certificateHash         OCTET STRING,
subjectKeyHash          OCTET STRING,
subjectKeyIdentifier    [0] KeyIdentifier  OPT,
issuerKeyIdentifier     [1] KeyIdentifier  OPT
}
BasicCertIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber,
subjectNameHash         OCTET STRING,
issuerNameHash          OCTET STRING,
}CertIdentifier ::= SET {
hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
basicCertId     BasicCertIdentifier,
extInfo         [0] ExtendedCertInfo    OPT
}
Fig. 1. PRQP CertiﬁcateIdentiﬁer data structure
for a node identiﬁer. Moreover, this allows a node to provide authentication
information that may be used by the successor node to verify that the joining
RQA is authoritative for a speciﬁc CA.
This method of building node identiﬁers frees us from the requirement of
having to store any value on the participating peers. Therefore, when a peer
joins or leaves the network no data need be moved (or copied) among nodes and
there is no need to implement operations for data storing/retireving to/from
the network (e.g., insert() and get()). This increases the network reliability and
lowers the number and load of operations needed in order to manage join() and
leave() operations.
In order to guarantee that the lookup of nodes takes place within O(logN)
steps, a list of m pointers is maintained at each node. This list of pointers is the
equivalent of the ﬁngers table in Chord and has the same purpose.
3.2 Certificate-Based Node Identifiers
In PEACH, we use a cryptographic hash function to generate node identiﬁers.
In particular, to maintain compatibility with current PRQP speciﬁcation, we
use the same hash function that is implemented in PRQP. The current PRQP
Internet draft uses SHA-1 [11] to provide CAs certiﬁcates identiﬁers. PEACH
does not depend on the hash function itself, therefore it can be easily updated
to future functions, like SHA-256, to build identiﬁers.
Although it is possible to use diﬀerent hash algorithms to build identiﬁers,
is must be noted that the chosen algorithm has to be shared across the whole
PEACH network.
Because PEACH is speciﬁcally designed to be used in conjunction with PRQP,
we leverage some data structures already present in PRQP to build PEACH
node identiﬁers. In particular, PRQP allows a client to request pointers related
to a CA by providing the CertIdentifier within a request. This data struc-
ture allows for several ways to identify the certiﬁcate of the CA of interest.
Figure 1 provides the ASN.1 description of the CertIdentiﬁer data structure.
The BasicCertIdentifier carries the information needed to identify a certiﬁ-
cate: that is, the serial number, the hash of the subject name and the hash of the
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issuer name. The optional ExtendedCertIdentifier ﬁeld bears more detailed
information about the CA’s certiﬁcate. In PRQP, this ﬁeld is optional as the
client could ask for pointers related to a CA without having the possibility to
compute the ﬁngerprint of the CA’s certiﬁcate.
In PEACH, each peer that joins the network is assigned with a node identiﬁer
which corresponds to the hash of its CA’s certiﬁcate. In other words, when an
RQA joins the network, it uses the ﬁngerprint of the certiﬁcate of the CA that
issued the RQA’s certiﬁcate.
In PRQP, an RQA can be issued certiﬁcates from more than one CA. This
enables the RQA to be authoritative for each of those CAs. To accommodate for
this possibility, the RQA is assigned multiple network identiﬁers as described in
Section 3.5.
The hash function generates values of m bits (which for SHA-1 is 160, while for
SHA-256 is 256). Therefore, the node identiﬁers can be seen as laid on an ordered
circular structure modulo 2m. Hence, the possible values for node identiﬁers
range from 0 to 2m − 1.
3.3 The Lookup Operation
The lookup operation in PEACH is derived from the one implemented in Chord.
To limit the number of hops needed to ﬁnd if a node is present on the network,
each node keeps a table of entries where data about nodes present on the network
are stored. This table is called the pointers table. It is important to notice that
PEACH does not need the pointers table in order to function properly. However
the pointers table reduces the complexity of the lookup operation from O(n) to
O(logN).
The number of entries in the pointers table is equal to the number of bits (m)
in the node identiﬁers. If the SHA-1 hash function is used, the pointers table has
m = 160 entries. The contents of each entry in the table is provided in Figure 2.
The table is ordered on the Entry ID ﬁeld. The Entry ID values for node n range
(idn+20) mod 2m (for entry 0) to (idn+2m−1) mod 2m value (for entry i). As
in Chord, the concept behind the pointers table is to divide the PEACH network
space into progressively growing slices.
????????
??????????
??????????????? ???? ?????????
?????????????????
? ? ?????????????? ???? ??????????????
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???????
????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
Fig. 2. i-th entry in the pointers table of node n
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For example, given the node n and the ith entry in its pointers table, be xni
such as:
xni = (idn + 2
i) mod 2m
then the node-identiﬁer space related to this entry is:
γni = [x
n
i , x
n
i+1)
Figure 3 shows two consecutive slices on the PEACH network for node n. To
perform a lookup of a node address, the application would execute a find node().
At ﬁrst, the node n will perform a lookup table (i) operation. This would look at
the local pointers table and return the closest node in the network that is equal
or precedes the node we are searching for. Be node k the closes match. If a perfect
match is not found in the local pointers table, then a find node ex(k, i) operation
is performed which asks node k to perform a find node(i). In other words, the
query recursively traverses the PEACH network and returns: (a) the address of
the matching node (if it exists on the network) or (b) the closest preceeding
match that is present on the network. The pseudocodes for the lookup table()
and find node() operations are reported in Figure 4.
??????
γ ?
?
??????????????? ?
???????????????????? ???
γ ?
?
?????????????????????? ?
Fig. 3. γni and γ
n
i+1 network identiﬁer spaces. The size of the space doubles at each
step.
The lookup function is diﬀerent from the Chord protocol in that it looks for
node identiﬁers, not for a key space assigned to a node.
The lookup function in a Chord-based network is generally used by insert()
or get() operations to retrieve or store content to/from the network. Therefore,
when searching for a particular key, a valid result (i.e., the node identiﬁer that is
responsible for the key space in which the searched key is in) is always returned
on a lookup operation. In fact, the node whose identiﬁer is the next on the Chord
ring is the one responsible for storing all the values related to the speciﬁc key
space.
In PEACH, instead, if no exact match is found on the network, the preceding
closest node (RQA) is returned. When this happens, the lookup operation fails,
meaning that the RQA that is authoritative for the particular CA is not present
on the network.
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function lookup table (id, γ):
for j ⇐ m− 1 downto 0
if ( pointers[ j ].id ∈ γ ) and
( pointers[ j ].id < id )
// We found the closest match on the pointers table
return pointers[ j ]
end if
done
// No suitable pointer found in the table
return ( null )
function find node(id, γ):
if ( id == self.id )
return ( self )
end if
ret ⇐ lookup table ( id, γ )
if ( ret == null )
// Current node is the closest on the network
return ( self )
end if
// Propagate the search with reduced space
γ ⇐ γ - ‖self− ret‖
return ( find node ex ( ret, id, γ ) )
Fig. 4. Pseudocode for ﬁnding a node with the id indentiﬁer. The closest match on
the local table is found by using the lookup table() function. The peer will then ask
closest matching node (ret) to perform a lookup by using the find node ex () function.
All the search operations are constrained on a seach space γ.
3.4 The Join Operation
One of the most important operations in PEACH is join(). In order to be able to
ﬁnd an authoritative RQA, the network has to be made aware of its availability.
Therefore when an RQA wants to provide services to the network via PEACH
it has to join() the network.
In PEACH , each node maintains, at minimum, the information about its
successor and its predecessor on the network. For the network to operate properly,
this information must be up to date. This is achieved via the join() and leave()
operations. When a node joins the network it performs the following operations:
a. connects to the one of the available nodes
b. ﬁnds its successor on the PEACH network
c. informs its predecessor and its successor of its presence on the network
d. (optionally) builds the list of pointers to other nodes
In order to perform step (a.), applications need to be instructed on how to reach
one node that participates in the network. PEACH does not specify how to
provide applications with a list of active nodes to contact at startup. However,
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it is possible to provide a pointer to active nodes by using diﬀerent methods,
e.g. DNS SRV records [12], DHCP extensions [13], or by scanning the local
network for active nodes. Another very popular method is to simply embed a
list of URLs that applications can use and update upon startup (e.g., root DNS
server addresses are usually embedded into DNS server software like Bind [14]).
Currently, in our test environment we use the latter approach. Future plans are
to set up some stable nodes that RQAs can use as “entry points” to the PEACH
network.
To ﬁnd its successor on the network (step b.), the joining RQA performs a
find node ex(). Be n the joining RQA, and k the “entry point”.
The find node ex() function asks node k to perform a lookup. The successor
of node n is found by simply using the find node ex() on node k with idn+1 =
(idn + 1) mod 2m. Be p the returned node. If the returned value is a perfect
match, the successor of node n is found. If the returned value is not a perfect
match, the returned value is the closest preceding node. In this case, to ﬁnd its
successor, the node n contacts ret and asks it for his successor. Ultimately, the
node p will return the ﬁrst entry in its pointers table to node n.
In order to ﬁnd its predecessor on the network (step c.), the node n simply
performs a lookup for node whose id is idn−1. More details on format of the data
packet that are exchanged over the PEACH network is discussed in Section 4.
Now, the joining RQA asks p to be considered as the new predecessor. To
do so, the n node sends to p a PKCS#7 [15] signed object. This object carries
the details about the n’s network address as the data payload. The object type
used for the exchanged message is SignedData. The RQA’s certiﬁcate and the
certiﬁcate of the issuing CA (the one for whom the RQA is authoritative) are
embedded in the certificates ﬁeld.
The receiving node, before updating the details about its predecessor but
after joining the PEACH network, veriﬁes that the RQA’s certiﬁcate is valid
and that it has been issued by the CA for which the RQA will be registered to
be authoritative, In order to do so, it veriﬁes that the signature on the PKCS#7
object is valid and that is has been signed with the private key that corresponds
to the public key present in the RQA’s certiﬁcate. Secondly it veriﬁes that the
RQA’s certiﬁcate is issued by the presented CA’s certiﬁcate (by verifying its
signature against the public key of the CA’s certiﬁcate). As a last step, the
receiving node calculates the CA’s certiﬁcate ﬁngerprint and assigns it as the
identiﬁer for node n as its predecessor. The new id, together with the network
address data, is stored on the receiving node. Diﬀerently from Chord where
only the successor of a node is informed when a new node joins the network, in
PEACH the joining peer pushes its information to its predecessor as well. Also
diﬀerently from Chord, as a result of our join() operation, participating nodes
do not need to execute any update() function to discover new nodes.
Once an RQA joins the PEACH network, it is required to maintain open one
socket to its predecessor and one socket to its successor. This enables nodes to
immediately be aware of a node leaving the network without the need to run
any update() operation.
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3.5 Multiple Joins
PRQP allows a Resource Query Authority to be authoritative for multiple CAs.
To be able to provide PRQP responses for multiple CA, an RQA needs to be
registered with multiple network identiﬁers.
To be assigned multiple node identiﬁers, the joining RQA performs multiple
join() on the network. Let n be the number of certiﬁcate the RQA possesses.
The set of its certiﬁcates (φ) can be expressed as:
φ = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
Let θ be the set of network identiﬁers related to the joining RQA:
θ = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}
where:
∀i ∈ [1, 2, ... , n], ∃xi, yi : xi ∈ φ ∨ yi ∈ θ ⇒ yi = H(xi)
For each xi the peer is authoritative for, the RQA has a diﬀerent network iden-
tiﬁer yi which is based on the CA’s certiﬁcate ﬁngerprint. For each of these
identiﬁers, the joining peers performs find node() to ﬁnd successor in the net-
work ring and proceeds to register itself in the right position.
3.6 Other Operations
In this section we provide some considerations on the eﬃciency of PEACH. We
especially focus our attention on the network maintainance operations.
Leaving the Network. PEACH does not require participating peers to execute
any leave() operation. Because each peer is required to maintain open two TCP
connections toward its successor and its predecessor, when the node leaves the
network, the required TCP connections are dropped. Hence both its predecessor
and its successor would be aware of the leaving operation right away.
Creating the list of pointers. After an RQA has successfully joined the
network, it needs to populate its pointers table. To do so, the joining peer queries
the network for the entries in the pointers table. The algorithm is reported in
Figure 5. Ultimately, the list of pointers is built by performing lookups for each
entry id, that is:
entryid = (idn + 2
i) mod 2m
where the table size is m, and the peer network identiﬁer is idn. The returned
value is stored in the entry only if it is in the space identiﬁed by the ith entry
(γni ). For instance, let the space of identiﬁers be 3 bits, let x be the joining node
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function update table ():
for ( i = 1; i < m; i = i + 1 )
ret = find node ( pointers[i].id )
if ret.id ∈ [pointers[i].id, pointers[i + 1].id)
pointers[i] ⇐ ret
end if
done
Fig. 5. Pseudocode for building the table of pointers
and let 1 be its id. The nodes present in the network have identiﬁers 0, 2, and
3. The last entry in the x pointers table is:
xid = (1 + 23−1) mod 23
= 5
Now, let k be the closest previous match on the network, and let 3 be its network
identiﬁer. The possible results of the performed search are:
res =
{
5 if xid ∃ on the network,
3 if xid  on the network,
Because no node with 5 as its identiﬁer is present on the network, node k is
returned instead. As the result should be stored only if it falls into the ith key
space, the returned value is discarded.
Maintaining the list of pointers. When performing a find node() operation,
it may happen that an entry in the pointers table points to a node that is no
longer available on the network. In this case, if the connection to the entry fails,
the entry is simply removed from the table and the lookup operation is resumed.
Occasionally a node may update its list of pointers in order to leverage the
presence of new nodes in the network.
4 PEACHES Details
In this section we provide considerations about the implementation of the algo-
rithm and an evaluation based on a PEACH simulator.
4.1 Network Communication
While building a PEACH enabled system, we also deﬁned the format of ex-
changed messages over the network. To minimize the impact of the message
format, we opted for a simple binary format.
The PEACH data packets are depicted in Figure 6. The format is consistent
across the diﬀerent commands that nodes exchange. In particular, each data
packet has the following ﬁelds:
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– command code
– packet length
– payload
The packet length is used to identify the lenght of the payload and it is 4 bytes
long (type uint32 t). The command code is 4 bytes long as well and it speciﬁes
the action to be performed on the target node or the return code. The identiﬁed
opt codes and their description are reported in Table 1.
? ??
???????? ????????
???????
????????????
??
???
???
??
???
???
???
??
??
??
??
???
???
???
?
Fig. 6. Basic structure of data packets exchanged on the PEACH network. The payload
depends on the speciﬁc command.
Table 1. PEACH opt codes values and description
Command Name Code Description
CMD ERROR 0x200 + 0 General Error
CMD SUCCESS 0x200 + 1 Cmd Successful
CMD GET NODE INFO 0x500 + 0 Get node information
CMD GET NODE SUCCESSOR 0x500 + 1 Get node successor
CMD GET NODE PREDECESSOR 0x500 + 2 Get node predecessor
CMD UPDATE PREDECESSOR 0x600 + 1 Update predecessor info
CMD UPDATE SUCCESSOR 0x600 + 2 Update successor info
CMD LOOKUP NODE 0x600 + 2 Perform a lookup
4.2 The PEACH Simulator
To analyze the feasibility of building a PEACH system, we developed a simulator
that implements the protocol’s operations. The current version of the simulator
is written in PERL. To implement the cryptographic functionalities, we use a
command-line based tool that is built on top of LibPKI [16]. This tool loads keys
and certiﬁcates and provides the simulator with an easy-to-use PKCS#7 object
generator.
Because the focus of the simulation is to test the feasibility of the PEACH
deployment, we concentrated our attention on the routing of the data in PEACH.
Because our work targets PKIs, we reasonably think (based on our knowledge
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Fig. 7. Lookup times in the PEACH network simulator
of deployed PKIs) that the number of participating RQAs for a PEACH based
system could reasonably set between few hundreds to few thousands of peers. We
have been able to successfully simulate systems with more than 65000 nodes on a
2.4Ghz Core-Duo laptop equipped with 2GB of memory. Moreover we measured
the performance of the lookup operation in PEACH. The results are reported in
Figure 7. We simulated PEACH networks with an increasing number of nodes,
starting from 50 to 65535. As expected, because PEACH makes use of DHTs,
after an initial trend (reported in the small box in Figure 7), the lookup time
grows very slowly with the the number of nodes present in the network. It is to be
noted that our simulator does not take in consideration network-related delays,
therefore in a real deployment lookup times may be sensibly larger because of
communication constrains between nodes.
During our simulations, we also noticed that the overhead introduced by the
need to provide signed messages when joining the network was relatively high.
The main reason for this is that we use an external command-line based tool2 to
generate the signatures. In PEACH, a peer is require to generate two diﬀerent
signatures in order to perform a join(). Therefore it is not surprising that, to
simulate a join() operation, it can take up to a second, although the signing
time per each signature should take only a few milliseconds. A fully C-based
PEACH implementation would not suﬀer from this problem. We envision that
the total time for a join() operation to occur (without considering time spent
on network operations) can be less than 100ms without requiring special cryp-
tographic hardware.
2 openca-sv, available as part of the openca-tools package from https://www.openca.
org
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5 Integrating PEACH and PRQP
In PRQP each client could use one of the conﬁgured RQAs to query for re-
sources related to a CA. When the contacted RQA has no information about
the requested service, the client has no alternative way to discover where to
forward the request to. By integrating PEACH into an RQA server, the RQA
would be enabled to forward the requests into the P2P network and retrieve the
missing information.
The RQA can leverage the PEACH in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst one is to
have the RQA act as a PRQP client. When a request cannot be answered, such
as the case where there is a lack of information about the queried CA, the RQA
searches for the authoritative RQA on PEACH and, if found, issues a request
to the RQA. The returned response is then parsed, and the signature (and the
server data) is substituted before sending the response back to the client. The
problem with this solution is that the original signature on the response is lost,
requiring the client to conﬁgure the RQA as a trusted authority (i.e., the RQA
is allowed to provide responses for diﬀerent CAs without having to be certiﬁed
by them).
The second option is to have the RQA act as a proxy for the client. In this
case, the RQA forwards the requests that it cannot answer to the authoritative
RQA, but only when it is present on the PEACH network. The response is then
forwarded back to the client.
When PRQP and PEACH are integrated, the P2P network maps network
addresses to PKI services similar to the way DNS maps logical names to IP
addresses. The main diﬀerence between the DNS and the RQA network is the
absence of a hierarchical system approach.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In our work, we describe the PEACH algorithm and its application to PKIs.
In particular, the presented approach introduces—for the ﬁrst time—the idea
of providing interoperable and collaborative peer-to-peer-based services in X509
PKIs.
We extend the PRQP protocol, which provides a PKI-speciﬁc protocol for
resource discovery, by providing the starting point for the development of a
PKI Resource Discovery Architecture. Under this novel system, diﬀerent RQAs
cooperate to access data that is not locally available.
In a more general sense, PEACH allows for the building of an authenticated
peer-to-peer network for client-server-based PKI services. Furthermore, our work
can be easily extended to provide other collaborative services. For example, the
proposed PEACH protocol would allow for OCSP or TimeStamping services to
be integrated among diﬀerent CAs and PKIs.
In the future, we plan to investigate the applicability of PEACH to the real
world. In particular, we plan to release an open-source version of the PEACH
enabled server based on the OpenCA-PRQP daemon and to establish collabo-
ration with other authorities to setup a public PEACH network. Overall, this
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new approach tries to enhance interoperability across PKIs and will be actively
promoted within the IETF PKIX working group as a standardized protocol.
Ultimately, we believe that this work will have a signﬁcant impact over the
interoperability and usability of PKIs and that it will open up new X509 PKI
models based on collaborative services.
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